

RAGING SEAS, NECESSARY PATHS: AN OVERVIEW OF SINO-INDIAN ENERGY GEOPOLITICS

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ABSTRACT

This article proposes a geopolitical analysis about energy security in China and India military dimension. The study will focus on energy cooperation and integration projects in which Beijing and New Delhi articulate with supplier countries in the nearby region. Then, It will be analysed the risks posed in selected cases, regarding energy sector infrastructure protection and the transportation of fuels through maritime routes and straits. It is concluded that instead of imposing competition as a geographical determination, geopolitical challenges in energy security presents a horizon in which Sino-Indian cooperation emerges as mandatory for the security of the two Asian powers.

Keywords: Geopolitics. Energy Security. China and India.

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1. INTRODUCTION

In a country or region energy security presents itself as a political, economic, social, environmental issue and, in certain cases, as an issue involving military issues (cf. PAIVA, 2016, 2015).

Given to the multiple possibilities, the present work intends to analyze how challenges to ensure energy sources security in China and India structure a delicate geopolitical chessboard, in which cooperation and strategic competition are balanced.

Despite the traditional approaches based upon economy and trade, energy security can be approached according to the “logic of war”, which is characterized by the “[...] argument that energy is a security issue because it is both the cause as an instrument of war or conflict” (CIUTĂ, 2010, p. 129).

This logic is closely related to the military dimension of energy security, and it should be noted that this strategy has different biases that must be differentiated precisely.

On the one hand, energy can be considered as means used by States in their disputes - *energy weapon* - in order to influence other actors to perform according to their interests⁴. On the other hand, energy can be conceived as a primary or secondary element in causing interstate or intrastate conflicts - *cause of conflicts*. Energy as a primary condition of war is related to the struggle for possession, access or control of resources, being an accessory element concerned to absence of energy when resources generate in socioeconomic or political conditions lead to conflict, for example.

A third strand from which energy can be approached in an articulated way with security is among variables linked to these resources in index compositions that measure and compare national capacities of countries. This bias understands energy not as a *weapon* or as a *cause of war*, but as a constituent element of States national power - *national capability*⁵.

The different approaches presented here can serve as a guiding element to analyze the military dimension of energy security in China and India. The understanding of different ways in which energy security affects countries international and national security will be delved here in the light of geopolitics.

⁴ Morse & Richard (2002) explore this perspective from the perspective of relations between the United States and Saudi Arabia.

⁵ Among the most famous, we highlight the Composite Index of National Capability (CINC) from the Correlates of War project, available at: <<http://www.correlatesofwar.org/data-sets/national-material-capabilities>>. Accessed on 30th August. 2017.

On the one hand, we will approach the continental aspect, whose emphasis will be on the strategic interaction among proposed cases, primarily in the context of Central Asia. On the other hand, on the maritime side, the focus will be on the context of its projections in the Pacific and Indian oceans.

This article aims to present a panorama and the main debates connected with energy, security and geopolitics as a useful unifying thread for understanding the complexity of the strategic scenario in which China and India operate today. In this sense, the dialectic between cooperation and competition in India illustrates the role that energy plays with security in the Asia strategic chessboard.

To attend the proposed objectives, the text put forward three more sections in addition to the introduction. In the next section, the geopolitics of China's energy security is analyzed, first on the continental side and then on the maritime side. In the next section, the geopolitics concerning energy security in India is analyzed, both from the continental and maritime aspects. Ultimately, a final section presents some conclusions that can demonstrate similarities and differences in a comparative perspective that relates China and India to the issue addressed.

2. THE GEOPOLITICS OF CHINESE ENERGY SECURITY

2.1. THE CONTINENTAL ASPECT

As Liao (2006, p. 6) warns, China's involvement in Central Asia was not only driven by energy security, but also as a mean to increase the security of its western border. These are some of the various reasons rendered by the Chinese government to the interest in the region (cf. BLANK, 2017).

In this sense, the 1990s represented for China a time of new military threats to its energy security. This scenario stems especially from problems related to its western borders, such as the intensification of the Uyghur separatist movement in the Xinjiang region and the instability in Afghanistan.

