

BRAZILIAN AND INDIAN MARITIME SECURITY ISSUES: DIFFERENCES IN INFLUENCE-BUILDING APPROACHES

Probal K. Ghosh¹
Kai Michael Kenkel²
Danilo Marcondes³

ABSTRACT⁴

Emerging powers have often employed diverse strategies to gain influence in their regions. This article explores and compares the maritime regional influence-building processes spearheaded by Brazil and India. We identify geopolitical variables that influence the permanence of discurive region-building strategies that involve: sustained interaction with coastal states; the generation of sufficient maritime consciousness/awareness; strategic importance, either in geopolitical or in economic terms; and acceptance of the proposing state's claim to a leadership role backed by power projection capabilities. These concepts are explored in the contexts of the South Atlantic and Indian Oceans, revealing the limits imposed on influence-building by geopolitical factors.

Keywords: maritime security. India. Brazil. Indian Ocean Region. South Atlantic Ocean

¹ Doutor. Capt. (ret.) Indian Navy. New Delhi, India. Email: pkghosh_in@yahoo.co.uk / Orcid: <http://orcid.org/0000-0002-8556-7676>

² Doutor. Instituto de Relações Internacionais, Pontifícia Universidade Católica do Rio de Janeiro (PUC-Rio), Rio de Janeiro (RJ), Brazil. Email: kenkel.iri@gmail.com / Orcid: <https://orcid.org/0000-0003-4356-9304>

³ Doutor Escola Superior de Guerra (ESG), Rio de Janeiro (RJ), Brazil. Email: danimarcondes@gmail.com / Orcid: <https://orcid.org/0000-0001-5142-5840>

⁴ Research by authors (2) and (3) which led to this publication has received funding through a Pró-Defesa research grant from the Coordenação de Aperfeiçoamento de Pessoal de Nível Superior – Brasil (CAPES). The second author has received support from the following sources: Brazilian National Council for Scientific and Technological Development—CNPq (Bolsa de Produtividade Nível 2); Rio de Janeiro State Research Foundation—FAPERJ (Cientista do Nosso Estado); CAPES – Finance Code 001. The third author has received financial support from CNPq under grant 314656/2020-0 and FAPERJ under grant E-26/202.732/2019". The views and opinions expressed in this article are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of any institution with which they are affiliated.

INTRODUCTION

Recent trends in International Relations literature, particularly within international security studies, have been guided by a renewed interest in looking at issues associated with maritime security (BUEGER; EDMUNDS; RYAN, 2019). While there are different ways to approach and advance a maritime security studies agenda, here we focus on its connection with foreign and defense policy analysis. In the specific realm of the so-called emerging powers, attention has been drawn to how countries project their geopolitical aspirations towards their respective maritime spaces.

The development of national maritime strategies, and investment in maritime capacity-building and standards of ocean governance have become an integral part of how these countries negotiate their rise and aim for recognition by other actors, most often in their own regional surroundings (NEL, 2010). Requests for the pursuit of responsible international conduct on the part of these countries⁵ include invitations for their participation in multilateral or ad hoc initiatives addressing a diversity of maritime issues such as piracy or environmental catastrophes at sea (VREĚ, 2017). In responding to such requests, these countries have come forward to participate in initiatives that seek to strengthen maritime security, especially as they identify these efforts as having a direct connection to their broader foreign and defense policy interests. For example, at one time China and India cooperated in efforts to counter piracy in the coast of Somalia (GIPPNER, 2016).

The strategies developed by emerging powers encompass activities that could be understood as part of a naval and defense diplomacy portfolio (MIÈRE, 2014). These engagements draw attention to new avenues for understanding the maritime approaches of Brazil and India, and how discussions about the role of these countries contribute to the body of literature on naval and defense diplomacy. While these practices are not the exclusive purview of emerging powers, contributions that address these considerations can potentially shed light on the distinct

⁵ A discussion on India and international responsibility is available at: NARLIKAR, Amrita. Is India a Responsible Great Power?. *Third World Quarterly*, v. 32, n. 9, p. 1607-1621, 2011. For a discussion on international responsibility in the Brazilian case, see: BRIMMER, Esther D. Is Brazil a 'Responsible Stakeholder' or a Naysayer?. *The Washington Quarterly*, Taylor & Francis, v. 37, n. 3, p. 135-151, 2014.

nature of how emerging powers engage in these initiatives, including their similarities and differences to North-South patterns of defense diplomacy (BARKAWI, 2011).

A number of contributions have emerged in order to understand Brazilian and Indian approaches towards the South Atlantic and the Indian Ocean Region (IOR), often with the participation of scholars based in these regions, providing a detailed analysis capturing each country's specificity, including their innovative approaches, as well as their challenges and limitations⁶. Within the diverse group of emerging powers, Brazil and India provide relevant examples of the growing rearticulation and resignification of maritime strategies, particularly in a post-Cold War scenario. Attempts to develop a comprehensive academic understanding of these strategies are often informed by the dominant theoretical approaches of different International Relations schools located in both countries.⁷ The specificities associated with the ways in which IR has developed in each national context are also presented in this analysis, reflecting varying degrees of how issues associated with interest-based or ideas-based readings have influenced theoretical understandings.

While there is a clear emphasis on the specificities and nuances of the ways in which each country engages with its respective maritime spaces, this does not preclude attempts to draw comparative lessons between the two engagements. The emphasis on developing capabilities to project power in maritime spaces is one of the similarities that emerge from the discussion presented in the next sections. Each country's scientific and technological trajectory reflects the pace by which these capabilities are incorporated into its respective navy, as well as the different policy choices made by decision makers.

Another important element to consider is how existing initiatives relate to previous efforts, dating from the Cold War period or the early

⁶ For a discussion on the South Atlantic space, see: DUARTE, Érico; BARROS, Manuel Correia de (ed.). *Maritime Security Challenges in the South Atlantic*. Cham: Springer, 2018 and DUARTE, Érico; BARROS, Manuel Correia de (ed.). *Navies and Maritime Policies in the South Atlantic*. Cham: Springer, 2019. For a discussion on the Indian case, see: PATEL, Bimal N.; MALIK, Aruna Kumar; NUNES, William. *Indian Ocean and Maritime Security: Competition, Cooperation and Threat*. New York: Routledge, 2016.

⁷ The development of the IR discipline in India is discussed in: BEHERA, Navnita Chadha. *Re-imagining IR in India*. In: ACHARYA, Amitav; BUZAN, Barry (ed.). *Non-Western International Relations Theory*, Abingdon: Routledge, 2010, p. 92-116. For the development of the discipline in Brazil, see: HERZ, Mônica. *O crescimento da área de Relações Internacionais no Brasil*. *Contexto Internacional*, Rio de Janeiro, v. 24, n. 1, p. 7-40, January/June 2002.

1990s. Initiatives developed in the past, such as the South Atlantic Peace and Cooperation Zone (ZOPACAS), presented to the United Nations General Assembly in 1986, and the Indian Ocean Rim Association (IORA), created in 1995, have gained new relevance in light of the pursuit of new international status and recognition. For example, the Indian Navy created the Indian Ocean Naval Symposium in 2008. In the case of Brazil, after several unsuccessful attempts to organize a ministerial-level ZOPACAS summit since 2015, the Brazilian Navy took the lead from the Brazilian Foreign Ministry and organized an online ZOPACAS workshop with a specific focus on maritime security and economic development in October 2020. While giving new strength to previously existing initiatives is important, the two countries have further invested in updating their maritime strategies by launching policy documents such as the Brazilian Navy's 2040 Strategic Plan —launched in September 2020 —and the Indian Navy's 2015 Maritime Security Strategy, or by acquiring strategic capability, such as nuclear-powered submarines and aircraft carriers.

