

TRUMAN DOCTRINE (1946); DEFENSE PLANNING GUIDANCE (1991) & THE NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY (2002): THE MACKINDER & SPYKMAN DIALECTICS REVISITED

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ABSTRACT

The aim of this article is to test the hypothesis that Halford Mackinder and Nicholas Spykman's geopolitical theories, which sustained the grand strategy of the United States with the implementation of 1946 Truman Doctrine, are still relevant today after their termination. The results indicate that the intellectual matrixes were found in documents of the grand strategy of the United States in two moments. First, in 1992, in the George Herbert Walker Bush's government's *Defense Planning Guidance* document, formulated by the Pentagon, in February 1992. Second, they were found replicated 10 years after in the first term of President George Walker Bush, inaugurated in 2001. In the latter, the theoretical formulations repercussions were depicted in the official documents *Quadrennial Defense Review* (2001) and the *National Security Strategy* (2002). The article concluded that the authors' ideas remain valid to explain and interpret the actions of the United States' grand strategy in the international scenario.

Keywords: Truman Doctrine; Defense Planning Guidance; The National Security Strategy; Pax Americana.

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INTRODUCTION

The aim of this article is to test the hypothesis that the ideas from geographers Halford Mackinder and Nicholas Spykman, which sustained Truman Doctrine's development in 1946, which inaugurated the so-called Cold War period, remain relevant after their termination. The intellectual matrixes from those theoretical formulations were found in the following documents. First, I found them in the Defense Planning Guidance, written in 1992, by the Pentagon, directed at the time by Richard "Dick" Cheney under George Herbert Walker Bush government. Those ideas resurfaced again ten years later, on George Walker Bush's first term, and they guided the actions of George W. Bush's government, concerning operation Enduring Freedom, in the Afghanistan War, in 2001, and operation Iraq Freedom, in the Iraq War in 2003.

The common thread to establish this connection has its origins in the documents "U.S. Objectives with Respect to the USSR to Counter Soviet Threats to U.S. Security", (NSC 20/4 from November 23, 1948) and in the "United States Objectives and Programs for National Security" (NSC 68 from April 7, 1950). Those documents outlined the grand strategy of the United States at the time within the expansion and containment dialectic: The soviet's land power expansion coming from Mackinder's Heartland and the naval power's containment under Spykman's Rimland control, implemented by the United States.

Based on those documents, I verified that the intellectual matrixes from these two authors are found in the Defense Planning Guidance document, formulated by a group of strategists, in February 1992, at the Pentagon, at the time chaired by then-Secretary of Defense Richard "Dick" Cheney, serving under George H.W. Bush administration. After the whole of 1990s, the discussions of that defense strategy were replicated in the two documents published during the president George Walker Bush's first term, after the September 11 terrorist attacks, namely: "Quadrennial Defense Review", from September 2001, and "The National Security Strategy", from September 2002.

With that in mind, the objective of this article is to test the hypothesis that the geopolitical theories of Mackinder & Spykman, which guided the Truman Doctrine, had influenced the Defense Planning Guidance, in 1992. The latter in turn, had an impact, ten years later, in the grand strategy of the George Walker Bush administration, which

is present in the documents “Quadrennial Defense Review” (2001) and “The National Security Strategy” (2002). In other words, my interest is to test whether there is a relation between the documents of the grand strategy from the Truman’s Administration and George Walker Bush’s Administration. Therefore, whenever a variable infers with another, there is some mechanism by which this occurs. It is on this mechanism, whose chain of events links the interfering agent with the agent that suffers the effect, that I lean on in this article.

MECHANISM

A] “Geopolitical Theories” => B] “Truman’s Doctrine” => C] “DPG” => D] “G.W.B

This article is organized as follows: First, I introduce synthetically the geopolitical formulations of the Heartland’s Theory of Halford Mackinder and the dialectics of Rimland’s Theory of Nicholas Spykman. The aim is to analyze their influence on the expansion–containment dialectics on the development of the Truman Doctrine or Containment Doctrine. I then approach the Defense Planning Guidance document, especially the February 18th memorandum, on which I comment on its main points and the unfolding of those ideas throughout the 1990s. Finally, I look into how these geopolitical formulas resonated in the “Quadrennial Defense Review” and “The National Security Strategy” documents from George W. Bush’s first term.

