

KNOWLEDGE OF WAR: CARL VON CLAUSEWITZ'S THINKING IN BRAZIL (1990-2019)

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ABSTRACT

Carl von Clausewitz (1780-1831) is recognized as one of the greatest theorists of war in the Western world. This study investigated how his thinking was used in Brazil, from 1990 to 2019. Our hypothesis is that production increased in the period due to the transformation and expansion of Defense apparatus in the country, which encouraged debate on Strategy and consequently led to more studies on Clausewitz. The research was limited to production in the form of articles and book chapters, due to the greater circulation of these means of dissemination in comparison to theses, dissertations or monographs. Platforms such as Scopus, Capes Journal Portal, Google Scholar and academic journal sites were investigated to carry out the research. Results showed where and for what purpose Clausewitz's thinking has been used in Brazil.

Keywords: Military History; Military Sciences; War Theory; Strategy; Clausewitz.

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INTRODUCTION

Since Military History is the branch of the historical field specialized in dealing with the phenomenon of war, conflict, and its consequences for human societies, its connection with the Theory of Strategy and its importance for the understanding of war is evident. Therefore, the impact of the ideas of Prussian general Carl von Clausewitz is relevant in the formulation of strategic plans in many countries (COUTAU-BÉGARIE, 2010, p. 167).

There has been an effort, a movement to build a “new military history” in Brazil, renovating the field so that it finally breaks the state of academic isolation of Military History, especially the dichotomy between military schools and the academy. Although extremely popular with the general public, Military History still faces challenges in its academic integration, as it is often perceived as a patriotism-based history and legitimizing nationalisms, with the exaltation of great captains and a remnant of “battle story.”

Already isolated for being linked to a historical model no longer related to contemporary thinking, this process was deepened by the rise of the French *Annales*³ school and its influence on historiography, as the ideal pursued was that of a *total history*, i.e., something not limited by political and military dimensions (BURKE, 1997). This meant that Military History was seen as factual and ignorant of the connections between the military and society in a broad sense (MOREIRA, 2016: 273).

Such isolation was only overcome by movements within the discipline of History itself, such as the approximation with other fields of knowledge, Sociology, Anthropology and Political Science, and a strong influence of Cultural History. No doubt this served to broaden the horizons of Military History, as military historians would now consider conflicts and their weight in human societies, and how their traits conditioned military institutions and their performance in combat (PARET, 1991).

Through this renovation, a rapprochement between military and civil historians became possible, which opened space for healthy debates ranging from the social composition of military institutions and their

³ The *Annales* school is an important historiographic school of French origin. Founded by Marc Bloch and Lucien Febvre in 1929, it has influenced the education of many historians around the world. For more information see: BURKE, Peter. *The Annales school (1929-1989)*. Unesp, 1997.

relationship with politics to studies on aspects eminently linked to the phenomenon of war, such as combat and studies on Tactics and Strategy, which began to appear as products from this approach, as shown in the pioneer work of André Corvisier (1995), exclusively dedicated to the study of wars in the Modern Age.

Although uncommon, such studies have emerged, overcoming the tendency of civilian historians to deal with the daily life of the barracks to deal with the challenge represented by combat (CASTRO; IZECKSOHN; KRAAY, 2004, p. 28). Thus, we must clearly state: what distinguishes military history, defines its field, characterizes it in relation to its counterparts – although methodological loans and exchanges are necessary –, is the combat, the armed conflict. Military history is, above all, a history of war and peace (MORILLO; PAVKOVIC, 2006, p. 5).

When dealing with a topic of a strategic nature, there is no surprise in this, compared to the field of New Military History. Thus, this study deals with how the reception of the work of the Prussian general Carl von Clausewitz took place in Brazil, mainly from 1990 to 2017. Carl von Clausewitz was born in Burg, Kingdom of Prussia, in 1780. Son of a Prussian army officer, he was born in a family in which most men pursued military careers, thus obtaining titles of the lower nobility, which were nonetheless contested – something that always caused him concern, which only ended in 1827 with the formal recognition of the family title. Titles of nobility were an essential condition for officialdom, which gave the Prussian nobility a different character compared to the European nobility of the Ancien Regime (STOKER, 2014, p. 3-6).

Entering the army at age 12, typical of eighteenth-century Prussia, as a soldier in a regiment his father served in, Clausewitz found himself involved in the wars of the French Revolution. Battlefield experience was crucial to his intellectual development thereafter. Regarded as distinguished, he was invited to study at the newly opened War School in Berlin, the former artillery school transformed in 1810 into the Military Academy, responsible for training the army's officer corps, a break with the previous practices of the Old Regime (STOKER, 2014, p. 24-37).

In 1801, as first place in his class, Clausewitz was able to choose where to serve, opting to stay in the capital, Berlin, being appointed as military tutor to one of the princes of Prussia, thus becoming protected by one of them, Prince Augustus of Prussia, which allowed him access to the halls of the Court, where he would meet his wife. The position gave him

time to study, integrate into the intellectual milieu, obtain contacts and even meet his wife, Countess Marie von Brühl, experiencing a new social dynamic until the 1806 Prussian defeat, in which Napoleon destroyed Prussian pride and left his Army in tatters (STOKER, 2014, p. 38-65).