The diversity and multiplicity of actors in each maritime space (22 countries in the IORA and 24 countries in ZOPACAS) create both challenges and opportunities for India and Brazil. The South Atlantic and the Indian Ocean encompass countries with significant differences related to maritime capabilities, specialized knowledge of maritime legislation, and approaches towards maritime governance. In addition, extra-regional powers have established permanent or semi-permanent presences in these spaces (such as the United Kingdom's military bases in both the South Atlantic and in the Indian Ocean). While the role of extra-regional powers has been historically associated with disputes during the Cold War, these dynamics have gained new momentum in the current geopolitical scenario. This has taken place in large part due to the growing competition between the United States and China, and the launch of initiatives such as the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), including its maritime component known as the 21st century MRI), which brought new significance to certain maritime spaces and routes.

“Extra-regional actors” have developed new understandings about maritime spaces, often based on their newly found geopolitical significance, such as China's emerging approach towards the South Atlantic Ocean (MARTINSON, 2019). In the specific context of the Indian and South Atlantic Oceans, these approaches by “extra-regional actors” will have to be addressed by Brazil and India, either by accommodation,

rejection and/or the launch of counter narratives. This is particularly true in the sense that geopolitical understandings of each maritime space are influenced by national perceptions of the seriousness of existing threats emerging from maritime spaces. For example, the decline in the occurrence of maritime piracy in the Gulf of Aden and the growth in the number of cases in the Gulf of Guinea.⁸

As will become clear from the analysis presented here, the investment in the institutionalization of maritime governance is an important component of the organization of maritime spaces. Such efforts are often related to each country's foreign and defense policy approaches, with different degrees of inclination towards the promotion of institutionalization. For example, while Brazil sought UN support for the creation of ZOPACAS in 1986, the initiative was never provided with a permanent secretariat, and summit meetings faced discontinuity, with a particularly significant gap between 1998 and 2007 (ABDENUR; MATTHEIS; SEABRA, 2016; GHOSH, 2015). At the same time, the lack of institutionalization provided Brazilian government actors with flexibility in their approach towards maritime security in the South Atlantic space.

While there are distinctive elements in Brazil and India's political and diplomatic trajectories, as well as in their engagement towards their respective maritime spaces, these differences should not be interpreted as preventing the emergence of cooperative efforts between the two countries. The India, Brazil, and South Africa maritime exercise (IBSAMAR) has provided a unique space for the socialization of Brazilian, Indian and South African naval officers and demonstrated remarkable continuity since its initial edition in 2008, in spite of significant logistical challenges. In addition, in recent years, Brazilian and Indian officers shared experiences in addressing the exchange of information between maritime surveillance centers. There is also a potential for collaboration in multilateral settings. India has recently headed a United Nations Security Council discussion on maritime security during its presidency of the Council in August 2021 and, starting January 2022, Brazil will serve as a non-permanent member in the Council, which could lead to a continuation of the discussions.

One point to be mentioned here refers to the understanding of how Brazil and India are required to adapt to a range of security issues

⁸ "The Gulf of Guinea is now the world's worst piracy hotspot. The Economist, Lagos, June 29, 2019. Available at: <<https://www.economist.com/international/2019/06/29/the-gulf-of-guinea-is-now-the-worlds-worst-piracy-hotspot>>. Accessed 29 April 2021.

arising not only from insecurity in maritime spaces but also from land-based challenges, deriving from situations of state fragility, border disputes and foreign intervention in their neighborhoods. This will require a complementary approach, as potential and existing challenges emerging from both land and ocean-based settings will have to be addressed by decision makers, leading to a discussion about the definition and allocation of defense priorities.

BRAZIL IN THE SOUTH ATLANTIC REGION

Historically the South Atlantic Ocean has fallen more naturally into two landbound ambits on either continent, rather than being considered an organic region in its own right. In maritime terms, the region's players have extremely limited naval capabilities, save for three green-water navies in Brazil, Argentina and South Africa. Long considered peripheral to global security concerns, the region's importance has risen of late due to the discovery of hydrocarbon deposits off the coasts of Brazil and the Falkland Islands.

These oil deposits led Brazil to rediscover maritime aspects of its security policy. The ensuing policy is largely based on diplomacy and the construction of a common regional South Atlantic security identity, built on Brazilian leadership and the minimization of the influence of "extra-regional actors" such as the US (United States) and UK (United Kingdom).

One vehicle for advancing this goal was the attempted revitalization of the ZOPACAS in 2007 (GUIMARÃES, 2014). Brazil also applied for the extension of its territorial waters to the full continental shelf, allowing access to significantly larger oil reserves. This area was given the moniker "Blue Amazon" in allusion to the importance of its terrestrial counterpart in land-based strategy (SILVA, 2013). Furthermore, Brazil worked within the Community of Portuguese Language Countries (CPLP) to foster relations with African coastal states. Efforts included cooperation on hydrographic research and fisheries management (ABDENUR; MARCONDES, 2014, p. 15). In addition, there has been a series of bilateral agreements with African states, the most extensive of which involved inter alia the training and creation of the Namibian Marine Corps by its Brazilian counterpart (SEABRA, 2016a, 2016b). Other

partners include São Tomé and Príncipe, Senegal, Cameroon, Cape Verde and Guinea-Bissau (ABDENUR; MARCONDES, 2013).⁹

Brazil's renewed interest in the South Atlantic was reflected in defense policy documents drafted shortly after the discovery of the pre-salt reserves, such as the 2008 National Defense Strategy and the 2012 White Paper on Defense (the most recent publicly available document) (BRAZIL, 2008; BRAZIL, 2012). In the analysis of one research team,

The former accords a new level of strategic priority to the South Atlantic, linking the richness of natural resources within Brazil's maritime territory to the possibility of armed conflict in the South Atlantic. The latter lays out the steps for securitising the South Atlantic through a mix of unilateral moves with international cooperation, not only with other South American countries, but also with states along the western coast of Africa. The White Paper notes not only the presence of natural resources such as oil, gas and fisheries within Brazil's maritime territory, but also the centrality of the ocean to the country's commercial interests and to global trade in general. These documents argue the need to safeguard Brazilian sovereignty in the South Atlantic, identifying maritime resources as being vital to national interests and covetous foreign states as potential enemies (ABDENUR; MARCONDES, 2013, p. 2).