1.0 TRUMAN DOCTRINE: MACKINDER & SPYKMAN’S DIALECT

On March 12, 1947, President Harry Truman stepped in the parliament’s chambers tribune to address a joint session of Congress, on a national radio broadcast (AMBROSE; BRINKLEY, 1997, p. 91-92). The goal of the speech was to ask immediate help from Greece and Turkey, asserting that the United States was willing and committed to defending the free people.

The United States has received from the Greek Government an urgent appeal for financial and economic assistance. Preliminary reports from the American Economic Mission now in Greece and

reports from the American Ambassador in Greece corroborate the statement of the Greek Government that assistance is imperative if Greece is to survive as a free nation. I believe that it must be the policy of the United States to support free peoples who are resisting attempted subjugation by armed minorities or by outside pressures. I do not believe that the American people and the Congress wish to turn a deaf ear to the appeal of the Greek Government. I believe that we must assist free peoples to work out their own destinies in their own way. I believe that our help should be primarily through economic and financial aid which is essential to economic stability and orderly political processes.
(TRUMAN DOCTRINE, 1947)

The speech defined the grand strategy² of the United States for the next generation and it became known as Truman Doctrine or Containment Doctrine, therefore starting the period named Cold War.

In July of the same year, Foreign Affairs published an article entitled "The Sources of Soviet Conduct", by the diplomat George Kennan, with huge repercussion, which rapidly became an almost official declaration for the new stance of the United States in the international system (AMBROSE; BRINKLEY, 1997, p.103). In this article, the author presents the objectives and what should be the principles of the foreign policy. In Kennan's words (1947, p.575):

In these circumstances it is clear that the main element of any United States policy toward the Soviet Union

² ART (2013, p.1-2) claims that: Grand strategy is a broad subject: a grand strategy tells a nation's leaders what goals they should aim for and how best they can use their country's military power to attain these goals. Grand strategy, like foreign policy, deals with the momentous choices that a nation makes in foreign affairs, but it differs from foreign policy in one fundamental respect. To define a nation's foreign policy is to lay out the full range of goals that a State should seek in the world and then determine how all of the instruments of statecraft political power, military power, economic power, ideological power should be integrated and employed with one another to achieve those goals. Grand strategy, too, deals with the full range of goals that a State should seek, but it concentrates primarily on how the military instrument that should be employed to achieve them. It prescribes how a nation should yield its military instrument to realize its foreign policy goals. Devising a grand strategy means hard thinking about basic interests.

must be that of a long-term, patient but firm and vigilant containment of Russian expansive tendencies. It is important to note, however, that such a policy has nothing to do with outward histrionics: with threats or blustering or superfluous gestures of outward toughness.

(KENNAN, 1947, p.575)

In the following years, these analyzes were expressed in two documents: the “U.S. Objectives with Respect to the USSR to Counter Soviet Threats to U.S. Security” (NSC 20/4 from November 23, 1948) and “United States Objectives and Programs for National Security” (NSC 68 from April 7, 1950).

In the 1948 NSC 20/4 document, in the conclusions section, the following arguments are found: “Soviet domination of the potential power of Eurasia, whether achieved by armed aggression or by political and subversive means, would be strategically and politically unacceptable to the United States” (NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL, 1948, p.3).

To contain those threats, the document presented the following general guides:

To counter the threats to our national security and well-being posed by the USSR, our general objectives with respect to Russia, in time of peace as well as in time of war, should be:

a. To reduce the power and influence of the USSR to limits which no longer constitute a threat to the peace, national independence and stability of the world family of nations.

b. To bring about a basic change in the conduct of international relations by the government in power in Russia, to conform with the purposes and principles set forth in the UN charter.

