

COOPERATIVE SECURITY STRATEGY IN THE SOUTH ATLANTIC: UNITED STATES INTERNAL DETERMINANTS AND REGION RESSIGNIFICATION

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ABSTRACT

This paper discusses the importance of the South Atlantic to the cooperative security strategy of the United States of America. This analysis consider some internal determinants of the US Foreign and Security Policies, the importance of the sea for their strategy and a brief discussion of the actions taken by the United States Department of Defense in the region. The central role of the sea for the American Grand Strategy endorse the need for understanding the importance of the oceans, and consequently the South Atlantic. It was verified the importance of the sea for the consolidation of the American position in the world, and the South Atlantic as

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important strategic region to the United States. This importance is highlighted by the search for collaborative security initiatives to stabilizing the West African coast and combating offenses of low intensity as piracy, seeking to contain new threats and tackle non-state actors, recognizes multilateral institutions, such ZPCAS, and strategic partners, such Brazil.

Keywords: Maritime Security. South Atlantic. Cooperative Security. United States of America. Grand Strategy.

INTRODUCTION

This paper aims to discuss the importance of the South Atlantic to the United States of America, from the analysis of the conduct of cooperative security policies in the region through its internal determinants and the region resignification. To conduct this analysis, the text begins by contextualizing some elements of United States' foreign and security policies, the importance of the sea for the conduct of these policies and a brief contextualization of the South Atlantic.

The paper begins with a brief discussion of some important theoretical concepts for understanding the US posture in the conduct of its foreign and security policy, resorting to the debate of US domestic politics on its position in its international relations. Then, briefly discusses the importance of the "use of the sea" for US foreign policy, contextualizes the South Atlantic as a strategic region, discussing their geographical boundaries, economic aspects and multilateral organizations. Finally discusses some North American cooperative security programs for the South Atlantic and the apparent increasing importance of the region in line with the new strategic positioning in the post 9/11 in order to stabilize the region and combating transnational crimes.

ELEMENTS OF THE U.S.' FOREIGN AND SECURITY POLICIES

Grand strategy is the highest level of planning at the modern National States level orchestrating - in the short-term, in war and peace - the ends, ways and means in the context of a possible armed conflict

State's own survival. More than that "is the theory of how to pursue national security and ensure a way of life by the combination of power and interests" (PORTER, 2013, p. 5). In this sense, Porter adds that grand strategy is "managing a chain of relationships between ends and means at various levels, an elusive effort to unite different objects. Then, strategy is different from both policy (the desired goal) and operations" (ways and means). It would not, in this sense, a clearly definite object, resembling more like a bridge that melts and lists them all. Therefore, "seeks to mold an external environment in which political institutions and values of a community, their territorial integrity and their way of life can remain safe in the long run" (PORTER, 2013, p. 5).

This definition is of utmost importance to both countries in the planning and conduct of its foreign and security policies, and in the analysis and the interpretation thereof. It answers some basic questions that reflect the role to be played worldwide for this country, of its objectives in international relations, the profile of its armed forces, its behavior as an individual actor in systemic anarchy context, their perception of external threats and strategies of how to answer them, among others issues. At State level, this planning is essential to coordinate resources and actions of the country towards common goals. At the level of the International System, directly influences the pattern of friendship and enmity (polarization) and may affect the actual number of poles (polarity) in the case of specific strategies (revisionists or not) by major powers (MARTINS; CEPIK, 2014, p. 14).

In the USA, since its establishment as a Regional Hegemony¹, its Grand Strategy is driven primarily by two objectives: (1) prevent the rise of a European or Asian power that is able to cross the US oceanic defenses, and (2) mold the international order in the likeness of its internal order. Although both relate to national security, each represents a different vision for the country. In the first, the US would be a great power among others; while in the second, the country would be the big global nation, being the universal model of ideas and governance. Liebert recognizes this tension between the objectives permeating from the beginning, the US Grand Strategy and his own identity as a country, connecting the first pole to the nationalist ideas and the second with the liberal nation model (LIEBERT, 2014, p. 5).