The same analysts identify a three-pronged strategy for the South Atlantic that ensued. The first is a bolstering of military investment in maritime presence and technological development. A key component is a new maritime radar system, the "Blue Amazon Management System" (SisGAAz), which is now on hold for budgetary reasons (DUARTE, 2015, p. 105). The second leg of the strategy is the claim to the continental shelf and the revival of regional diplomatic initiatives (ABDENUR; MARCONDES, 2013). The third element, aligned at the time to the global aspirations of Workers' Party foreign policy, was the expansion of both defense and development cooperation with African states. These strategies are designed materially to back the country's discursive region-building strategy with

⁹ See also: BBC News Brasil. Contra pirataria, Brasil expande ação naval na África. BBC News Brasil, Brasília e São Paulo, May 15. 2013. Available at: <https://www.bbc.com/portuguese/noticias/2013/05/130513_pirataria_africa_brasil_jf_1k>. Accessed 29 April 2021.

the material means necessary to make it happen in practice; they have also led to a tentative awakening to maritime potential in Brazilian strategic thinking (MATTOS; MATOS; KENKEL, 2017; MEDEIROS; MOREIRA, 2017). However, as shown in the analysis below, in the absence of consistent funding and political commitment and institutional stability, albeit normatively attractive, discourse alone did not suffice to bring about significant change to geopolitical realities.

SUSTAINED INTERACTION AND MARITIME CAPABILITIES

The South Atlantic region possesses relatively limited strategic and economic interaction between its coastline states. In economic terms, while these states depend on ocean routes for the vast majority of their international trade, their economic relations are largely not conducted with other states in this ambit: Brazil's trade with all African partners halved from an already limited USD 28 billion in 2013 to 14 billion in 2018.¹⁰

Similarly, in the military sphere, dense interaction is exclusively limited to ambits composed of states on one side of the Atlantic only. On the South American side, there are only three states with coastlines and navies: Brazil, Argentina, and Uruguay. While these states possess the operational wherewithal to patrol their territorial waters — although each face struggles in maintaining the investment levels required for full operational capacity — none is capable of projecting power across the entire Ocean or even of providing seamless and constant SAR coverage (INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTE FOR STRATEGIC STUDIES, 2020).

Among the African states, South Africa possesses by far the largest and most historically active Navy; however, its attention has now shifted heavily towards its presence in the Indian Ocean, particularly the Mozambique Channel. Indeed, only one frigate (of the country's four) was still dedicated to the Atlantic in 2013 and all bases on the Atlantic save for one—responsible for both oceans—have been closed (INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTE FOR STRATEGIC STUDIES, 2020, p. 501).

¹⁰ See COMÉRCIO entre o Brasil e a África se distancia dos anos dourados e retorna ao patamar de 2004. Comex do Brasil, Brasília, June 27. 2018. Available at: <<https://www.comexdobrasil.com/comercio-entre-o-brasil-e-a-africa-se-distancia-dos-anos-dourados-e-retorna-ao-patamar-de-2004>>. Accessed 29 April 2021.

Almost all states on the African side of the South Atlantic possess at best coastal control capacity (INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTE FOR STRATEGIC STUDIES, 2020). In addition to following a predominantly territorially-based conception in their security policy, where these states do prioritize a naval presence it is often with assistance received from extraterritorial powers such as the European Union and the US.¹¹ No other African coastal states currently possess the capacity for a continued presence beyond their coastal waters, nor do they—in policy documents—consider the Ocean as a whole to constitute a significant policy concern. This lack of naval capabilities contributes to limited joint naval activity in the region, with the bulk of this type of interaction occurring between South American states and the US Navy.¹²

STRATEGIC IMPORTANCE

Although the economic importance of the South Atlantic has increased with the discovery of oil and gas reserves in Brazilian and Falklands/Malvinas waters, the region remains—compared to the Indian Ocean at least — an area of low threat, limited capacity and peripheral global attention. Beyond its role as a transit space for economic goods — where the Cape route continues to garner some security attention—the area has not received priority particularly given the rise of contentious relations elsewhere (MATTOS; MATOS; KENKEL, 2015, 2017).

The region's main dispute is between Argentina and the UK over the Falklands/Malvinas, including the demarcation of territorial waters and hydrocarbon deposits. Additionally, there are few common maritime security threats to bind South Atlantic states together. Piracy is a consistent presence in the Gulf of Guinea, and though it has generated some international cooperation (DUARTE, 2016; ESPACH, 2019, p. 137), its effects do not radiate beyond immediate neighbors.

¹¹ Examples here are the US Navy's African Coastal and Border Security Program and the EU-funded initiatives in the Gulf of Guinea and for continent-wide maritime security architecture.

¹² See Medeiros and Moreira (2017) for South American regional initiatives; on US Navy joint exercises in the region, see ESPACH, Ralph. Reflections on the Ends, Ways, and Means of Maritime Security Cooperation in the South Atlantic. In: DUARTE, Érico; BARROS, Manuel Correia de (ed.). *Maritime Security Challenges in the South Atlantic*. Cham: Springer, 2018, p. 129-154.

The economic opportunity connected to oil discoveries is a key policy driver for Brazil; some estimates place the pre-salt reserves at 60 billion barrels of oil (PETERSOHN, 2019), which would propel the country into the world's top ten producers. Both Brazil and South Africa have awakened to the economic opportunities afforded by the 'blue economy' beyond oil, albeit to differing degrees (DUARTE, 2015; DUARTE; KENKEL, 2019). The desire to control and deny access to these reserves is the fundamental driver for both the country's discursive strategies and its moves to back these latter up with increased naval capabilities.

ACCEPTANCE AND FEASIBILITY OF BRAZILIAN LEADERSHIP CLAIM

Brazil's strategy for maritime influence converges both inclusionary and exclusionary logics and depends more on diplomatic discourse than on operational realities (ABDENUR; MATTHEIS; SEABRA, 2016, p. 1112-1113). It seeks to mobilize smaller littoral states under inclusive Brazilian leadership under the banner of a perceived threat from what are termed extra regional powers, such as the US (with the reactivation of the Fourth Fleet) and UK and its Falklands presence (MATTOS; MATOS; KENKEL, 2015). This led to strategic investments by the Brazilian Navy in major new platforms including four frigates from Germany beginning in 2024¹³—and primarily the prestige-driven effort to produce a locally-built nuclear-driven submarine based on French assistance. Currently the country possesses a green-water navy with eight frigates and several corvettes, which provide a partial deterrent capacity for the offshore oil fields but fall short of denial capabilities.

Interest in the South Atlantic, present in civilian policy since at least the first years of democracy in the mid-1980s and long a centerpiece of Brazilian seaborne military efforts, was further bolstered by the foreign policy initiatives of Lula da Silva's Workers' Party, which sought to forge an identity for the country as a global power from the Global South, predicated on strong ties with other postcolonial states, particularly on the

¹³ See GERMANY'S Thyssen and Embraer to build four frigates for the Brazilian Navy. MercoPress, Montevideo, March 9. 2020. Available at: <<https://en.mercopress.com/2020/03/09/germany-s-thyssen-and-embraer-to-build-four-frigates-for-the-brazilian-navy>>. Accessed 29 April 2021.

African continent¹⁴. The result was a blossoming of economic and strategic ties with African littoral states (SEABRA, 2016a), couched in a foreign policy platform that emphasized South-South Cooperation and the implied drive to supplant Western states as major strategic partners for African states (KENKEL, 2013; SARAIVA, 2010). African states have in general been receptive to Brazilian discourses of alternative leadership, but have often returned to aligning with strategic and development partners capable of offering financial incentives for cooperation, such as China. In this sense, while there is considerable soft-power potential for Brazil to take on a leadership role in consolidating a South Atlantic region, at present these efforts are not backed with the military and financial wherewithal needed to ensure lasting success.