In pursuing these objectives due care must be taken to avoid permanently impairing our economy and the fundamental values and

institutions inherent in our way of life.

(NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL, 1948, p.3)

In the 1950 document NSC – 68, on chapter IX– Possible Course of Action, the concern about Eurasia and the apprehension of the United States in adopting an isolationist behavior that would imply a threat to its security is also found:

With the United States in an isolated position, we would have to face the probability that the Soviet Union would quickly dominate most of Eurasia, probably without meeting armed resistance. It would thus acquire a potential far superior to our own and would promptly proceed to develop this potential with the purpose of eliminating our power, which would, even in isolation, remain as a challenge to it and as an obstacle to the imposition of its kind of order in the world. There is no way to make ourselves inoffensive to the Kremlin except by complete submission to its will. Therefore, isolation would in the end condemn us to capitulate or to fight alone and on the defensive, with drastically limited offensive and retaliatory capabilities in comparison with the Soviet Union.

(NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL, 1950, p.44)

Throughout the Cold War period, the United States foreign policy was guided by the strategic directives stated in the documents and the article “The Sources of Soviet Conduct”. Its primordial goal was to restrain the Soviet Union within the borders established in the post-war (KENNAN, 1947).

In the International Relations literature, diplomat George Kennan is considered the father of the Containment Doctrine and to interpret it as a document anchored around political and ideological issues. However, the origin of the analysis and propositions suggested by Kennan seems to return to the geopolitical and strategy formulations from British Halford Mackinder and American Nicholas Spykman. This stems from the fact that the main features of the post-1945 international system took the form of a bipolar confrontation between a maritime power and a landmass power,

that is, the United States as the naval power that dominated the oceans, and the Soviet Union on the role of the landmass power, which sought to dominate Eurasia's peripheries to obtain an exit to the hot seas (MELLO, 1999, p. 131-132).

Beyond that, the NSC 20/4 and NSC 68 documents confirm this interpretation that the clash between the two powers throughout the Cold War had the same concerns present in Halford Mackinder and Nicholas Spykman's geopolitical formulations, namely: dialect of Soviet expansion and American containment that unfold around the planet's great base mass – the Eurasian supercontinent.


Therefore, in the next sub-item, I will briefly discuss the intellectual matrixes of the two authors.

1.1 *HALFORD JOHN MACKINDER*³

In 1904, at London's Royal Geographical Society, an innovative thesis on "The Geographical Pivot of History" conference was presented: that the 20th century would be marked by the maritime power's decay. This revolutionary view changed the established geographical science's axiom that there were four oceans – Atlantic, Pacific, Indian, and Arctic – and six continents - Europe, Asia, Africa, America, Australia, and Antarctica. In the author's understanding, in reality there was a single ocean that covered $\frac{3}{4}$ of the totality of the globe, which he called the Great Ocean. From the $\frac{1}{4}$ that was left, $\frac{2}{3}$ were constituted of emerged lands that were formed by European, Asian, and African continents, which, in his original vision, were a single large continent, called World Island.

³ Halford Mackinder's geopolitical thought, under Great Britain's strategic perspective, was presented in the following works: "The Geographical Pivot of History" (1904); "Democratic Ideals and Reality" (1919); "The Round World and winning of the Peace" (1943).

MACKINDER'S WORLD – 1904



Source: (MACKINDER, 1904, p.435).

The World Island, regarded as the basilar continent of the world, was surrounded by a single ocean and circled by small and neighboring islands, such as Great Britain and Japan, and further continental islands, with Americas (North and South), and intertwined by the Panamanian isthmus, and Australia (MELLO, 1999, p.42). In it, Mackinder identified an area inside Eurasia called Heartland:

The word Heartland occurs once in the 1904 paper, but incidentally and as a descriptive and not a technical term. The expressions “pivot area” and “pivot state” were used instead, thus: The oversetting of the balance of power in favor of the pivot state, resulting in its expansion over the marginal lands of Euro – Asia, would permit of the use of vast continental resources for fleet-building, and the empire of the world would then be in sight. This might happen if Germany were to ally herself with Russia.