¹ Regional Hegemony is a State spanning large area of an entire continent without threatening land rivals, benefited from the oceans's "stopping power of water" (MEARSHEIMER, 2001).

We can identify two distinct paradigms, Weberian ideal types², which establish the placement of the US relative to other countries and the international system; they are the “Monroe Doctrine” and “Manifest Destiny”. Duality that shapes the Grand Strategy influencing the internal political negotiations, shaping the Foreign and Security Policies and the way that international relations are conducted this influence of the national issues in the international level. It was what Robert Putnan (1988) called “the logic of two-level games” and Kenneth Waltz (2001) described as interference of the second image in the third image. According to the logic of two levels, there is an alternation of the preponderance of influence of each of the paradigms in the conduct of their international relations, as swings inner strength of the political groups advocating one or another paradigm. However, does not translate into behavior completely “ideal” and influenced to a lesser or greater degree of both paradigms because “in reality intermingle, interchange and mimicking themselves [...] permeating the US history and incorporating in their action foreign policy until nowadays” (FRANÇA et al., 2013, p. 8).

The Monroe Doctrine represents the values of self-government, promoting citizenship and the exercise of leadership by example. The basic principles of the “Right of Peoples”, of self-government and self-determination were also expressed in 1823 by President James Monroe through the rejection of a new European colonization, with the US taking the lead to ensure these values to other countries in the international system plagued by the European harassment.

The Manifest Destiny, in turn, stems from the belief that the North American people are an exceptional people and it is the people chosen by Divine Providence (God) to guide the world. It has civilizing domination characteristics, racial and cultural superiority presumption. Its formulation is in the article “The Great Nation of Futurity” John O’Sullivan published in the United States Magazine in 1839, which urges Americans to stop imitating Europe and take responsibility to lead the world in the quest for universal freedom, equality and redemption of men (DOMINGUES, 2009). The original article did not attract much attention at the time, but the term was resumed in 1845 at the time of the Texas annexation process in the article called “Annexation”, also published in the United States Magazine, when referring to foreign interference of other countries, it said:

² An “Ideal type” is an analytical definition stipulated to compare similarities and deviations developed in Max Weber’s theory (COSER, 2003).

[...] out of the lower region of our past party dissensions, up to its proper level of a high and broad nationality, it surely is to be found, found abundantly, in the manner in which other nations have undertaken to intrude themselves into it, between us and the proper parties to the case, in a spirit of hostile interference against us, for the avowed object of thwarting our policy and hampering our power, limiting our greatness and checking the fulfillment of our manifest destiny to overspread the continent allotted by Providence for the free development of our yearly multiplying millions. This we have seen done by England, our old rival and enemy; and by France, strangely coupled with her against us, under the influence of the Anglicism strongly tinging the policy of her present prime minister, Guizot. The zealous activity with which this effort to defeat us was pushed by the representatives of those governments, together with the character of intrigue accompanying it, fully constituted that case of foreign interference [...] (O'SULLIVAN, 1845, p. 5).

The paradigms of this duality alternate at different moments in North American history, such as the launch of the Monroe Doctrine in 1823 by President James Monroe, defending the idea of regionalization and the rejection of a new European colonization, and the prominence of the idea of Manifest Destiny during the “westward expansion” seeking to occupy the immense territory which God, in accordance with the idea, was “reserved” for the North American people and the displacement of the world's gravity center from England to North America and the US consolidation as Continental State. The Prominence of the Monroe Doctrine returns with the idea of defense of the Americas in the Spanish-American War in 1898, and the expansion of the doctrine beyond the Americas with the conquest of the Philippines and the open-door policy towards China (CUMMINGS, 2009).