In the first case, China decided to increase the number of border posts and control over trade routes, with the support of Central Asian countries, in order to maintain local stability to not undermine Chinese energy interests in the area. Regarding Afghanistan, the Chinese government has decided to transfer military-technical equipment and

resources to neighboring countries, besides promoting joint military exercises, especially with Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan. This was all carried out based on the Shanghai Convention on Combating Terrorism, Separatism and⁶ Extremism, on June 15, 2001 (POP, 2010).

China's energy diplomacy for the region has managed to establish a strong position in the past decade, making Central Asia one of the most dynamic locations for Chinese oil companies operating abroad. It is worth mentioning that China's energy security concept, at the turn of the 21st century, should rather be seen in terms of economic threats and market solutions, than military threats and diplomatic responses for that purpose (cf. TROMBETTA, 2018; DAOJIONG, 2005).

However, this does not mean that Chinese energy security is not deeply involved in military or defensive issues, both demanding assertive positions by the Chinese government in the face of threats. Even before announcing the project *"One Road, One Belt"*, in September 2013, Central Asia was already configured as an essential area for Chinese geopolitics.

As shown in Figure 1, China has a natural route in Central Asia to meet its demands for oil and gas, in order to diversify its energy import routes from the sea and increase the security of energy supply and other essential resources for its economy and society.

Figure 1: "One Road, one Belt"



Source: Chellaney (2017).

⁶ Among the various Chinese initiatives to increase its security and presence in Central Asia, we highlight the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), which includes China, Russia, Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan. Recently, India and Pakistan have been elevated to full membership. See *"India and Pakistan become members of the Shanghai Organization"*, available at: <http://www.jornal.ceiri.com.br/india-e-paquistao-se-tornam-membros-da-organizacao-para-cooperacao-de-shanghai/>, access: 30 aug.2017.

At the turn of the 19th century China had expanded its presence in Central Asia through cooperation and energy integration projects with several border countries, including the construction of a pipeline with Kazakhstan in July 2009, and the opening of a gas pipeline in partnership with Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan, in December 2009.

Firstly, the strategic outline of Chinese action is shown in the choice of a territory rich in oil reserves in Kazakhstan, which would justify the investment in more than 3,000 kilometers in oil pipelines capable to flow values exceeding 10 million tons of oil crude oil to China annually. In the second case, the investment made jointly with Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan would allow China to acquire a maximum capacity of 40 billion cubic meters of natural gas per year.

In order to obtain energy resources from Russia, China also invested in assets in eastern Siberia, following an agreement signed in 2009. China joined the project called *Eastern Siberia – Pacific Ocean Pipeline* (ESPO), which predicts the construction of an oil pipeline from Eastern Siberia to the Pacific Ocean crossing through Chinese territory. The agreement also predicts that Russia will supply 30 million tons of oil per year to China during a period of 20 years; by his turn the Chinese government has pledged to lend about 25 billion dollars to the Russian government.

Central Asia is a region in which the great world powers have invested a lot of time, money and effort, channeling relevant measures in diplomatic and military terms in order to gain control over one of the largest energy reserve and transit zones in the world. The main importers of oil and gas, such as the USA, Europe, China and India are paying attention to the countries of Central Asia, always under the watchful eyes of Russia.

In relation to the latter, China has so far been able to avoid conflicts over energy assets, which was mainly due to three factors: (1) the mitigation of tensions in the region due to the multivectorial foreign policy conducted by leaders of Central Asia; (2) The maintenance of a convergent relationship with Russia, related to the common interest in maintaining the broader “strategic partnership” between the two countries; (3) The cyclical favoring caused by the 2008 global economic crisis, which contributed to reduce the intensive competition between Russia and China in the energy sector in that region (DU, 2011).

In United States’ case, general opinions converged with the words of Downs (2000, p. 44), when stating that:

Of particular interest to Chinese analysts is that no state (or groups of states) is powerful enough to balance with the United States. They consider China to be especially vulnerable to American power in a world in which the United States is the only superpower.

As shown in Figure 2, besides being the main military power in the world, United States has a significant presence in Asia. In addition to the balancing obstacles imposed to the United States in the systemic-global field, US participation in Asian arenas (especially in Northeast Asia) affects Chinese strategic options due to the Sino-Asian connection with the balance of power between the USA and China at the global level.

Figure 2: United States military personnel in East Asia



Source: CSIS (2014a).

As we can see, Central Asia emerges as an important option to guarantee both Chinese national security on its continental borders, but also as an alternative to diversification of energy suppliers.