INDIA AND THE INDIAN OCEAN REGION

The recent hype and acknowledgement of the concept of the 'Indo-Pacific', as a mainstream strategic construct, has led to extensive debate and discussions worldwide. Such a construct manages to evoke divergent responses depending upon the strategic outlook of the responder.

This geographically amorphous concept has been wholeheartedly accepted and espoused by the political dispensation in India. It was reiterated by the Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi during his speech at the Shangri-La Dialogue¹⁵, wherein he articulated his vision of

¹⁴ On Brazil's quest to rise to global players and the role of security issues and the African continent therein, see KENKEL, Kai Michael. Brazil's peacebuilding in Africa and Haiti. *Journal of International Peacekeeping*, Brill Academic Publishers, v. 17, n. 3-4, p. 272-292, 2013; and the contributions in KENKEL, Kai Michael; CUNLIFFE, Philip (ed.). *Brazil as a Rising Power: Intervention Norms and the Contestation of Global Order*. London: Routledge, 2016. On the how the South Atlantic and its function in the country's new Africa strategy came together in comprehensive fashion, see DAUVERGNE, Peter; FARIAS, Déborah BL. "The Rise of Brazil as a Global Development Power". *Third World Quarterly*, v. 33, n. 5, p. 903-917, 2012; STOLTE, Christina, *Brazil's Africa strategy: role conception and the drive for international status*, London: Palgrave, 2015; SARAIVA, José Flávio Sombra. *The new Africa and Brazil in the Lula era: the rebirth of Brazilian Atlantic Policy*. *Revista Brasileira de Política Internacional* [Brazilian International Politics Review], Centro de Estudos Globais da Universidade de Brasília (Center for Global Studies of the University of Brasília), v. 53, n. spe, p. 169-182, 2010.

¹⁵ SLD as, it is also known, is an inter-governmental security forum held annually by the think tank, International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS) which is attended by Defense Ministers, permanent heads of ministries and military chiefs of 28 Asia-Pacific states. In June 2018 Prime Minister Modi delivered the keynote address at this forum. See INDIA. Ministry of External Affairs Website. Prime Minister's Keynote Address at Shangri-La Dialogue. June 1. 2018. Available at: <<https://www.mea.gov.in/Speeches-Statements.htm?dtl/29943/Prime+M>

a constructive relationship with the entire region. He emphasized India's promotion of 'a democratic and rules-based international order' that placed the responsibility on 'both existing and rising powers', adding that the region should not return 'to the age of great power rivalry'.

In this regional power play within the Indian Ocean Region (IOR), India has emerged as one of the primary contenders with China close by at its heels. Other littorals like Australia, Indonesia and South Africa are also important nodal powers that wield considerable influence in the area.

The entire IOR has often been considered to be India's strategic backyard and the current focus is obviously on enhancing its influence while 'taking along' less capable littorals by assisting them in capacity building. This contextualizes New Delhi's declaration of playing the role of a 'net security provider' for the entire IOR, and it simultaneously highlights the cooperative approaches in the region.

Thus, there exists a renewed focus on creating close relationships with the coastal states in the neighboring areas to create a common multilateral forum. This was particularly evidenced during the March 2015 visit of the Indian PM Narendra Modi to three island nations of Sri Lanka, Seychelles, and Mauritius, and in November 2018 to attend the signing in and oath taking ceremony of President Mohamed Solih, in the Maldives. Additionally, India has provided assistance during times of natural calamities, and it has enacted vaccine diplomacy by providing free/subsidized covid vaccines to all friendly neighboring countries during the ongoing pandemic. The country also hosted a series of NSA and also a recent Deputy NSA level talk on maritime security¹⁶ as part of a charm offensive focused at reducing the grip of the purported 'string of pearls' – the encirclement strategy of the Chinese to strategically encircle India.

The aim of this new initiative is to build a multilateral maritime security arrangement with the littoral states commencing with the nearby

inisters+Keynote+Address+at+Shangri+La+Dialogue+June+01+2018>. Accessed: December 2, 2018.

¹⁶ A series of NSA level talks on issues of maritime security have been held with friendly island countries. The Fourth such meeting was held between Sri Lanka and Maldives (Seychelles and Mauritius were present virtually at the level of senior officials) in November 2020. During this – a Secretariat was established in Colombo in March 2021. More importantly it also led to the Colombo Security Conclave (CSC) Deputy-NSA meeting in Aug 2021. A trilateral Naval exercise under the aegis of the CSC was held on 27-28 Nov 2021 towards reinforcing the 'Pillars of Maritime Security' as outlined in the CSC meet. India Sri Lanka and Mauritius participated in this exercise. Also see TNN, 'India conducts drill with Lanka, Maldives on maritime security', Times of India, print edition 29 Nov 2021

Sri Lanka, Seychelles, Mauritius, and Maldives. 'We call this Indian Ocean outreach as 'SAGAR'',¹⁷ Prime Minister Modi said in Mauritius during his visit 'we seek a future for Indian Ocean that lives up to the name of SAGAR- Security and Growth for All in the Region.'

India's rising trajectory in the entire region and worldwide has heralded the realization amongst the normally 'sea blind' Indian bureaucracy in New Delhi that the Mahanian concept of Sea Power is an indispensable part of enhancing national power and its international status. Thus, newfound accents on military diplomacy in general and naval diplomacy in particular, have led to the emergence of the Indian Navy (IN) as an important tool for implementation of Indian foreign policy objectives. Having emerged from its Cold War isolationistic profile, the IN has displayed remarkable flexibility and has easily adopted a far more cooperative approach in consonance with the changing geopolitics of the region. It is with this outlook that the Navy perceives itself to be a 'security provider' and guarantor in the Indian Ocean Region (IOR).

While these efforts relate to the ongoing competition with China, attempts to increase naval capability date back to the late 90s. Accordingly, "The Maritime Dimension-A Naval Vision", issued in 1998, set the mission for IN as a force capable of operating in high seas and away from coastal waters. Subsequently, in April 2004, a formal unclassified Indian Maritime Doctrine (INBR8) of 148 pages publicly proclaimed the strategic vision of all Indian maritime assets (including the Indian Navy), which constituted the components of the Maritime Power of the State. Even though it identified the missions, roles, and methodology for the employment of maritime forces, but most of the concepts discussed in it were templates from the western understanding of their definitional approach (mainly the US and British Royal Navy ones). Subsequently, a more tropicalized and Indianized version of the vision came through in the next Vision Statement published as the unclassified Indian Maritime Doctrine (INBR8) 2009. This unclassified document covered the various naval concepts to suit Indian conditions and was well received.

With the growing area of influence of the Navy, the vision was altered to accommodate subsequent changes in numerous documents. Subsequently, these changes were aptly expressed by the Indian Prime Minister Dr. Manmohan Singh who stated that, 'our strategic footprint

¹⁷ Prime Minister Modi's speech delivered on 12 March 2015 on the occasion of commissioning Mauritius National Coast Guard Ship Barracuda

covers...to the far reaches of the Indian Ocean. Awareness of this reality should inform and animate our strategic thinking and defense planning.’ Currently India considers enlarging its ‘maritime footprints’ beyond the Indian Ocean into the realms of the Pacific Ocean under the Indo Pacific architecture.