In the twentieth century, the Atlantic Charter in 1941 is recognized as the globalization of the Monroe Doctrine because of self-government ideas and non-conquest of other countries; during the Cold War, the Nixon Doctrine expressed various features of the Monroe Doctrine, as the negation of the American Empire, by allowing the Pacific century in cooperation with the newly industrialized countries. “It neoliberal rise, in the 1970s, whose icon is Ronald Reagan, and the neoconservative wave of the 2000s, symbolized by George Bush, have in common the return to Manifest Destiny” (FRANÇA et al., 2013, p. 8).

However, beyond the differences, it is essential to realize the similarities between the two poles of duality, as it certainly shall guide the Grand Strategy, no matter what will prevail. The main one relates to obtaining and retaining the ability to access all parts of the world, which has been the principal US strategic goal in the last 100 years (SILVERSTONE, 2014, p. 55). To this purpose, called “Grand Area Access”, add important political and economic factors, the first demands a political balance among each region and the second requires open markets to North American capital. Therefore, this goal seems to be compatible with the two sides of American duality identified by França et al. (2013) and Liebert (2014) both the more realistic, as it seeks to avoid the rise of regional rivals that may hegemonize the region, as the most liberal, since it seeks to spread the American socio-economic values for the rest of the world. Namely, the Monroe Doctrine and Manifest Destiny respectively.

From the beginning of this century, the Bush administration adopted the Primacy as a strategy, approaching therefore of Manifest Destiny. A result were the conflagrations of the War on Terror, the relativization of multilateral systems, restoration of weapons systems related to Shield Missile in Europe and the search for the elimination of nuclear retaliatory capability, one of the qualities of the great powers, of Russia among others (LIEBER; PRESS, 2006).

The Obama administration, meanwhile, retook ideas more compatible with the ethical content of the Monroe Doctrine. In the speech, the transition was radical: while not the scope of this work internally, change is unquestionable (counter-cyclical measures, obamacare, etc.); externally, multilateralism becomes valued, defending the approach to China and the reset with Russia (FRANÇA et al., 2013). However, the Obama Grand Strategy remains unclear. Actions at the level of foreign and security policy are confusing and do not seem to indicate a move away from the Primacy strategy.

THE IMPORTANCE OF THE SEA FOR THE USA

Understanding the importance of the Sea to USA's Grand Strategy position in the International System and consequently to its international relations is fundamental for the full comprehension of its strategies and applications' consequences, ever since its Foundation and the pivotal role of the Navy as seen it as part of the American Constitution. The naval

capabilities differs a regional power from a great power, due to the primacy of the Sea in the global projection of military and political power of a country.

Mearsheimer assigns USA regional hegemony to its isolation from other powers due to its bioceanic territory. The inexistence of any competitor powers within the same region may be one of the key elements responsible for the great development of its economy and consequently, the capability to build an extensive land power. The protection provided by the “stopping power of water” hardens the maintenance of any invasion in the American soil. Regardless of the “stopping power of water”, no nation possess nowadays a capability to project power as seen as in the American Armed Forces (MEARSHEIMER, 2001).

The capability to globally project power was defined by Buzan and Weaver as a criterion to classify a national power as regional or global after the Cold War. Buzan and Weaver define a great power as one with the capability to globally project military and political influence (BUZAN; WAEVER, 2003). This global power projection, especially military, requires naval capabilities for the full completion of the logistic operation due to the importance of the sea in the transportation of the “tonnage of war” (DUNNIGAN, 2003)³.

Since WWII, the US Navy reigns over the oceans and even during the Cold War the Soviet Navy was not prepare to project power, being the homeland security the core of its doctrine (TILL, 2013). This main position is the naval component of the “Command of the Commons”, the military base to the US global hegemony. The command of the Sea allows the US to maintain its military presence in different areas and to have the capability to enforce them quickly, an important deterrent component to its strategy (POSEN, 2003, p. 5).

Historically, the South Atlantic Sea plays a secondary role in the strategic issues of Security and Defense in the International System. The region has not been a theater of no relevant engagement during WWI, WWII or the Cold War (SILVA, 2014). Not the sinking of Brazilian ships in WWII or the Angolan Revolution during the Cold War has the South Atlantic been considered a priority operational theater by the USA.