Despite all the difficulties and constraints encountered in the maritime side, it is noted that strategic calculation carried out by China in Central Asia continental energy issues also includes threats such as international terrorism, religious extremism and drug trafficking.


As a result, initiatives such as the Shanghai Cooperation Organization and the growing rapprochement between Beijing and Moscow reveal possibilities for the geopolitical redesign of Central Asia after more than a decade marked by the Afghan War (2001), as well as its negative externalities in the field of regional security.

2.2. THE MARITIME SIDE

Considering that the continental aspect has emerged in recent decades specially in Central Asia as a strategic horizon for Chinese energy security, the maritime aspect presents itself as a possibly more audacious and sensitive challenge. Among the main conflicting potential regions for Chinese interests specially remains the maritime area of South China Sea.

The dilemmas surrounding the South China Sea involve multiple actors, given to the fact this area is contested by China, Vietnam, Malaysia, Indonesia, Brunei and the Philippines. In relation to China, the Chinese government has troubled relationship with Vietnam and the Philippines and this an example of this tension (COURMONT, LASSERRE, MOTTET, 2017; BUSZYNSKI, 2012).

In the case of China's relationship with Vietnam, it should be kept in mind that the latter is the largest oil producer in the area, whose exploration is in charge of the state oil company called PetroVietnam. The possibility of dispute between the two countries remains in the Chinese government's insistence on exploring new oil fields in the region, and in the Chinese opposition to Vietnamese attempts to enter into exploration agreements with international oil companies around the southern China Sea strip. Similarly, the case of the clashes with the Philippines is linked to Chinese attempts to exercise greater control in the aforementioned maritime region, entail reciprocal accusation that both countries are invading their own territorial waters, as illustrated in Figure 3.

Figure 3: Conflicting claims in the South China Sea


Source: Kalman (2016).

What makes conflicts in the South China Sea particularly delicate is the control of the region's primary maritime communication routes that cross the Straits of Malacca, which provide access to oil resources that are derived from oil in the Middle East.

It is worth mentioning that this dispute is a cause for concern and disagreement with the United States, which in reaffirming its interest in Asia-Pacific, does so by strengthening security relations with the countries that compete with China in the aforementioned maritime zone. In addition, the US government have stated that any attempt to declare the area as a sovereign territory (China is the only likely claimant) would be considered a violation of the principle of freedom of the seas and it would be considered an unacceptable attitude (cf. US-CHINA ECONOMIC AND SECURITY REVIEW COMMISSION, 2016; COLE, 2008).

As shown in Figure 4, in addition to the American challenge, India also appears as a possible contender, which may have an impact on the conformation of the military dimension of Chinese energy security (SILVA, TEIXEIRA JÚNIOR, 2016). The Chinese projection for regions such as the eastern part of Africa, the Middle East and Central Asia, has in the Indian presence a fundamental factor for its geopolitical and energy security strategy, which goes through its maritime expressions in the oceanic communication lines, straits and routes.

Figure 4: India maritime interests



Source: Ward (2017).

Historical competitors, the reasons that lead China and India to divergences are diverse and complex (SILVA, TEIXEIRA JÚNIOR, 2016), ranging from the dispute for greater regional influence to the support position that China gave Pakistan in land disputes border:

In geopolitics, the power structure in Sino-Indian relations includes many complex factors, such as the political-military status of Tibet, Nepal, Burma and Bangladesh; capacity and guidance regarding Pakistan; the Indian Ocean political and military regime; the political-military status of the southern hillside of the eastern Himalayan region, among others. These factors created a mutual security dilemma in Sino-Indian relations. With the increasing need for oil from the Middle East, the economic and strategic value of the Indian Ocean is increasing for the countries of Asia-Pacific. Undeniably, the main concern that animates Chinese interests in the Indian Ocean is the safety of maritime communication lines for energy supply, which is also considered a concern to Indian maritime safety (HUANG, 2009, p. 221).

Despite the historic competition between Beijing and New Delhi, both countries participate in significant regional cooperative initiatives, coordinating policies and positions in instances as BRICS and SCO. In addition to the balance of power, the Chinese are concerned with other

non-traditional security agendas, such as piracy and terrorism. These threats in the Straits of Malacca have encouraged dialogues with countries such as Indonesia, Malaysia and Singapore, regarding cooperation to maintain security on that naval passage.