After a period as a prisoner in France, in which he noted ironically, of his treatment in that country and Napoleon, that “the conquerors are always friendly...” (ROTHFELS, 1920, p. 97), Clausewitz returned to Prussia, which, despite being defeated, kept its army, thanks to Napoleon’s admiration for it and for the deeds of the former Prussian king Frederick II the Great, of whom he was an admirer. Between 1807 and 1812, Clausewitz was involved in a major reform of the Prussian army that was only ended with the Prussian king’s decision to support Napoleon in the invasion of Russia. For Clausewitz, it was not worth serving what he called “the god of war,” and he, like many Prussian soldiers, went to Russia to serve in the Russian army against the French (STOKER, 2014, p. 81-105).

The Russian campaign marked a series of campaigns in which he would take part, first as a Russian officer and then returning to Prussian service in 1813, hence Napoleon’s two defeats in 1814 and 1815 in the Waterloo campaign. Clausewitz was promoted to general at the end of 1818 and took over the War Academy in Berlin, which formed the General Staff of the Prussian Army (STOKER, 2014, p. 145-253). Until 1830, he had time to return to his intellectual production, refining and changing several of his previous writings, and dedicating himself to writing “*On War*” which, despite that time, remained unfinished, given his departure for the Prussian border with Poland as part of an observation force, where he died of cholera in 1831.

His wife, Marie, organized his writings and published the first edition of “*On War*” in 1832 (STOKER, 2014: 254-281).

On the influence of Clausewitz, we consider the works of Paret (2015) and Strachan (2008) to be sufficient for an adequate presentation of the Prussian general and military thinker. The repercussion of his work in the world can be measured through Gray (2006), Herberg-Rothe and Strachan (2007) and Freedman (2013), in which one may observe how the international reception of Clausewitz’s thinking took place.

The research period (1997-2019) was selected to understand this reception, as there was a transformation in the Defense apparatus both in Brazil and in the international context. In the international context, the end of the Cold War (1945-1991) changed the dynamics with which

civil and military state agents faced the security and defense agendas, expanding interest in the area as relations between international entities changed (BUZAN; HANSEN, 2012).

Nationally, between the last decade of the 20th century and the initial decade of the 21st century, the area of Defense has had a series of important changes both in the national political-strategic dimension, and in the search for the creation of a dialogue with society, part of which is done through the teaching in military schools. From a political point of view, during the Fernando Henrique Cardoso government, in 1999, the Ministry of Defense was created and the Military Ministries (ALSINA, 2003) were terminated, causing a change in their *status* in the Republic.

The publication of national documents related to the field of Defense such as the “National Defense Policy,” the “National Defense Strategy” and the “White Paper on National Defense,” which began in the “FHC Era” and had the latest versions of the documents sent to Congress in December 2018 (BRAZIL. Chamber of Deputies, 2018), marked an important step in opening a civil-military dialogue on defense matters. The documents underwent revisions and were published in 2020 in the form of the “New National Defense Policy and Strategy” (BRASIL, 2020).

In the meantime, there is the strengthening of bridges of contact between Universities, the so-called academy, and the Armed Forces through commissions, establishment of forums, seminars and symposia, in addition to funding aimed at stimulating the development of research and graduate programs focused on the defense theme, as was the case with the Pró-Defesa and Pró-Estratégia public notices. The Formation of the Brazilian Association for Defense Studies (ABED) demonstrated there was an important group of researchers involved in studying military matters and researching with the military. There was also the formation of graduate programs in federal and state universities and in Armed Forces High Studies schools; the most prominent among these are the Graduate Program in Military Sciences at the Army Command and General Staff School (PPGCM/ECEME) (NUNES, 2012); the Air Force University Aerospace Science Program (PPGCM/UNIFA); and the Naval War College Program in Maritime Studies (PPGEM/EGN). One must also point out that these programs are concentrated in area 39 of CAPES - Political Science and International Relations, which in the last decade has seen the growth of programs related to Defense (CAPES, 2019), with the emergence of a subcommittee of “Military and Defense Studies”.

Such opening in the academic field, with reflections on various issues such as civil-military relations, Military History, Strategic Studies, the Defense Industrial Base/IDB, Regional Defense, among other themes, made it possible for different audiences to come into contact with the works by Clausewitz.

Such movements stimulated and encouraged studies on the aforementioned fields of knowledge, mainly Strategy, and consequently on Clausewitz's work. Thus, we understand such a cutout as the most relevant period and in which one can measure, through a bibliographical review, how the approach of Clausewitzian thought was carried out in Brazil. The search was carried out in digital databases (*Scopus*, *Web of Science*, *Capes Journal Portal*, *Google Scholar* and *journals* available on the web), expanding the scope of the search to also contain physical sources, thus constituting a elements of stimulus for future work with specific support.