³ The US Navy has eight American Rollo n/Roll off carriers which are able to carry more cargo than a thousand C-5 or C17 (two of the biggest military cargo aircrafts currently operating) (DUNNIGAN, 2003, p. 587).

THE SOUTH ATLANTIC OCEAN - A BRIEF DESCRIPTION

The South Atlantic is located in the geographical area stretching from South America to the west to the African continent to the east, their limits with the Pacific and Indian Oceans, are respectively the meridian crossing the Cape Agulhas in the east and the meridian crossing the Cape Horn in the West. With respect to latitudes bordering the South Atlantic there is no uniform criterion, some consider its southern and northern limits respectively the parallel 60° S where the Antarctic Convergence begins, and the imaginary diagonally line from São Roque Cape in Brazil to Cape Verde in Africa, the narrowest portion of the Atlantic between the two continents; others consider the parallel 15° N to the intersection with the imaginary diagonal line of the border between Guyana and Venezuela, its northern boundary and the south the own Antarctic continent (MARTINEZ, 2008).

This ocean has important geo-strategic areas such as “Atlantic Throat,” whose distance between Brazil and Sierra Leone is only 2900 km, the passage south of South America at Cape Horn connecting the Pacific to the Atlantic and the passage south of Cape of Good Hope, which in addition to connect the Indian Ocean to the Atlantic Ocean is an important trade route and the best maritime access to the Antarctica (MARTINEZ, 2008).

In terms of maritime communication, however, the South Atlantic plays a secondary role, to be out of the routes of the biggest traffic between Asia the United States and Europe, and this importance decreases with the completion of the expansion of the Panama channel will allow the passage of larger vessels. Obviously, for the countries of the region the importance of the South Atlantic is indisputable, given that, for example, 80% of foreign trade of Brazil, arguably the country with the highest gross domestic product of the region, is carried by sea (SILVA, 2014).

The southern portion of the Atlantic Ocean has significant energy reserves for diversification of world supply, reducing dependence on troubled areas like the Middle East. Energy reserves exploited so far in the South American Atlantic coast comprise 1.1% of the world total, if we include the discovered reserves and still did not explored the pre-salt this percentage jumps to 18% of world oil reserves and 3 5% of world gas reserves. In sub-Saharan coast of West Africa are located 8% of world oil reserves and 7% of world gas reserves. Note that the geological formations

that holds the South American Pre-salt reserves are also present in the African coast and may multiply these reserves.

The mineral resources of the South Atlantic however are not limited to hydrocarbons, Brozoski draws attention to the presence of three compounds in the South Atlantic Area⁴ : cobalt crusts (cobalt enriched manganese crusts); polymetallic nodules (rock formations rich in nickel, cobalt, copper, iron and manganese); and polymetallicsulphide (rich in iron, zinc, silver, copper and gold) (BROZOSKI, 2013).

Despite the reduced exploitation of the resources mentioned above, the region has several initiatives of economic integration; in Sub-Saharan Africa is present SDAC - Southern African Development Community, and the ECOWAS - Economic Community of West African States, while Argentina, Brazil and Uruguay belong to the Southern Common Market (MERCOSUR). The South Atlantic also has important fishing grounds, and numerous other economic activities related to the sea such as the exploitation of tourism and entertainment (MARTINEZ, 2008).

From the political point of view is present in the region the South Atlantic Peace and Cooperation Zone (ZPCAS), which was established in 1986 and is formed by 22 countries from both sides of the Atlantic, it has the initiative to seek cooperation in various fields, including in defense, and aims to keep the region free of the presence of weapons of mass destruction, especially nuclear. The institution is a flexible mechanism that seeks to achieve regional peace and cooperation expected from the fully functioning democratic institutions, respect for human rights and fundamental rights (BROZOSKI, 2013).