Recently, the unclassified strategic publication “Ensuring Secure Seas: Indian Maritime Security Strategy” (2015) NSP 1.2 is in many ways a path breaking document, which also contains the culmination of earlier strategic thought processes. It also builds on the principles enunciated in the earlier Navy’s Vision Statement and Guiding Principles formulated in 2014.

The modified strategy increased its focus ‘...in undertaking cooperation and coordination between various navies, to counter common threats at seas’ (INDIA, 2015, p. 4-5). Thus, one of the aims of the recently articulated maritime strategy has been to shape a favorable and positive maritime environment for enhancing net security in India’s areas of maritime interest by building up engagements with maritime forces of friendly nations in multiple levels (INDIA, 2015, p. 10-11).

SUSTAINED INTERACTION AND MARITIME CAPABILITIES

Despite this common link affecting all the Indian Ocean littorals, a unified approach towards overcoming these numerous challenges have not received the due importance that they deserve. A cursory analysis reveals that the rationale for a lack of unified approach lies in the considerable dissimilarities between maritime capabilities of the coastal states. On one hand, there is India with its large and capable blue water navy while on the other hand there are small island nations with minimal naval/maritime forces harboring incongruent national interest and priorities.

Thus, the difference in approaches towards maritime governance and the inability to dovetail it with national objectives makes seamless cooperation and coordination difficult to achieve. It is obvious that maritime issues that are of importance to one State need not necessarily hold the same significance and precedence or priority for others – thus bringing into focus the differing ‘Hierarchy of Relevance’ for each littoral.

STRATEGIC IMPORTANCE

The Indian Ocean is an important oceanic space, which has increased its importance in light of the transition of the center of global economic and political dynamism from the North Atlantic to the Asia-Pacific region. This movement fulfils the words incorrectly attributed to A.T. Mahan: 'Whoever controls the Indian Ocean will dominate Asia, the destiny of the world would be decided on its waters'- which rings true in the current geopolitical scenario (SCOTT, 2006, pp. 98, fn 7 pp. 120-121).

With enhanced accent on globalization and sea borne trade, the density of maritime commerce passing through the regional SLOCs (Sea Lines of Communication) has increased exponentially. Consequently, this trade increase has also witnessed an enhanced level of traditional and non-traditional threats in the area.

Given the ever-increasing dependence of most of the coastal states on sea borne trade, the level of shipping traffic has increased over the years, and currently nearly 100,000 ships transit the vast ocean annually - through all important SLOCs. The criticality of these SLOCs is evident from the fact that oil tankers and LNG carriers carry oil and gas from the resource heartland of the Persian Gulf to the demand periphery that stretches from India to NE Asia. Any interdiction of these primary lifelines can have grave consequences for the energy dependent countries. In addition to energy, dry/bulk cargo, commodities, mineral ores, and containers are carried through these sea routes which enhance the criticality of the SLOCs.

With the IOR encompassing nine of the world's most important choke points and narrow passages, the vulnerability of these SLOCs is increased and hence security against emergent traditional and non-traditional threats assume primacy in the region.

The growing strategic importance of the region has prompted scholars to analyze the ensuing dynamic interplay of powers between littoral states and 'out of area' participants like China, the resultant of which would ensure the evolution of a new maritime order in the region. Due to this, the Indian Ocean Region has witnessed a subterraneous jostle for power and strategic leveraging capability resulting in an unequalled complexity and fluidity in the hierarchal equations.

It is noteworthy that this jostle for power has become accentuated over time, especially with the perceived erosion of strategic influence and

'imperial overstretch' of US forces in the region resulting in shifts and realignment in the power equations. Thus, in geo-strategic terms, there is growing participation of other major power players in the field, seeking primacy along with that of the US.

ACCEPTANCE AND FEASIBILITY OF INDIAN LEADERSHIP CLAIM

While the Indo Pacific construct is often perceived to be anti-Chinese in its orientation, especially in its Quad (Quadrilateral Security Dialogue – QSD) format, it is ironic that the Indo Pacific concept has found acceptance by some Chinese scholars themselves. At the same time, the Quad grouping comprising of India, US, Japan, and Australia has been partially constrained in its ability to move into the highest political realm, languishing in the circle of senior official/ministerial meetings, till recently when the first Quad summit meeting was held in September 2021. Seen as a non-military grouping – mainly at India's firm insistence – it is still trying to find ways and means of enhancing its relevance and efficacy in the entire region. This has also led to the formation of the trilateral security alliance called AUKUS comprising of Australia UK and the United States on 15 September 2021 and is expected to be a game changing factor in the region.

For India, the 'Indo' in the Indo Pacific construct signifies the Indian Ocean which is of primary importance to the country, even though it has growing strategic stakes in the adjoining Pacific Ocean. For US, the current promoters of the concept, the Indo Pacific idea provides for a sense of continuum from the Pacific to the Indian Ocean, interlinking their prominence in both regions. A somewhat similar strategic logic holds true for the Chinese, whose reach extends to both oceanic regions.

Under the circumstances, India's hard power reach beyond the Indian Ocean is more aspirational than reality. Hence, New Delhi often stays focused on the Indian Ocean maritime system, rather than envelope the entire Indo Pacific area.¹⁸ India expects that the Indian Navy will operate freely in the IOR to safeguard its 'diplomatic, security and

¹⁸ For a detailed perspective see KUMAR, Yogendra; GHOSH, Probal Kumar. The "Indo" in the "Indo-Pacific"—An Indian Perspective. *Naval War College Review*, U.S. Naval War College, v. 73, n. 2, Article 7, Spring 2020.

economic interests.¹⁹ In addition, it is also committed to assisting friendly countries in maritime capacity building while at the same time ensuring that these navies develop a degree of interoperability with each other and in tandem with other friendly navies.

While this forms the essence of the current thrust areas, there is a renewed effort to enhance strategic reach through bilateral agreements with coastal states for the usage of port facilities for warship turnarounds. Modest efforts in creating virtual or real forward bases are currently in a nascent format and should develop in the near future. This would provide the Indian Navy (IN) with the desired sustainability in distant seas and into the farthest reaches of the Indian Ocean, reinforcing its IOR's aspirational role.

An analysis of the engagement patterns of the IN reveals that its collaboration with foreign navies on a bilateral/multilateral basis assumes distinctive patterns. For example, the Indian Navy engages with US Navy - the predominant naval force in the region, by following an equity principle. This is especially true when viewed from the Indian side. Seen as a symbiotic relationship, the Indian side seeks parity and desires that the US Navy (USN) treats the IN on equal terms. Meanwhile the perception from the US side revolves around helping an emergent India to build its naval capacity, professionalism and develop an enhanced degree of interoperability especially while operating in the Indo Pacific region. It also seeks to use the hedging strategy against the rise of Chinese power by fostering India's growth and its Navy to withstand the rising challenge posed by the Peoples Liberation Army (Navy).

The growing relationship between the IN and the USN has led to an incorporation of diverse aspects. At the inter-operability front, it has led to the complex Malabar exercises to evolve from a bilateral to a Quad and a multilateral format.²⁰ It has also led to numerous purchases of high-

¹⁹ THE Strategic Vision of Indian Navy. PakTribune, Rawalpindi, May 24. 2010. Available at: <<http://old.paktribune.com/articles/The-Strategic-Vision-of-Indian-Navy-227781.html>>. Accessed: April 30, 2021.