Internationally, during the period, there were discussions about Clausewitzian work and its validity given the end of the Cold War and a supposed increase in the number of irregular wars, in which a State militarily confronts a non-state actor, which would automatically, according to some authors, already circumscribe any analysis outside of a so-called Clausewitzian paradigm (SMITH, 2005).

Several authors invested in such an interpretive line, and built theses on how such a change in the nature of War would have occurred, such as Martin Van Creveld (1991), Edward Luttwak (2009), John Keegan (1997) and Mary Kaldor (1999). Although they are not Brazilian authors, it is important to mention them, as they influenced the debate this study intends to map. Bassford (1994) has a work that studies the reception of Clausewitz in England and North America, especially in the United States of America.

As studies show the reception of Clausewitzian thought in these countries, this encourages reflection on how this process occurred in Brazil, since the country is influenced by various Western powers in their military and political-strategic thinking. It is only natural that, despite distortions or misinterpretations, Clausewitz's thinking would emerge and influence Brazilian military personnel, researchers and professors. Thus, the question that guides this study is: how was Clausewitz's thinking received in Brazil in recent years? In the wake of such reflection, this essay seeks to survey reception in Brazil, realizing how it is treated. For some authors, Clausewitzian thought is something positive and necessary for

the conduct of war today; for others, such thinking is already outdated, even old-fashioned, and its adoption can still lead to strategic failures. Mapping where these actors are and what are their contributions is a first step in this direction.

The sections that divide this article are intended to present and weave some considerations about how Clausewitz's works arrived in Brazil, and how this generated a local intellectual production, with contributions from researchers, professors, and soldiers and how it served for a Brazilian debate, powered by Military History and Strategy.

THE RECEPTION OF CLAUSEWITZ'S THINKING IN BRAZIL, 1990-2019

Clausewitz's work is vast, although during the first few years after his death it was hardly accessible due to the German language in which it was produced. His books and correspondence reveal a sophisticated military thinker who was able to establish a reflection that survived him. Such works gained popularity after the Prussian victory over France in 1870-71 and were soon translated into several languages, especially French and English, as interest in Clausewitzian thought grew (STRACHAN, 2008).

Clausewitz had few Brazilian editions, to the extent that time allowed the mapping, and both editions are translations of an American edition translated from German in the 1960s, made by Anatol Rapaport (CLAUSEWITZ, 1979; 1996; 2010). There is no translation into Portuguese of the most established editions in English or even French, much less directly from German. In Portuguese, we will find, in addition to *On War*, his study of the 1812 Campaign in Russia (1994) and a compilation of his work, which brings together fragments of *On War* (1988).

This, in our view, leads to a certain direction in the observation of Clausewitzian work, as more than one translation would allow an interesting debate on the nuances of the work, even more considering its unfinished character (STRACHAN, 2008). There are still citations to a Portuguese edition, made by Editora Europa-América (CLAUSEWITZ, 1986).

One can even see that, by analyzing the references of doctoral theses and master's dissertations that work with or cite Clausewitzian thought, they end up working with foreign language versions of "On

War," especially the translation into English by Michael Howard and Peter Paret (1984).

Such information is based on research in the twenty-four theses and dissertations found in a search on Clausewitz in the "Bank of Theses and Dissertations of the Coordination for the Improvement of Higher Education Personnel" (CAPES -<https://www.capes.gov.br/>). We have noticed in this research that production is relatively recent, with works between 2002 and 2016. However, for reasons of delimitation, this study will not deal with the theses and dissertations that were found. Despite this, it is noteworthy that the works permeate different fields of knowledge, such as Law, History, International Relations, Political Science, Production Engineering, Urban Planning, Clinical Psychology, Philosophy and Sociology, showing a diversified scope of reception of Clausewitzian thought in the Brazilian academic community.

The study focus on making a brief analysis of the production of articles is based on the belief that they allow for a more dynamic debate on this topic and are the main vehicle for academic dissemination. Throughout the text, one will see that part of the articles found are products of their authors' theses, but already exposed to a peer review process carried out by academic journals.

AN ANALYSIS ON THE ARTICLES

Differently from the multiple fields of knowledge covered by theses and dissertations, in the articles there is a concentration around Political Science, International Relations, and History.

The search on the SciELO portal for production prior to 2002 obtained as the oldest result a publication from 1994. The CAPES journal portal does not reveal all the articles dealing with Clausewitz in Brazil, possibly for indexing reasons, in which they were published. Although not desirable, the cited articles were found by searching Google's academic portal. Three articles cited on the Scopus Platform were also observed, but all published by Brazilians in English-language journals.

The first article that appears in the period determined by the work is by Oliveiros S. Ferreira (1994), where the author seeks to make a presentation and reflection on the issue of politics in Clausewitzian work, with strong influence from the work of Raymond Aron (1986a; 1986b),

clearly demonstrating that it was possible to consider in politics the issues that Clausewitz had identified that would govern the phenomenon of war.

There are few articles produced in the 1990s that, in our view, have a relationship with the processes of transformation of national Defense and Security structures. There is an increase in the number of articles, such as theses and dissertations, in the 2000s.