The Union of South American Nations (UNASUR) is another policy initiative that plays a stabilizing role in the South American region, being regarded by the US as an alternative to soothe fiery attitudes of leftist governments such as Venezuela and Bolivia (BROWN, 2013). UNASUR contributes positively in the security community established in the southern cone of South America⁵ and the South American stability obviously reflected in Southern Atlantic area.

⁴ The Area corresponds to the soil and subsoil that lie beyond the limits of national jurisdiction. The area and its resources are the common heritage of humanity (VIDIGAL,2006).

⁵ What Busan and Weaver (2003) named the *Southern Cone Security Subcomplex*, originally fostered by the success of Mercosur on improving cooperation dialogue in the region.

US COOPERATIVE SECURITY IN THE SOUTH ATLANTIC

The National Security Strategy (NSS – 2002) calls the other nations to work together with the US in a new era, when the World is not divided anymore between totalitarianism and “freedom and equality”. It aims to fight terrorism and to prevent attacks to the US homeland, and to work together in order to avoid regional conflicts, to support economic development and to promote free trade (U.S., 2002).

This NSS, the very first one after 9/11, is concerned with stabilizing actions and the search for peace and cooperation through alternatives that may minimize the need of asymmetrical engagements and different threats. The paper considers that, in the Western Hemisphere, there will be promoted a legit democracy in line with regional institutions. Concerning Africa, the paper highlights the fact that war and extreme poverty threat not only the global fight on terror, but also the search for human dignity (U.S., 2002).

The importance of the Americas and their strategic environment, what includes the South Atlantic, is undeniable to the US, since “the primacy of the United States in world affairs derives from the American position as the only regional hegemony in the Americas” (DUARTE, 2013, p.9). Although the new American strategic behavior after 9/11 does not assume the South Atlantic as a top priority, since 2002 has took place a ressignification of its relation with the region, in which the continent starts to be considered and included in actions of fighting terrorist threats. The US is interested in maintaining the security of the region, ensured by the presence and activities of state and multilateral actors, combating drug trafficking, illegal immigration and ensuring freedom of navigation (U.S. DEPARTMENT..., 2012).

In this context, the importance of the South Atlantic as a route for large ships cannot be neglected. In 2011 the region was route for 14,432 ships with a capacity of over 10,000 metric tons, on their way to the United States, totaling 21.2% of all ships of this nature, a 6% increase over the 2009 survey of values. In terms by comparison, the ships bound for US ports that used the North Atlantic route accounted for only 15.8% of these ships (U.S., 2013).

The US Department of Defense, in order to meet the objectives of the 2006 version of the National Security Strategy, pointing to Africa as a region of growing geostrategic importance and requires partnerships

to overcome the challenges (U.S., 2006), announced in February 2007 the creation a new Unified Combatant Command, the United States Africa Command (USAFRICOM) for this region. Although the roles and responsibilities of a combatant command, to lead and facilitate military operations, this command incorporates a larger contingent of civil staff of other North American government agencies to meet the widest range of humanitarian activities in line with defense strategy that evolves to conflict prevention.

The trust of the Department of Defense in cooperative action is such that some officials suggest that the US government will consider the success of the command if it is able to keep American troops out of Africa for the next 50 years. Beyond protecting the production and transport of oil, maritime operations in the West African coast also aim to combat illegal fishing, many illegal trafficking (arms, people, diamonds and narcotics) and piracy (PLOCH, 2011). Obviously, these actions depend on naval operations, that in the case of USAFRICOM are the responsibility of the 6th Fleet of the US Navy.

The Department of US Defense through USAFRICOM and the US Navy developed the Africa Partnership Station (APS), which is a program that seeks to develop protection and maritime safety working together with African and other foreign partners. Specific events are conducted in order to promote maritime governance, responding to specific requests for assistance that benefit the international community and the United States. More than one installation or specific ship, the APS is a concept of cooperation through action (U.S. AFRICA..., 2012). The APS is part of the international effort to improve governance in the Gulf of Guinea, although it is not restricted to that area. Law enforcement activities are conducted to combat illicit trafficking, piracy and other criminal activities. Operations are conducted US Navy vessels and often rely on the support of friendly nations crews to a closer contact and to minimize barriers with language issues (MILES, 2012).