²⁰ The Malabar Exercises which commenced as a bilateral exercise between the USN and IN in 1992 has steadily enlarged to include the Japanese MSDF and the Australian RAN. This has led to a media hype stating that in its current format Malabar represents the military interface of the Quad. However, templating the Malabar exercise as a Quad engagement has been more of a media speculation as the Indian Government has clearly and categorically denied this amalgamation and has tried to differentiate between the two.

tech weapons platforms from the US, and it has importantly led to the promulgation of a joint vision statement for the entire region.²¹

India's engagement with friendly middle powers like Japan and Australia on the other hand are held purely on a reciprocal and equitable basis, in order to build interoperability and engage constructively on maritime issues of common interest. A subsidiary aim is to seek high technology weaponry and platforms from countries like Japan and subsequently license and manufacture them (partially or wholly) in India, thus supplanting the national effort of 'Make in India' or 'Atmanirbhar Abhiyan'.

Lastly, its naval interaction with the close island neighbors, and other friendly littorals such as Bangladesh and Vietnam follow a similar disenable pattern. It aims at assisting these countries with their maritime capacity building, while simultaneously fostering an enhanced degree of jointness and interoperability through joint exercises and training programs. In addition, there is a desire to establish/undertake bilateral agreements that guarantee the usage of ports in these countries by the IN as virtual/ temporary forward bases to be used when required as opposed to having a permanent forward base.

Admittedly, the degree of assistance offered by the IN differs according to the capacity of the receiving state, but the overall aim is to include all these states into a comprehensive security arrangement or grid resulting into a mutually beneficial symbiotic relationship.²² Maritime security multilateralism reiterates the role of India as a regional 'net security provider', as well as partially diminishes the growing Chinese influence in the region.

The Chinese have been operating in the Indian Ocean as part of anti-piracy patrols, since late 2008 under the concept of Military Operations Other Than War (MOOTW), and have displayed both reach and sustenance capability.²³ This factor was enhanced with the development of Djibouti as

²¹ INDIA. Ministry of External Affairs Website. Joint Statement: Vision and Principles for India-U.S. Comprehensive Global Strategic Partnership. February 25, 2020. Available at: < https://www.mea.gov.in/bilateral-documents.htm?dtl/32421/Joint_Statement_Vision_and_Principles_for_IndiaUS_Comprehensive_Global_Strategic_Partnership>. Accessed 29 April 2021.

²² For details of such engagements see GHOSH, Probal Kumar. *Maritime Security Trilateralism: India, Sri Lanka and Maldives*. Strategic Analysis, Routledge, v. 38, n. 3, p. 283-288, May 14, 2014, and GHOSH, Probal Kumar. "Indian Ocean Outreach" *Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary*. *Diplomatist*, v. 3, n. 4, p. 24-26, April, 2015.

²³ Surprisingly the Chinese anti-piracy patrol Task Force has been collaborating with the

a forward (logistical) base. Thus, New Delhi is keen to restrict its influence as far as possible, more so due to the growth of the 21st Century Maritime Silk Road and the BRI initiatives which apart from being economic in nature have security implications.

Besides the aforementioned, as part of its multilateral efforts to establish its primacy in the IOR, India created the pan IOR maritime initiative IONS (Indian Ocean Naval Symposium) in 2008 – which sought to establish a common maritime platform for the IOR littorals. This forum has subsequently grown in size and influence over the years.

India established the Fusion Centre Indian Ocean Region (IFC-IOR) in 2018 for supporting the MDA needs of the region. Additionally, New Delhi's hosting the Indian Ocean Dialogue (IOD) in 2013 and every alternate year from 2019 and the Indian Ocean Defense Minister's dialogue in 2021 are all aimed at boosting the SAGAR initiative and consequently enhancing its influence as a major maritime nation in the region.

CONCLUSION

From the above analysis, it becomes clear that the two influential and rising maritime nations operating in different parts of the globe have developed diverse strategies for influence building in their areas of strategic interest primarily due to the constraints of their respective geopolitical realities.

First, the geostrategic environments in which these countries operate are vastly different. The strategic importance of the South Atlantic differs considerably from that of the Indian Ocean region. The latter is perceived as the strategic center of gravity of its part of the world, hosting important SLOCs and energy transfer lines from the resource heartland in Western Asia to the demand heartland eastwards. The disruption/ interdiction of these lifelines could well develop into an existential threat for the energy deficient countries in the region. Comparatively, the geostrategic importance and criticality of Southern Atlantic is much lesser.

Secondly, there is the difference in maritime capacity and potential of the respective naval forces. India possesses a Navy that is

other such patrols of India, Japan and South Korea. See GHOSH, Probal Kumar. Chinese Nuclear Subs in the Indian Ocean. *The Diplomat*, Washington, D.C., Abril 12, 2015. Available at: <<https://thediplomat.com/2015/04/chinese-nuclear-subs-in-the-indian-ocean/>>. Accessed 29 April 2021.

nearly blue-water in its orientation and capacity, which contrasts with its often resource-constrained Brazilian counterpart, though both of these maritime forces wield considerable influence in their respective areas of operation.

As a corollary to the above, the ability to project both soft and hard power in its area of influence is vastly different. At the multilateral level, both countries have projected initiatives with the intention of getting all the respective littorals on a common maritime platform. While India initiated the fairly successful IONS in 2008, Brazil has supported the ZOPACAS with mixed results. However, at the bilateral level, the Indian ability to undertake immediate responses to natural calamities, vaccine diplomacy²⁴, and capacity-building in general are at variance with more modest Brazilian efforts.

It cannot be denied that considerable power dynamics underpin both oceanic spaces, respectively arising from contestation of regional primacy. While in the case of the Indian Ocean, India--with the tacit support of the US, its Western allies, and other coastal states like Australia and South Africa--has emerged as a primary regional maritime power, in the case of Brazil's role in the South Atlantic, the situation is nuanced. Brazil faces contestation of its regional leadership within South America and is not backed by either the US or the UK, which have sought to draw down their influence in the region. The lack of hard power maritime capability and inventorial assets add to the degree of disadvantage for the Brazilian aspirations. On the other hand, India too faces opposition from the growing influence of the Chinese Navy, which is disadvantaged as it is a dislocated power, with lengthy supply lines from Chinese ports and vulnerable ones from Djibouti. Recent competition between the US and China in Latin America and the Caribbean could lead to an increase in maritime competition in the South Atlantic space, which will impact Brazilian interests.

²⁴ India which makes the basic ingredient for about 60% of world vaccines has been active in donating as well as selling Covid during the pandemic. Accordingly, it has donated many of the littoral's vaccine doses for e.g Maldives and, Mauritius have both received one hundred thousand doses as aid, Sri Lanka has/will be received five hundred thousand while Seychelles has got fifty thousand doses. See INDIA made Covishield part of Pak jab drive under vax alliance: Govt's Vaccine Diplomacy gathers Pace. The Times of India, New Delhi, February 1, 2021. Available at: <<https://epaper.timesgroup.com/Olive/ODN/TimesOfIndia/shared/ShowArticle.aspx?doc=TOIDEL%2F2021%2F02%2F01&entity=Ar00310&sk=55307D0B&mod=e=text>>. Accessed 29 April 2021.