Another article still in the 1990s is that of Júlio Silva (1998), published in the *Revista da Escola Superior de Guerra*. This is the first reflection made by a military man, and it will be the only one for some time to come. The work basically deals with the actuality of Clausewitzian thought through a historical trajectory of the 20th century, with a focus on the Cold War. The text is influenced by Aron (1986a; 1986b), similar to the article by Ferreira (1994).

The 2000s see greater interest in Clausewitz, possibly in parallel with studies in the area of Defense and Security, gaining strong momentum, with a steady pace of production of articles dealing with his thinking, written by both civilians and military personnel. In 2003, there are two articles by Carlos Silva (2003a; 2003b) in which considerations are made in the light of Clausewitzian theory, regarding the phenomena of terrorism (SILVA, 2003a) and about the logic of the use of Armed Forces in combating urban crime (SILVA, 2003b). In 2005, Silva published another article, dealing with the issue of modern warfare and the aesthetics of postmodernism to consider how the phenomenon of war takes place through a sociological analysis with a Marxist basis. It concludes about the totalizing complexity of the event, making use of Clausewitzian theory (SILVA, 2005).

Also in 2005, we have the first publication in a foreign academic journal (*The Journal of Strategic Studies*) by Domício Proença Júnior and Érico Duarte (2005). The authors launch the proposal: the elaboration of a concept of Logistics based on the work of Clausewitz, opening a front different from the consecrated one, which is influenced by the work of Antoine-Henri de Jomini (2008). The authors review the literature on Military Logistics, placing it as insufficient and incapable of meeting research demands, as well as paying attention to the importance and regulatory capacity that logistics has on military operations and, therefore, on war itself (PROENÇA JUNIOR; DUARTE, 2005).

2006 witnesses the resurgence of reflections made by the military in articles such as those by Alves (2006) and Neto (2006). The first makes

considerations regarding the consolidation of the Ministry of Defense, which emerged in 1999, and whether the process would be completed or not, based on an assumption linked to the Clausewitzian war theory (ALVES, 2006). The second conducts a study using the theory of war to analyze the relationship between the Brazilian Army and the National Guard and how this had an impact on the defense of the Brazilian Empire, when the two institutions were involved in international conflicts (NETO, 2006).

In the field of Marxist-based reflections, Martins Filho highlights the lack of studies on how the Clausewitzian war theory was developed by Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels. Especially in Engels, strongly marked by his readings of Clausewitz, the weight of Clausewitzian war theory in the construction of the Marxist revolutionary paradigm is great (MARTINS FILHO, 2006), a point quite unknown by Brazilian scholars.

There is another contribution by Proença Júnior and Duarte (2007) that uses Clausewitz's theory of war as a basis for reflection for thinking in National Defense, through the centrality occupied by Strategic Studies, reporting important questions at the end, such as the loss of importance of Strategy as a vital discipline in the decision-making process; or even within the Academy, given the observation of new paradigms that would end up attacking the character of the discipline rather than actually contributing to a real debate about its evolution (PROENÇA JUNIOR; DUARTE, 2007).

Neiva Filho (2009), a military author, deals with the concept of Effects-Based Operations, seeking to demonstrate the viability of the adoption by the Brazilian Army of the concept then used by the United States of America (USA) and by the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), recalling the weight of the Clausewitzian concept of Center of Gravity for operations (NEIVA FILHO, 2009).

The decade beginning in 2010 is witnessing an increase in the production, following the trend already started in the 2000s, in which there is a profusion of articles written by civilians and military, including co-authorship between civilians and military, dynamic linked to the growth and expansion of the Defense area, both due to the institutional effort of the Armed Forces as academically, with the growth in the number of researchers in the area.

In 2010, there are three works, starting with Rosas Duarte (2010), which deals with the link between Clausewitz's theory of war and how war takes place in the air, and the use of force by air, within the scope

of the discussion of theories of International Relations in light of the relevance of Strategic Studies as a way to facilitate understanding (ROSAS DUARTE, 2010).

In turn, Almeida (2010) uses Clausewitz to reflect on the vulnerabilities and weaknesses of the National Defense Strategy (END) of 2008, which he outlines as prosaic and incapable of meeting the Brazilian interest, as well as proposing elements that, in his view, the END should have in order to correspond to the objectives declared by it (ALMEIDA, 2010).

Closing the year, Diniz (2010) questions John Keegan's (1996) critique of Clausewitz and argues that his theory of war has "scientific validity", while demonstrating the contradictions in Keegan's interpretation of the phenomenon of war, based on Clausewitzian presupposition as a basic element for Strategic Studies (DINIZ, 2010).

The use of Clausewitz to establish a critical reading of institutions and documents related to the area of Defense is also made by Rodinei Silva (2011), who uses the theory of war to verify whether the phenomenon of war is subordinated to Politics (SILVA, 2011).