The APS is the consolidation of the Global Fleet Station, which seeks to enhance maritime governance and to deny the use of the sea for those who threaten the global and regional security. It was initially inserted into the Gulf of Guinea after a pilot conducted in the Caribbean and Central America by the US Southern Command (USSOUTHCOM). In the first edition in 2007, three US ships and eight friendly nations crews engaged on a mission of seven months visiting countries with Senegal,

Liberia, Ghana, Cameroon, Gabon, Sao Tome and Principe, Togo and others (SOHN, 2009).

The mission of the Africa Command can be compared to the Southern Command (USSOUTHCOM), which includes the Caribbean and Central and South America, with respect to the forward defense of the United States through security cooperation, counter-narcotics operations, counterterrorism, humanitarian assistance and monitoring and support for initiatives for human rights in the region (PLOCH, 2011).

THE RESSIGNIFICATION OF THE SOUTH ATLANTIC TO THE US IN THE NEW WORLD SCENARIO

With the announcement of then-President George W. Bush in 2006 that the US intends to replace more than 75 percent of Middle Eastern oil imports by 2025, alternative producers gained an outstanding importance in American energy policy. Among these, Nigeria stands out being the fifth largest US supplier worldwide. This way, in the perception of some policy makers, the primary mission of the North American military in Africa is to secure the production of oil fields in Nigeria, many of them offshore (PLOCH, 2011). In 2011 President Barack Obama announced the intention to reduce to one third the dependence on foreign oil by 2025, what at that the time was 11 million barrels a day. In addition to the reduction of external dependence, it was also highlighted the need to diversify the portfolio of suppliers seeking oil from neighboring countries, such as Canada, Mexico and Brazil, in order to distance themselves from the Middle East turmoil and the growing need for oil from India and (OBAMA'S, 2011).

On April 24, 2008 it was announced the reestablishment of the 4th Fleet of the US Navy, which is responsible for tactical control and operating ships, aircraft and submarines operating in the area of the US Southern Command (USSOUTHCOM) comprising areas of Caribbean and Central and South America. This command aims to conduct various operations, including counter-narcotics and theater security cooperation, Military-Military interaction and bilateral and multilateral training operations (NAVY, 2008). Although it does not have organic naval assets and is considered by the Department of Defense an administrative assignment, focusing on cooperation to combat threats, it is expected that the operational resources are delegated to the control of the fleet as the circumstantial needs of current operations and confrontations, they being

symmetrical or not. It means that the 4th Fleet can operate a simple LCS or a complete battle group, with an aircraft carrier and all her escorts and support vessels. The possibility of such action, in addition to fight transnational crimes, is related to the existence in South America of anti-American bias of governments, the need to maintain the Panama Channel free of threats, and especially the increasing importance of the South Atlantic (SILVA, 2014).

The Quadrennial Defense Review 2014 reiterates the need for cooperation and partnership with African governments and multilateral organizations to improve governance and combat the threats above mentioned. In South America, the document points out the partnership of nations in the Western Hemisphere as a way to develop regional capacities to counter threats from non-state actors (U.S., 2014). This cooperative security policy recognizes the importance of multilateral institutions seeking to stabilize the region and the need to have them as partners in this process. In this regard, the recognition of ZPCSA is a natural movement.

In this sense, Duarte (2013) proposes that the time is ripe for the development of collaborative security for the Atlantic Basin as a whole, as NATO's expertise in multilateral operations may have a lot to contribute to the ZPCSA, although a broader rapprochement to the two Atlantic initiatives is out of place. Among the policies to be developed by ZPCSA member countries are: helping to strengthen peace and to promote the UN principles; promoting the sustainable development of the region; protecting the maritime environment and controlling the exploitation of resources, renewable or not; promoting freedom of navigation and control of maritime traffic; maintaining the South Atlantic as a conventional weapons of mass destruction, especially nuclear, free-zone (MARTINEZ, 2008). Obviously, these policies provided by ZPCSA member states are in line with the activities planned for the USAFRICOM and USSOUTHCOM, and especially for naval elements of the 6th Fleet and 4th Fleet respectively.