Based on the possibilities to interpret energy in the geopolitical strategies of the states presented in the introduction, the assessment of the geopolitical panorama of Chinese energy security, based on what has been exposed so far, leads us to infer that its security perspective on energy encompasses an understanding about energy predominantly interpreted as *national capability*.

3. THE GEOPOLITICS OF INDIAN ENERGY SECURITY

3.1. THE CONTINENTAL ASPECT

The immediate strategic environment and Central Asia are central to India's energy security and geopolitics, as well as to China. Nonetheless, India has made less progress with regard to the development of international cooperation in regard to the regional energy integration, when compared to China

What is concrete today is a small-scale cooperation to supply electricity from hydroelectric plants settled in Bhutan and Nepal, and some negotiations and agreements signed with the intention to build gas pipelines in the region, in order to meet the great demand for gas in the Indian market. Armed conflicts and other military security problems are among the major hindrances to the development of energy integration projects intended by India in its region.

There are some integration projects of great relevance and complexity in which India is involved. Since 2008 India officially integrates the gas pipeline project between Turkmenistan, Afghanistan and Pakistan, also known as the Trans-Afghan Pipeline (TAP - Trans-Afghan Pipeline, and TAPI with the inclusion of India). It would depart from the Dauletabad gas field in Turkmenistan and reach Indian soil after covering approximately 1700 km, with the capacity to transport around 27 billion cubic meters a year.

Besides, since 1994 Iran, Pakistan and India are under discussion about the construction of a pipeline with an estimated capacity to transport 55 billion cubic meters per year, with approximately 2,800 km in length,

starting from Iran, passing through Pakistan and finally arriving in India. Although it is already under construction and is expected to be completed in the coming years, the gas pipeline extension to Indian territory still remains uncertain.

However, it is worth noting that none of the projects “got out the ground” due to instability in the countries of the region and other reasons, all of them often or potentially related with intrastate and interstate conflicts. More specifically, there is a lot of uncertainty about the ability of India and Pakistan to maintain energy cooperation in harmonious terms, given to the history of coexistence marked by distrust and armed conflicts between the two nations.

The construction of the gas pipeline is the most economically advantageous solution, but one must reflect how reliable and possible it is to have access to a strategic energy resource in partnership with a neighboring country with which it has little friendly relationship (KANWAL, 2007). The possibility that Pakistan would increase national revenue and profit socioeconomically from the pipeline, says the aforementioned author, would not be considered a sufficient guarantee to rule out the possibility of unilateral measures being taken against the Indian government due to contradicted interests. Energy would thus become both means at the disposal of the Pakistani government to constrain the Indian government to act according to its designs (*energy weapon*), rendering a possible direct or indirect cause of armed conflict (*cause of conflicts*) between the two states.

The political approach between India and Iran has energy security as a relevant factor. There would be at least three reasons that encourage this rapprochement: (1) the fact that the United States has a strong influence and has privileged relations with the Arab countries of the Persian Gulf, turning out to be difficult for the Indian government to find space and options for choice in the region; (2) due to the political problems existing between Iran and the United States, the former tends to offer favorable conditions to India in the energy field; (3) the gain in the rapprochement is reciprocal, as the Iranian government needs investment from Indian companies that operate in the energy sector and the Indian government would have an abundant source of energy in the future (SISAKHT, MAHMOUDI, 2012).


However, the narrowing of India's relations with Iran may also pose some problems for the former government, including the security energy area involving military issues. The United States does not welcome

the rapprochement between India and Iran and, even though energy cooperation is focused on social development and economic prosperity, the American perspective is meant to conceive energy as a strategic weapon and a component that can be decisive in a conflicting environment (cf. ASHWARYA, 2017; VERMA, 2008).

Consequently, the United States could support, even militarily, other countries competing for space with India (Pakistan and China), and may even increase instability in the regional conflicting situations, thus dissuading the Indian government from distancing itself from Iran - some European countries could act in the same direction. On the other side, the constant threat of armed confrontation between Israel and Iran, and the problems arising from Iran's insistence on developing a nuclear bomb, may represent a high risk factor not only in terms of energy security for India, but is also a temerity from a political and economic point of view.