The year 2012 maintains the rhythm of Clausewitzian production and reception, being another year with an interesting production for the studies of Military History, with three articles. Ramos (2012) analyzes the issue of national mobilization, both in terms of men for the Armed Forces and material to wage war, through a trajectory of historical cases, illuminating the thinkers who inspired such processes, such as Sun Tzu, Machiavelli and Clausewitz, in addition to military leaders present in the cases mentioned (RAMOS, 2012).

In the Marxist field, Passos (2012) indicates the influence of Clausewitz on Lenin, demonstrating the intellectual kinship between the two, and how the vision of the revolutionary leader was greatly inspired by the theses of the Prussian general. Lenin, after diving into Clausewitzian theory, comes to regard the link between war and politics as indissoluble, and hence indicates that revolution is also a form of war. For the revolutionary leader, war and revolution are the highest manifestations of politics, of which they are part (PASSOS, 2012).

Mendes (2012) criticizes the postulates of two theorists of "democratic peace", Oneal and Russett, in International Relations, using Clausewitzian theory of war to demonstrate the weaknesses of such a corollary, disregarding Clausewitz's point of war as a phenomenon fully

political, in favor of establishing a critique of realism, which proves to be a failure for not capturing the nature of the war phenomenon (MENDES, 2012).

In 2013, we found four articles. Ferezin (2013) analyzes the production of Brazilian military personnel about Clausewitz in the magazine "A Defesa Nacional" and finds a biased reading, in which the thinker is more cited than actually read, being also approached through the logic of Kaldor (1999) and Crevelde (1991), in a real contradiction to Clausewitzian theory (FEREZIN, 2013), and revealing a very common academic vice: indirect reception and refusal to read the classics.

Lemos and Santos (2013) analyze the conflicts of the Brazilian Empire, seeking to mediate such understanding in the light of Clausewitz, demonstrating how the country, faced with the challenge of war, spared no effort to impose its will on its enemy, having sought to preserve their own State (LEMOS; SANTOS, 2013).

Serrano criticizes the "Fourth Generation" thesis of war, pointing out the validity of Clausewitzian theses on the phenomenon of war and the scope of the theory of war, demonstrating the weaknesses and disadvantages of the option for trying to classify war "in generations," which, according to the author, goes against its very nature (SERRANO, 2013).

Closing the year 2013, Duarte analyzes the increase in US troops in Iraq in 2007, in the movement called "*The Surge*", in a change in strategy, correcting the errors of political-military coordination in the invasion and subsequent occupation of 2003, with results that are difficult to assess.⁴ This represented a change in the strategy that governed the actions with new actors, attitudes and official documentation, with the production of manuals and the adoption of operational concepts that dialogued with the desired strategic direction. Despite this, the mitigated success – Baghdad never became a "safe" city, let alone Iraq – from the "*Surge*" was more due to interpersonal relationships between generals and political leaders than

⁴ In the context of the Iraq War "*The Surge*" corresponds to the increase of American troops in Baghdad and in the province of Al-Anbar ordered by President Bush in 2007 in the order of 20 thousand men, according to recommendations of the commission formed by the think tank of the American Enterprise Institute, Iraq Study Group and acted upon by Vice President Dick Cheney and Condoleeza Rice. KILCULLEN, David. **The Accidental Guerrilla: Fighting Small Wars in the Midst of the Big One**. Oxford, University Press, 2009, p 179.

to the effective functioning to which the US aspired through this change (DUARTE, 2013).

The following year, 2014, witnesses the maintenance of the production levels of articles related to Clausewitz. The first article of that year is by Pimentel and Neto (2014), a collaboration between a military and a civilian author, developing the argument that possible flaws in the “Fourth Generation” concept of warfare can be corrected by applying limited theory of Clausewitzian war, which, in the authors’ view, would also not be sufficient to explain the phenomenon of war and its changes in the late 20th and early 21st century (PIMENTEL; NETO, 2014).

In the Marxist field, Passos (2014a) deals with how Gramscian thinking about war evolved from Marxist readings of Clausewitz. Hence, Gramsci articulates the idea of the phenomenon of warfare as a broad manifestation, which can encompass both the confrontation between States and violence as a metaphor for politics, within the logic of class struggle, a central element of Marxist thought (PASSOS, 2014a).

The relationship between Machiavelli, Clausewitz and politics in war is dealt with in another article by Passos (2014b), in which it is possible to perceive a dialogue established by the Prussian general with the work of the Florentine thinker, in his writings on war and politics – by the way, the key to Clausewitz’s reception made by Antonio Gramsci – through a break with medieval political thought, and it can be said that, without Machiavelli, there would be no opening for Clausewitzian thought, and the point in which it resides the “moral” difficulty of accepting it by John Keegan (PASSOS, 2014b).

Another article this year is by Rezende and Ávila (2014), which provides an overview of the issue of innovation in war and how this, through new technologies, techniques and procedures, would have caused changes in the phenomenon of warfare. In the text, the concept of war is defined based on Clausewitzian theory (REZENDE; ÁVILA, 2014).