The articulation of American interests with ZPCSA must necessarily rely on the possible leadership of Brazil. Brazil plays a central role in the articulation of South America with the ZPCSA as it is one of its founders and responsible for its recent reactivation. In the words of Duarte: "For the first time Brazil is being able to articulate its diplomatic, economic, technical and military assets in order to have the actual tools to secure the South Atlantic in the near future according to regional interests" (DUARTE, 2013, p. 9). Besides being one of the founders and promoters of ZPCSA,

Brazil seeks defense cooperation with several African countries. Since 1994, Brazil has signed cooperation agreements on defense with nine African countries: Cape Verde, South Africa, Guinea Bissau, Mozambique, Namibia, Nigeria, Senegal, Angola and Equatorial Guinea, eight of them countries bordering the South Atlantic. These agreements are designed to promote cooperation in research and development; support in purchase of equipment; sharing lessons learned and support the training of African military in Brazilian military academies (AGUILAR, 2013).

This way, Brazil has the possibility to act as guarantor of US intentions in the region, averting possible misunderstandings concerning the partnership actions conducted by the Department of Defense and the USAFRICOM that may eventually be interpreted by some African countries as neo-colonialism. The country also has great potential to be elevated to a strategic partner in the long term, strengthening the cooperation and security of the Western Hemisphere (BROWN, 2013).

There tired captain of Brazilian Navy and Professor Claudio Rogério de Andrade Flôr (2008) highlights possible obstacles regarding US cooperation with other countries in the region. He points out several issues that can negatively affect the cooperative security processes. Starting with the divergent conception in US concerning security relations with the countries of the South Atlantic: while for Americans, their safety depends on their hegemony derived from its power in the military and technological field, security for the countries of the region rests on the belief of peace among peoples and a more symmetrical cooperation. Obviously, the US will seek thus to increase their sense of security asserting its hegemony. Another possible point of disagreement, according to the author, is the presence of US Navy ships possessing weapons of mass destruction, such nuclear weapons. These weapons, as well as inadequate to this type of confrontation (fighting terrorism and drugs), are a threat to the consolidation of ZPCSA.

FINAL CONSIDERATIONS

This paper sought to analyze the importance of the South Atlantic to the United States departing from the discussion of internal determinants. To conduct this analysis, it was performed the contextualization of some elements of foreign and security policy of the United States and the importance of the sea to the US; a brief contextualization of the

South Atlantic, the cooperative security programs and an analysis of the increasing importance of the region to the US.

In the cooperative security policy there is a difference of intensity of operations and actions to combat new threats and international crime in the West African coast and the reality in the east coast of South America. While the USAFRICOM develops several visits, enforcement of the law actions and maritime governance building adjacent to African countries bordering the South Atlantic, the USSOUTHCOM limits this type of action to the Caribbean, not acting this way along the South American countries in the South Atlantic. In addition, the social situation in South America east coast is much more stable than in Africa, because, according to Buzan and Weaver (2003) there exists in the region a “security community” arising from the interstate confidence built from establishment of MERCOSUR.

The fight against low-level crimes such as piracy, and the pursuit of building collaborative security initiatives to stabilize the West African coast can count on multilateral institutions such as the ZPCSA and ECOWAS, and countries like Brazil, which exerts a stabilizing leadership in the region. According to Lowell Schwartz and Peter Wilson, researchers at the RAND Corporation, a greater involvement of Brazil in regional security, including the South Atlantic, could allow the United States to focus their efforts on more contentious areas. The researchers also defend that a strategic partnership with Brazil should be different from that with its allies during the Cold War, what means accepting greater autonomy of the South American country. Although Brazil have restrictions on US interventionist actions and is aligned with China and Russia in the BRICS, the partnership for security issues between the two countries tends to be a beneficial partnership for the US in the long run (SCHWARTZ; WILSON, 2013).