2.2. THE MARITIME ASPECT

The Indian Ocean is the theatre of operations par excellence of the Indian Navy, a place marked by bottlenecks, islands and naval bases, and a space with which the strategists of that country must occupy themselves, including the energetic interests that run along these paths. Among the strategic challenges faced by India and its maritime expression are the bottlenecks of this region, namely: the passages that involve the Straits of Malacca, Lombok, Sunda, Ormuz and Bab el-Mandeb, in which the main international energy transport routes pass through (cf. GUPTA, 2017; HOLMES, 2011).

Figure 5: Routes and Sea Straits in Asia

Source: CSIS (2014b).

The Indian Maritime Doctrine clearly states that the country is


[...] in a position to significantly influence the movement / safety of navigation along the maritime communication lines of the Indian Ocean region as long as we have the maritime power to do so. The control of bottlenecks can be useful as a bargaining chip in the international power game, where the currency of military power remains a harsh reality (INDIA, 2004, p. 64).

For India it is essential to exert more influence on Asian sea routes in order to ensure adequate levels of energy security and, in this sense, livelihood and development. However, the maritime space for India's natural projection also constitutes the fundamental horizon for Chinese expansion by sea. Figure 6 contributes to understand how the maritime projections of China and India collide in the geography of the Indian Ocean.

Similar to the aspirations for more qualified international insertion of China, according to Singh (2011, p. 18) the Indian objectives are broad and involve political, economic and military interests, which are not restricted to the regional scenario, but also worldwide:

India sought to increase its strategic influence on maritime and energy routes that play a key and strategic role passing through the Indian Ocean, Arabian Sea, Gulf of Bengal and the Straits of Malacca. Its role and importance in energy supply chain would lead to a concomitant increase in India's influence on the world stage, especially the energy security that is currently a key factor in global politics. India also hopes to use its influence to prevent any interruption in the supply of energy and raw materials that are sorely needed to boost its economy, in order to combat potential rivalries against India's energy projects, gain support from its immediate neighborhood, and give India leverage in the midst of global economic development and, by his turn, increase Indian political, economic and strategic influence.

Figure 6: China and the Indian Ocean



Source: CSIS (2014c).

India's main source of oil and gas has been and appears to continue to be in the Persian Gulf for long-time and, thereby, the maritime routes used to receive external energy resources that help to spell out military dimension of India energetic security.

With regard to non-traditional security dynamics, it is noteworthy that the problems related to piracy and incidents of violence in the waters of the Persian Gulf have crossed the Straits of Malacca, thus becoming one of the most dangerous maritime routes (KANWAL, 2007). Another

complicating factor is the active presence of Al Qaeda and other terrorist groups in the waters of that region. On the other side, signs of conflict in the Persian Gulf persist because Iran seeks to develop its nuclear capacity, resulting in legitimate fears of a blockade in the Strait of Hormuz due to a war in the region (PUNTAMBEKAR, 2008).

In addition to these factors one can mention another related to a study produced by the *India Energy Congress - IEC* (2013) entitled "Securing tomorrow's energy today: Policy & Regulations", which makes an important relationship between Indian energy security and protests widespread and civil wars that broke out between 2010 and 2011 in the Middle East and North Africa, in countries as Egypt, Libya, Yemen, Iraq, Algeria, Syria - an event that became known as the "Arab Spring". Based on this study, intrastate conflicts would have had repercussions on the world oil market, either by the decrease in production and the interruption of supply or the increase in prices charged in international trade.

In this particular situation, energy was the indirect *cause of conflicts*, because some of these manifestations, as in the case of Egypt, "[...] were a consequence of the fall in oil production, exhaustion of the surplus exportable, which led to a lack of funds for food and fuel subsidies and consequently to dissatisfaction and unrest" (IEC, 2013, p. 24). The Arab Spring events have a direct impact on India's energy security, given that there is a high dependency on the producer lying in the Middle East and North Africa, representing about 60% of the oil importations (IEC, 2013).

India's offshore oil installations are considered to be quite unprotected, with the majority of it belonging to large state-owned companies, such as Oil India Limited (OIL) and Oil and Natural Gas Corporation (ONGC), both of them spreading well beyond the area of responsibility of your Coast Guard. The *offshore* energy infrastructure is considered vulnerable to several types of threats, since small vessels that can hit oil platforms or support structures, to divers capable of securing explosive loads through an underwater approach (KANWAL, 2007).