Finally, the essence of gaining strategic influence lies in the level of maritime consciousness prevalent amongst the political elite and to a lesser extent amongst the local population. While in the case of Brazil, the chances are undoubtedly low, in the case of India the chances are higher especially within the current dispensation of the Modi government that realizes the importance of gaining maritime power as a means of enhancing international status.

Thus, we see that while the objective of gaining influence is essentially congruent in the vastly different oceanic spaces, their approaches differ vastly as both Brazil and India face reality constraints on discursive region building.

QUESTÕES DE SEGURANÇA MARÍTIMA BRASILEIRA E INDIANA: DIFERENÇAS NAS ABORDAGENS DE CONSTRUÇÃO DE INFLUÊNCIA

RESUMO

Potências emergentes frequentemente empregam diversas estratégias para ganharem influência em suas regiões. Este artigo explora e compara os processos de construção de influência regional marítima liderados pelo Brasil e pela Índia. Identificamos variáveis geopolíticas que influenciam na permanência de estratégias discursivas regionais de construção que envolvem: interação sustentada com Estados litorâneos, percebendo consciência/compreensão marítima suficiente; importância estratégica, seja em termos geopolíticos, seja em termos econômicos; e aceitação da reivindicação do Estado proponente para um papel de liderança, apoiado por capacidades de projeção de poder. Esses conceitos são explorados nos contextos do Atlântico Sul e do Oceano Índico, revelando os limites impostos à construção de influência por fatores geopolíticos.

Palavras-chave: segurança marítima. Região do Oceano Índico. Oceano Atlântico Sul

REFERENCES

ABDENUR, Adriana E.; MARCONDES, Danilo. Brazil in the South Atlantic: growing protagonism and unintended consequences. NOREF Policy Brief, Norwegian Center for Conflict Resolution, Oslo, May. 2013.

ABDENUR, Adriana E.; MARCONDES, Danilo. Brazil's Maritime Strategy in the South Atlantic: The Nexus Between Security and Resources. Occasional Paper, South African Institute for International Affairs, Johannesburg, n. 161, November. 2013.

ABDENUR, Adriana E.; MARCONDES, Danilo. South-South cooperation and democracy in Africa: Brazil's role in Guinea-Bissau. *Africa Review*, Routledge, v. 5, n. 2, p. 104-117, December. 2013.

ABDENUR, Adriana E.; MARCONDES, Danilo. O Brasil e a cooperação em defesa: a construção de uma identidade regional no Atlântico Sul. *Revista Brasileira de Política Internacional [Brazilian International Politics Review]*, Centro de Estudos Globais da Universidade de Brasília (Center for Global Studies of the University of Brasília), v. 54, n. 1, p. 5-21, 2014.

ABDENUR, Adriana E.; MATTHEIS, Frank; SEABRA, Pedro. An ocean for the Global South: Brazil and the zone of peace and cooperation in the South Atlantic. *Cambridge Review of International Affairs*, Routledge, v. 29, n. 3, p. 1112-1131, November. 2016.

BARKAWI, Tarik. "Defence diplomacy" in North-South Relations. *International Journal*, v. 66, n. 3, p. 597-612, Summer 2011.

BBC News Brasil. Contra pirataria, Brasil expande ação naval na África. *BCC NEWS BRASIL*, Brasília e São Paulo, May 15. 2013. Available at: <https://www.bbc.com/portuguese/noticias/2013/05/130513_pirataria_africa_brasil_jf_1k>. Accessed: April 29. 2021.

BEHERA, Navnita Chadha. Re-imagining IR in India. In: ACHARYA, Amitav; BUZAN, Barry (ed.). *Non-Western International Relations Theory*, Abingdon: Routledge, 2010, p. 92-116.

BRAZIL. Ministry of Defence. *Estratégia Nacional de Defesa (Brazil's National Defence Strategy)*. Brasília, DF: Ministério da Defesa, 2008.

BRAZIL. Ministry of Defence. Livro Branco de Defesa Nacional (Brazil's Defence White Paper). Brasília, DF: Ministério da Defesa, 2012.

BRIMMER, Esther D. Is Brazil a 'Responsible Stakeholder' or a Naysayer?. *The Washington Quarterly*, Taylor & Francis, v. 37, n. 3, p. 135-151, Fall 2014.

BUEGER, Christian; EDMUNDS, Timothy; RYAN, Barry J. Maritime security: the uncharted politics of the global sea. *International Affairs*, Oxford University Press, v. 95, n. 5, p. 971-978, September. 2019.

COMÉRCIO entre o Brasil e a África se distancia dos anos dourados e retorna ao patamar de 2004. *Comex do Brasil*, Brasília, June 27. 2018. Available at: <<https://www.comexdobrasil.com/comercio-entre-o-brasil-e-a-africa-se-distancia-dos-anos-dourados-e-retorna-ao-patamar-de-2004>>. Accessed: April 29. 2021.

DAUVERGNE, Peter; FARIAS, Déborah BL. "The Rise of Brazil as a Global Development Power". *Third World Quarterly*, v. 33, n. 5, p. 903-917, 2012

DUARTE, Érico. Brazil, the Blue Economy, and the maritime security of the South Atlantic. *Journal of the Indian Ocean Region*, Routledge, v. 12, n. 1, p. 97-111, 2015.

DUARTE, Érico. Drugs, Piracy and Sovereignty: Brazil, United States and European Union's Security Perspectives for South Atlantic. *Sicherheit und Frieden (S+F), Nomos*, v. 34, n. 3, p. 185-190, March. 2016.

DUARTE, Érico; BARROS, Manuel Correia de (ed.). *Maritime Security Challenges in the South Atlantic*. Cham: Springer, 2018

DUARTE, Érico; BARROS, Manuel Correia de (ed.). *Navies and Maritime Policies in the South Atlantic*. Cham: Springer, 2019.

DUARTE, Érico; KENKEL, Kai Michael. Contesting Perspectives on South Atlantic Maritime Security Governance: Brazil and South Africa. *South African Journal of International Affairs*, Routledge, v. 26, n. 3, p. 395-412, 2019.

ECONOMIST. The Gulf of Guinea is now the world's worst piracy hotspot. *The Economist*, Lagos, June 29. 2019. Available at: <<https://www.economist.com/international/2019/06/29/the-gulf-of-guinea-is-now-the-worlds-worst-piracy-hotspot>>. Accessed: April 29. 2021.

GHOSH, Probal Kumar. Maritime Security Trilateralism: India, Sri Lanka and Maldives. *Strategic Analysis*, Routledge, v. 38, n. 3, p. 283-288, May 14. 2014.

GHOSH, Probal Kumar. "Indian Ocean Outreach" Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary. *Diplomatist*, v. 3, n. 4, p. 24-26, April. 2015.

GHOSH, Probal Kumar. A Ticking Time Bomb: Piracy in the Gulf of Guinea. Saarbrücken: Lambert Academic Publishing, 2015.

GHOSH, Probal Kumar. Chinese Nuclear Subs in the Indian Ocean. *The Diplomat*, Washington, D.C., April 12. 2015. Available at: <https://thediplomat.com/2015/04/chinese-nuclear-subs-in-the-indian-ocean/>. Accessed: April 29. 2021.