Mearsheimer proposes that an international specific order at any given time is essentially a by-product of the selfish behavior of great powers in the international system (MEARSHEIMER, 2001). In this view, the question is whether the search for cooperation in the South Atlantic region, would be a by-product of the selfish behavior of the United States in the International System moved by the Manifest Destiny? If so, the US concerns in regional stability of South America and Africa could be a strategy to guarantee its supply lines and future strategic oil reserves of its new hemispheric partners. It is also important to discuss what are the real US intentions for the South Atlantic and its strategic environment, as doubts about these intentions are the confidentiality of its radar’s information in

São Tome and Principe, and the reactivation of the 4th US Navy Fleet few months after the announcement of the discovery of the Brazilian pre-salt reserves. Does the Monroe Doctrine or the Manifest Destiny inspire these moves?

To address the possible selfish behavior of the United States in the international system, we can rely on the provisions of the National Security Strategy, which makes it clear that one of the United States main concerns is the promotion of human dignity, especially in Africa. Although in fact it primarily seeks to increase US protection through cooperative security, US enforcement of law actions and building governance through the promotion of freedom and exploitation of governments and multilateral organizations currently are in accordance with the ideals of self-government as in the "Monroe Doctrine."

Similar dynamics can be observed in the case of energy security. The recent increase in oil exploration in the Gulf of Mexico and the increased exploitation of Shale Gas reserves on American soil decrease the pressure to import, making it possible to diversify fuel suppliers in the international market. Obviously, this scenario enables the United States to reduce its dependence on Middle East oil as noted in the speeches of Bush and Obama, ensuring the governance of the bordering oil-producing countries to the South Atlantic. While aiming at a prime necessity of Americans, energy security, these actions contribute to the promotion of human dignity as noted earlier.

Regarding the maintenance of the strategic positioning of the US Department of Defense for the South Atlantic, the best hypothetical scenario for this approach has to be based again in their official documents. There is no indication that this view may change in the short term. The latest versions of the National Security Strategy recognizes progress in stability and governance in some countries of the West African coast, and the United States recognize the UNASUR and ZPCSA as potential partners in search for regional stability, and see the growing institutionalization of multilateral organizations. Also, the importance and the stabilizing presence of countries like Brazil, key elements for peace and regional cooperation, despite the existence of some countries with an anti-American bias in South America.

A ESTRATÉGIA DE SEGURANÇA COOPERATIVA NO ATLÂNTICO SUL: DETERMINANTES INTERNOS DOS ESTADOS UNIDOS E A RESSIGNIFICAÇÃO DA REGIÃO

RESUMO

Este artigo discute a importância do Atlântico Sul para a estratégia de segurança cooperativa dos Estados Unidos da América. Esta análise considera alguns determinantes internos da Política Externa e de Segurança dos EUA, a importância do mar para sua estratégia e uma breve discussão das ações tomadas pelo Departamento de Defesa dos Estados Unidos na região. O papel central do mar para a Grande Estratégia americana endossa a necessidade de compreender a importância dos oceanos e, conseqüentemente, o Atlântico Sul. Verificou-se a importância do mar para a consolidação da posição Americana no mundo, e do Atlântico Sul como importante região estratégica para os Estados Unidos. Esta importância é evidenciada pela busca por iniciativas de segurança colaborativa para a estabilização da costa Oeste Africana e combate às ameaças de baixa intensidade como a pirataria, visando conter novas ameaças e enfrentar os atores não estatais, reconhece instituições multilaterais, tais como a ZOPACAS, e parceiros estratégicos, tais como o Brasil.

Palavras-chave: Segurança Marítima. Atlântico Sul. Segurança Cooperativa. Estados Unidos da América. Grande Estratégia.

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