In the set of such works, a highlight should be made to the article by Diniz and Proença Júnior (2014), published in *“The Journal of Strategic Studies”*, in which a different order of reading of “On War” is proposed, so to suppress inconsistencies the work has for being unfinished. The authors argue that, based on this reading order, one can approach the final and more developed stages of Clausewitzian thought, with the purpose of suppressing controversies and abuses in the interpretation of their writings (DINIZ; PROENÇA JUNIOR, 2014).

In the world of military production about Clausewitz, Neiva Filho (2014) highlights the application of Complexity and Chaos Theories in military operations and in the organization of the Armed Forces, verifying how these theories are linked in the evolution of the Art of War, through the concept of “chaosplexity”. Disagreeing with the authors who advocate such ideas, Neiva Filho defends and identifies elements of these theories already present in Clausewitz, especially in the concepts of “friction,” “chance” and “interaction.” Still highlighting the very notion of Clausewitzian Paradoxal Trinity, it fits into “chaosplexity,” which shows the permanence and relevance of Clausewitz (NEIVA FILHO, 2014).

Cecílio (2014) sees how Raymond Aron interpreted Clausewitz's thought, with Montesquieu's influences on both. Through this, it is clear that Aron's interpretation evolved with the passage of time, so that his first observations on Clausewitz differ from the sophistication of observations made in a second moment in Aron's life, due to the changes in the conditions of the Cold War and the role played by France in this global conflict (CECÍLIO, 2014).

Closing the year, Mendes (2014) proposes an analytical distinction about the phenomena of regular war, guerrilla warfare and terrorism through the Clausewitzian war theory. In an articulation in which the objective is the same: the imposition of the will of one contender over another, differences in the organization and capacity of forces will indicate the path that the antagonists will choose and through which they will use force (MENDES, 2014).

The year of 2015 is prolific, with several works. The first, by Passos (2015), deals with the construction of hegemony in international relations from a Gramscian perspective in which, for this process to occur, war is a necessary step, and it can only be perceived through a perspective that brings together views of Clausewitz and Gramsci for proper understanding (PASSOS, 2015).

Matos (2015) reviews classic authors of strategic thinking, indicating that Clausewitz's Trinity has links with the dynamics of the economy, as this would regulate the relationships that would imply in public spending on military operations and the Forces. Armed (MATOS, 2015).

Morais (2015) uses Clausewitzian theory to analyze the 1941 German campaign against the Soviet Union during World War II. Through Clausewitz's postulates, the Germans made a series of mistakes

that resulted in their failure to conquer the Soviet capital, Moscow. Failure would lead to a war of attrition that would eventually destroy Nazi Germany (MORAIS, 2015).

Paula (2015), in the scope of military production, in the sense of analyzing the phenomenon of terrorism from the perspective of Clausewitzian theory of war, noting that authors who defend an obsolescence of Clausewitz would be wrong, since the “Trinity” of this is not only it applies to the understanding of the functioning of terrorist and insurgent groups, as well as its objectives are circumscribed in the political dimension that war has in Clausewitzian thought, that of the imposition of wills (PAULA, 2015).

Diniz and Proença Júnior (2015) draw a picture of the dissociation between the realities of Strategic Studies and International Law through the collapse of the material foundations that regulated the coercive capacities of States, which will force, in the authors’ view, a reorganization of International Law, in which only actors with greater capacity to use force will have a voice, if this dissociation is not the target of deep and sustained reflection (DINIZ; PROENÇA JUNIOR, 2015).

Duarte (2015) makes an operation to rescue the concept of limited wars, starting from Clausewitzian theory and the readings that Corbett made about it. Evaluating recent conflicts, the author seeks to demonstrate the relevance of Clausewitz (DUARTE, 2015).

There is also a production by Duarte with Mendes (2015) with a proposal to launch a scientific-methodological approach to Strategic Studies, in order to observe the phenomenon of war through a Clausewitzian research program, drawing on its war theory (DUARTE; MENDES, 2015).

The year 2016 brings new contributions to the study. Palácios Júnior (2016) analyzes Florestan Fernandes’ theses on war and how it occurs, identifying points of contact and divergences between him and Clausewitz, and from there it aims to extract reflections for the debate on the idea of “new wars” in International Relations (PALACIOS JUNIOR, 2016).

Antunes (2016) makes a Marxist critique of Keegan’s (1996) thesis, who attacks Clausewitz, since, in his view, this attack did not stop with the Prussian general, but also reached Lenin, revolutionary leader and admirer of the ideas of Clausewitz, adopting them in his revolutionary paradigm. The author contests Keegan’s thesis, denying the primacy

of culture as the reason for war, using the Clausewitzian paradigm to understand the phenomena of revolution and warfare from a Leninist perspective (ANTUNES, 2016).

Magalhães (2016), another military researcher, analyzes the work of Beaufre (1998), observing the concepts of Strategy developed by him and seeking to identify Clausewitzian influences in the text, as well as Liddell Hart's oppositions to the work of the Prussian general, to whom he attributed the responsibility for the carnage of the First World War (MAGALHÃES, 2016).