GIPPNER, Olivia. Antipiracy and Unusual Coalitions in the Indian Ocean: China's Changing Role and Confidence Building with India. *Journal of Current Chinese Affairs*, GIGA Institute for Asian Studies, v. 45, n. 3, p. 107-137, 2016.

GUIMARÃES, Bruno Gomes. Brazilian Policy towards the South Atlantic: politics and strategy. 2014. M.A. thesis (Joint Master Program in International Relations) – Free University of Berlin, Humboldt University of Berlin, University of Potsdam, 2014.

HERZ, Monica. O crescimento da área de Relações Internacionais no Brasil. *Contexto Internacional*, Rio de Janeiro, v. 24, n. 1, p. 7-40, January/June 2002.

INDIA. Integrated Headquarters, Ministry of Defence (Navy). Ensuring Secure Seas: Indian Maritime Security Strategy, NSP 1.2, New Delhi: Ministry of Defence (Navy), October. 2015.

INDIA. Ministry of External Affairs Website. Prime Minister's Keynote Address at Shangri-La Dialogue. June 1. 2018. Available at: <<https://www.mea.gov.in/Speeches-Statements.htm?dtl/29943/m,m,m,m,Prime+Minister+Keynote+Address+at+Shangri+La+Dialogue+June+01+2018>>. Accessed: April 29. 2021.

INDIA. Ministry of External Affairs. Joint Statement: Vision and Principles for India-U.S. Comprehensive Global Strategic Partnership. February 25. 2020. Available at: <https://www.mea.gov.in/bilateral-documents.htm?dtl/32421/Joint_Statement_Vision_and_Principles_for_IndiaUS_Comprehensive_Global_Strategic_Partnership>. Accessed: April 29. 2021.

INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTE FOR STRATEGIC STUDIES. *The Military Balance 2020*. London: Routledge, 2020.

KENKEL, Kai Michael. Brazil's peacebuilding in Africa and Haiti. *Journal of International Peacekeeping*, Brill Academic Publishers, v. 17, n. 3-4, p. 272-292, 2013.

KENKEL, Kai Michael; CUNLIFFE, Philip (ed.). *Brazil as a Rising Power: Intervention Norms and the Contestation of Global Order*. London: Routledge, 2016.

KHAN, Raja Muhammed. "The Strategic Vision of Indian Navy. *PakTribune*, Rawalpindi, May 24. 2010. Available at: <<http://old.paktribune.com/articles/The-Strategic-Vision-of-Indian-Navy-227781.html>>. Accessed: April 30. 2021.

KUMAR, Yogendra; GHOSH, Probal Kumar. The "Indo" in the "Indo-Pacific"—An Indian Perspective. *Naval War College Review*, U.S. Naval War College, v. 73, n. 2, Article 7, Spring 2020

LE MIÈRE, Christian. *Maritime Diplomacy in the 21st Century: Drivers and Challenges*. New York: Routledge, 2014.

MARTINSON, Ryan D. China as an Atlantic Naval Power. *The RUSI Journal*, Routledge, v. 164, n. 7, p. 18-31, September. 2019.

MATTOS, Beatriz Rodrigues Bessa; MATOS, Francisco Eduardo Lemos; KENKEL, Kai Michael. Segurança regional, comunidades epistêmicas e cooperação no Atlântico Sul: o caso das Ilhas Falkland/Malvinas em perspectiva comparada. *Revista da Escola de Guerra Naval [Brazilian Naval War College Review]*, Rio de Janeiro, v. 21, n. 2, p. 89-114, July/December 2015.

MATTOS, Beatriz Rodrigues Bessa; MATOS, Francisco Eduardo Lemos; KENKEL, Kai Michael. Brazilian Policy and the Creation of a Regional Security Complex in the South Atlantic: Paz Brasileira?. *Contexto Internacional*, Rio de Janeiro, v. 39, n. 2, p. 263-280, May/August 2017.

MEDEIROS, Sabrina Evangelista; MOREIRA, William de Sousa. Maritime Co-operation among South Atlantic Countries and Repercussions for the Regional Community of Security Practice. *Contexto Internacional*, Rio de Janeiro, v. 39, n. 2, p. 281-303, May/August 2017.

MERCOPRESS. "Germany's Thyssen and Embraer to build four frigates for the Brazilian Navy. MercoPress, Montevideo, March 9. 2020. Available at: <<https://en.mercopress.com/2020/03/09/germany-s-thyssen-and-embraer-to-build-four-frigates-for-the-brazilian-navy>>. Accessed: April 29. 2021.

NARLIKAR, Amrita. Is India a Responsible Great Power?. *Third World Quarterly*, v. 32, n. 9, p. 1607-1621, 2011.

NEL, Philip. Redistribution and recognition: what emerging regional powers want. *Review of International Studies*, Cambridge University Press, v. 36, n. 4, p. 951-974, October 2010.

PATEL, Bimal N.; MALIK, Aruna Kumar; NUNES, William. *Indian Ocean and Maritime Security: Competition, Cooperation and Threat*. New York: Routledge, 2016.

PETERSOHN, Eliane. Pre-Salt Super Play: Leading Brazil into the World's Top 5 Oil Suppliers. In: *AAPG LATIN AMERICA AND CARIBBEAN REGION GEOSCIENCE TECHNOLOGY WORKSHOP*, Rio de Janeiro, June 13-14. 2019. Available at: <http://www.searchanddiscovery.com/documents/2019/30625petersohn/ndx_petersohn.pdf>. Accessed: April 29. 2021.

SARAIVA, José Flávio Sombra. The new Africa and Brazil in the Lula era: the rebirth of Brazilian Atlantic Policy. *Revista Brasileira de Política Internacional* [Brazilian International Politics Review], Centro de Estudos Globais da Universidade de Brasília (Center for Global Studies of the University of Brasília), v. 53, n. spe, p. 169-182, 2010.

SEABRA, Pedro. From geopolitical spill-over to tacit bargaining: Brazilian-African defence cooperation in the South Atlantic (2003-2014). 2016a. PhD thesis (Doctorate in Political Science, with emphasis in International Relations) – University of Lisbon, 2016a.

SEABRA, Pedro. Defence cooperation between Brazil and Namibia: Enduring ties across the South Atlantic. *South African Journal of International Affairs*, v. 23, n. 1, p. 89-106, 2016b.

SILVA, Alexandre Pereira da. O novo pleito brasileiro no mar: a plataforma continental estendida e o Projeto Amazônia Azul. *Revista Brasileira de Política Internacional* [Brazilian International Politics Review], Centro de Estudos Globais da Universidade de Brasília (Center for Global Studies of the University of Brasília), v. 56, n. 1, p. 104-121, 2013.

SCOTT, David. India's "Grand Strategy" for the Indian Ocean: Mahanian Visions. *Asia-Pacific Review*, v. 13, no. 2, p. 97-129, 2006.

STOLTE, Christina. *Brazil's Africa strategy: role conception and the drive for international status*, London: Palgrave, 2015.

VREÏ, François. A Blue BRICS, Maritime Security, and the South Atlantic. *Contexto Internacional*, Rio de Janeiro, v. 39, n. 2, p. 351-371, May/August. 2017.

Recebido em: 02/05/2021

Aceito em: 12/04/2022