Because nearly 89 percent of India's oil imports are undertaken by sea, it is imperative that this area is safe for Indian companies. The need for security is reinforced when one considers that most of the imported oil originates in West Asia, and that regional routes pass through areas under the influence of Pakistan, India's opponent in the region. Past events evidence that energy supply in this region has been jeopardized

by different facts, most of the time by political reasons and not because market reasons (GOSH, 2004).

The panorama exposed on Indian energy security, therefore, requires actions to manage threats:

Therefore, energy security must be part of India's strategic thinking and military planning. India needs to ensure maritime communication lines, a critical issue for the energy sector managed by state and non-state actors. A capable Navy, good relations and regional agreements (for patrolling and joint exercises) with all nations that participate in the Indian Ocean region would help India to keep its maritime communication lines secure. In addition, India also needs to increase the capacity of its strategic oil reserves (KUMAR, 2012, p. 15).

The oceanic region that involves India's interests is crossed by oil pipelines, embedded by platforms, handling facilities and scattered by export terminals settled in oil and gas fields.

In this environment, the governments of the region are faced with the circulation of oil and gas every day, which also means that they are always situated in a scenario in which they can be potential targets for individuals intended to cause damage to the mentioned energy infrastructure. Therefore, the challenge is huge and inevitable requires constant reflection on new and old problems.

CONCLUSION

From the above it seems evidently demonstrated that the military dimension is a active factor in the debates on energy security for China and India. In addition, it is possible to make some considerations in order to highlight peculiarities related to the issues analyzed, such as similarities and differences that characterize the reality of those countries on the subject analysed.

Firstly, it can be noted that the problems involving military issues in terms of energy security are almost always related to other issues, involving political, geopolitical, economic and social problems, ranging from instabilities resulting from the lack of socioeconomic development to investments in the re-equipping of the armed forces, the latter needed to preserve the countries' energy sovereignty.

Secondly, threats that harm China's and India's energy security in the defense field appear to be both potential and real. In this perspective, the cases listed in this article present situations that may result in intrastate or interstate conflict, not always related to the maintenance of a continuous and adequate supply of energy, but that could somehow have an impact on the energy security of those countries.

In any case, the instability in these scenarios could interfere directly or indirectly in shaping national policies for the armed forces in order to guarantee energy security.

Thirdly, and related to the previous paragraph, China and India have in energy security an important opportunity *window* to investment in the armed forces, whether in the Army, Navy or Air Force. This reality has been proven along the two aspects analyzed throughout this article, emphasizing the defense of maritime communication lines as fundamental means for accessing energy sources from external producers or from national *offshore* sources.

Despite the contingent changes brought about by China and India efforts to guarantee energy security, their dynamics of competition and cooperation cannot be understood without looking closely at the deep and long-lasting trends. Articulating geography, politics and history, Geopolitics proved to be useful to stress how time and space shape the international politics of these ancient powers.

The outlines and lines of Asian geography, in the continental and maritime strands, still present fundamental challenges for the realization of their national interests. In this way, whether in Central Asia immediate strategic environment, or in the Pacific or Indian environment, the awareness of space lectures strategic reflection when faced with the constraints of reality.

Finally, it is necessary to stress that the main point of this article is to point out some issues involving the military dimension of energy security in China and India under a geopolitical focus, without the intention of carrying out a definitive interpretation of the geostrategic board in focus, but offer a starting point for further debate on the subject.

MARES REVOLTOS, CAMINHOS NECESSÁRIOS: UM PANORAMA DA GEOPOLÍTICA ENERGÉTICA SINO-INDIANA

RESUMO

O presente artigo apresenta uma análise geopolítica sobre a dimensão militar da segurança energética de China e Índia. O estudo em tela terá como objeto os projetos de cooperação e integração energética que Pequim e Nova Deli articulam em seu entorno regional com países fornecedores. Em seguida, serão analisadas as ameaças que se apresentam aos casos selecionados quanto à proteção da infraestrutura do setor energético e o transporte de combustíveis por meio de rotas marítimas e estreitos. Conclui-se que os desafios geopolíticos ligados à segurança energética, ao invés de impor a competição como determinação geográfica, apresenta um horizonte no qual a cooperação sino-indiana emerge como necessária para a segurança de ambas as potências asiáticas.

Palavras-chave: Geopolítica. Segurança Energética. China e Índia.

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