Coutinho and Gomes (2016) revisit Clausewitz to think about the relevance of his concepts after the September 11, 2001, attacks on the Twin Towers in the US. They observe the elements of the "Clausewitzian Trinity" and question, with support from authors such as Mary Kaldor, its validity in explaining the war today. They admit the permanence of thought in views like Colin Gray and other authors; ending by endorsing the current importance of Clausewitz for thinking about war (COUTINHO; GOMES, 2016).

Judice and Jones (2016) use Clausewitz to reflect on issues of polarity in global geostrategy, as in the case of the South China Sea, and for those involving Brazil in the South Atlantic, as in the case of pre-salt in the coast of the country. Using their own translations, they infer what they consider important to emphasize, that Brazil is attentive to the alliances of interests that are built to avoid falling into a difficult position (JUDICE; JONES, 2016).

Ferezin (2016) introduces a healthy debate by demonstrating, based on a public debate, which took place through the press, how Clausewitz was read and appropriated by Brazilian Army soldiers between the years of 1889 and 1918, and how the reception of his thought was intrusive in the great intellectual clash of the time: which model of Land Force the Brazilian Army should follow, with officers divided among those sympathetic to France, which inspired the different Brazilian republican traditions, or to Germany, with a model characterized by discipline and efficiency. In this clash, the figure of Clausewitz was sometimes perceived as an amoral war technician, sometimes as a relevant thinker to be considered (FEREZIN, 2016).

In 2017, we came across the article by Romeu Daros, which makes a comparison between two theorists of military strategy (Clausewitz and Sun Tzu) and two theorists of government strategy (Machiavelli and Carlos

Matus), justifying the intellectual importance of both in the elaboration of military and government strategic planning today (DAROS, 2017).

An interesting text is that of Liziero (2017), who seeks to identify the concept of war in Clausewitz, from scattered passages in the work to the best known part, which is the Trinity. Having done this, he relates war to the law of national states; postulating on how war is an element of guaranteeing sovereignty and a right of states *jus ad bellum*, but even during conflict, the permanence of rules exists *jus in bellum* (LIZIERO, 2017).

Sochaczewski (2017) draws observations on Operational Science and Art to demonstrate the possibilities that an operations commander can have when using Operational Design. In this, Clausewitz is one of the main thinkers who open space for such reflection, as the Prussian general placed war in the domain of art, since it is characterized by uncertainty (SOCHACZEWSKI, 2017).

Macedo (2018) reflects on the issue of war and its relationship with Law. Not being something exogenous to society and international politics, it would also not be alien to the legal regulation, and thus, we resort to Clausewitz to understand that, instead of being the last resort in the hands of politicians, the use of force was naturalized in international political practice, so that Clausewitz's two concepts of war serve to understand this process (MACEDO, 2018).

Another text from 2018, *The concept of Friction: from Clausewitz to the present time* (TAVARES; RAMOS; FRANCHI, 2018), which appears as a chapter of a work that proposed to bring together different studies focused on Military Sciences. In the text, the authors address the concept of friction elaborated by Clausewitz, dividing it into categories and analyzing the permanence, or not, of these categories in contemporary authors.

Rodrigues (2018) points out possible contributions of the thought of Clausewitz for society at various scales, from global to national. By observing the work of the Prussian general and how it was received, it can be said that changes in the perception of what war is, as well as in the preparation of Armies, in the defense planning of countries, as well as the subordination of force to political power (RODRIGUES, 2018).

In 2019, there is a new round of interest in Clausewitz, as seen in the article by Luiz (2019), who intends to evaluate strategy as a philosophical concept through the vision of Michel Foucault. Observing the contributions to Western strategic thinking, such as those made by

Liddell Hart and Beaufre in front of Clausewitz and how this is perceived by Foucault (LUIZ, 2019).

Vainfas and Barreiros (2019), looking for references in a recent field of History, the so-called *Big History*, reflect on, in their view, an inappropriate dichotomy about war: would it be cultural or political? In this debate, in which the political vision of war is inspired by Clausewitz and the cultural one through the lens of John Keegan, it is about the figure of the “warrior culture” and how it permeates society, in relation to political power, demonstrating that this dichotomy it would not be real (VAINFAS; BARREIROS, 2019).

Finally, Teixeira Junior (2019) conducts a study on the possibilities of war in the future, and how it can be influenced by different scientific-technological advances, such as biotechnology, robotic automation and intelligence can change the way war is fought, but not its nature, identified by Clausewitz, being the continuation of the policy by other means (TEIXEIRA JUNIOR, 2019).

Table 01 – Distribution of articles by journal reference areas*.

Área de Estudo	Quantidade e Período de publicação (quantidade e ano)		
	1990-1999	2000-2009	2010-2019
Ciência Política	1 (1994)	1 (2006)	7 (2010, 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014, 2016)
Relações Internacionais	-	-	3 (2010, 2012, 2014)
Sociologia	-	2 (2003, 2006)	4 (2014, 2015, 2016)
Estudos Estratégicos	-	2 (2005, 2007)	10 (2010, 2013, 2014, 2015, 2016, 2018)
Filosofia	-	-	1 (2019)
Ciências Militares/Defesa	1 (1998)	3 (2006, 2009)	9 (2013, 2014, 2015, 2016, 2017, 2018, 2019)
Letras	-	-	1 (2017)
História e História Militar	-	-	4 (2012, 2013, 2015, 2019)
Direito	-	-	2 (2017, 2018)
Total	2	8	41

*We considered areas of studies announced in the focus and scope of journals or their classification according to Qualis-Capes 2016.

Source: Prepared by the authors based on the bibliography presented throughout the text.

CONCLUSIONS

CLAUSEWITZ AND THE INFLUENCE OF HIS WORK ON BRAZILIAN MILITARY THOUGHT

When investigating part of the Brazilian academic production (articles) in the period between 1990 and 2019, the results provided us with evidence of the use of Clausewitz's works as a reference for Brazilian authors.

As already mentioned, the increase in academic spaces for reflection on Defense stimulated discussions in the field of Strategy that involved military and civilians, and the works of Clausewitz became object of many different discussions echoing foreign influence and presenting debates considering Brazilian realities and perspectives.

Such an increase would not be possible without an expansion of the historical field and, mainly, the new breath of the New Military History. Such movement is based on Clausewitzian thought itself, for whom History was not a repository of ideas, but a space for the exercise of testing their theses, a means of establishing a reflection on military events, drawing on historical experience for the formulation of a thought that is both military and strategic (SUMIDA, 2001).

Considering that Clausewitz had as purpose of his theory the education of those who dealt with the phenomenon of warfare, such as military personnel, and, why not, of civilians, especially those who might hold political positions and public functions related to war – let us remember that he actively participated of the reform of the Prussian State after the defeat by Napoleon – recourse to History and the New Military History are essential for the construction of military thinking in a critical way, as aspirated by Clausewitz (ROGERS, 2002).

Thus, the reflection on Clausewitz's thinking would not take place other than resorting to Military History, especially in its new facet, as, with breadth and depth, without giving up the relationship with other fields of knowledge, such as Sociology, Anthropology and Political Science. Among others, it brings valuable contributions to demonstrate the possible breadth of the New Military History, bringing together interdisciplinarity alongside the specific knowledge typical of historians who work with conflict, conflict and its specificities, demonstrating a wide range of possibilities in this field (PARET, 2009).

In fact, we observed the prevalence of articles in journals in the areas of Strategic Studies, Military Science/Defense and Political Science and International Relations – and the sub-area of Defense Studies, as it is institutionalized in Capes today –, which coincides with the area of *Strictu Senso* programs of the Schools of Higher Military Studies (EGN, ECEME, UNIFA) and other graduate programs that have lines of research related to Strategic Studies/Defense, as already pointed out by the CAPES area document. This points out that Clausewitz has had the attention of professors, students, and graduates of programs linked to the area of Political Science and International Relations, especially those connected with Defense Studies (CAPES, 2019).

It is possible that there are articles within the chronological clipping that have not been covered here, due to the non-indexing of journals in CAPES or even SciELO databases, and a large part was found using the academic portal of *Google Scholar*, or in some cases on the simple *Google* portal. In this case, the alert is for better integration, in order to facilitate future work and research, not only on this topic, but on others and, in advance, excuses to researchers not covered in the current study.

Finally, verifying the production from 2010, one can affirm, regardless of positive or negative approaches, that Clausewitz's thinking will still have influence for some time, as the debates about his work are not closed and, in general, in the observed universe, they consider him in a positive way, without which a strategic debate would not be possible, which is vital for the elaboration of reflections on national military thought.

Clausewitz's contribution and his relationship with History, especially Military History, can be summarized by a quote from Isaiah Berlin (2013): "Where more than twenty interpretations hold the field, the addition of one more cannot be deemed an impertinence." (BERLIN, 2013, p. 99). Although these words are at the heart of an essay on Machiavelli, they are suitable for both Clausewitz and the New Military History.

OS SABERES DA GUERRA: O PENSAMENTO DE CARL VON CLAUSEWITZ NO BRASIL (1990-2019)

RESUMO

Carl von Clausewitz (1780-1831) é reconhecidamente um dos maiores teóricos da guerra no mundo ocidental. Este trabalho investigou como seus conhecimentos têm sido utilizados no Brasil, entre 1990 e 2019. A hipótese é que a produção no período se ampliou na medida em que ocorreu uma transformação e expansão do aparato de Defesa no país, o que impulsionou o debate em Estratégia e conseqüentemente mais obras relacionadas a Clausewitz. A pesquisa foi limitada à produção em forma de artigos e capítulos de livros, devido a maior circulação desses meios de divulgação do que teses, dissertações ou monografias. Para realizar a pesquisa foram investigadas plataformas com Scopus, Portal de Periódicos Capes, Google Scholar e sites de revistas acadêmicas. Os resultados mostraram onde e com qual finalidade Clausewitz tem sido trabalhado no Brasil.

Palavras-chave: História Militar; Ciências Militares; Teoria da Guerra; Estratégia; Clausewitz.

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