(MACKINDER, 1943, p. 596-597)


This concept entailed a pivot area that represented the core of the Eurasian mass, and it was, therefore, key for the land power theory. This theory was based on the existence of a secular rivalry between two antagonistic powers: landmass power and maritime power. The landmass power was located exactly at the central region named Heartland, which geo-historical tendencies were expanded into the peripheral areas from the Old Continent with the aim of reaching ports and sea exits to the hot seas. The maritime power, on the other hand, was located at the Britain islands and the islands⁴ surrounded by the great basilar island, and it had an opposite movement. The strategy would be the adoption of a siege policy, that sought to keep the grand-Russian's land power trapped inside Eurasia.

According to Mackinder, the power that had control over the Heartland, by extension, would dominate the rest of the world, because it concentrated most of the the globe's population, natural resources and industries. In 1919, the author published the work "The Democratic Ideals and Reality: A Study of Politics of Reconstruction", in which, despite the German Empire defeat, which apparently contradicted his world policies analysis about the decline of the maritime power, the author keep himself faithful to his argumentation since "[...] If I now venture to write on these themes at somewhat greater length, it is because I feel that the war has established, and not shaken, my former points of view..." (MACKINDER, 1919, Preface).

With the Russian defection and the United States' arrival at the conflict, the clash took on the classic form of a confrontation between the Anglo-American oceanism and German continentalism, culminating with the maritime power victory over the land power. (MELLO, 1999, p. 54-55). From this outcome, Mackinder (1942, p.150), synthesized his strategic vision on the following geopolitical axiom: "Who rules East Europe commands The Heartland; Who rules the Heartland commands the World Island; Who rules the World-Island commands the World".

⁴ The continent islands are: North America, South America, and Australia.

MACKINDER'S WORLD – 1943



Source: MACKINDER, 1919, p. 190.

In 1943, he wrote to the Foreign Affairs magazine presenting a new configuration of the Heartland Theory. He changed the flat surface world map for a cylindrical-shaped terrestrial globe, with substantial adjustments. Featuring new perspectives of the relations among continental masses and liquid surfaces, he presented a new concept: Midland Ocean. The analyses revealed another resizing between the globe's continents and the wet surface. On one hand, the Heartland in Eurasia center, on the other, the Midland Ocean, located at the North Atlantic, having four subsidiary oceans: the Mediterranean, the Baltic, the Arctic, and the Caribbean.

According to Mello (1999, p. 65), the Midland Ocean concept helped to anticipate two major events: Operation Overlord and the bipolar structure in the post-war world.⁵

⁵ The first was the Anglo-American strategic landing operation at Normandy, which opened a second front of the war in Western Europe, in 1944. The denominated Operation Overlord faithfully reproduced the Mackindrian draft. Material and human resources regimentation in the United States/Canada, their concentration on England, and, finally, the landing on France. [...] The second event [...] when the Cold War vertically divided the northern hemisphere and structured the power blocks around its two major axes: Midland Ocean and Heartland. In the West, NATO was created - League of maritime power led by the oceanic superpower: United States. [...] In the East, the Warsaw Pact was formed in 1955 - a coalition of land power

1.2 NICHOLAS JOHN SPYKMAN

Professor Nicholas Spykman developed his geopolitical conceptions over twenty years at Yale University. He presented them clearly and objectively in two works: "America's Strategy in World Politics" (1942) and the posthumous work "Geography of the Peace" (1944).

In "America's Strategy in World Politics", the discussion focused on the great debate in American politics. The question was: What should be the grand strategy to be adopted if the United States would be compelled to engage in the conflict? This dispute was led by supporters of two distinctive schools who defended, on the one hand, the principles of isolationism and, on the other hand, the principles of interventionism. Regardless of the motivations supported by such schools, both also differed in their perceptions of the United States' geographical situation regarding Europe and Asia. As a result, they reflected distinctively on the American strategy conduct over the security policy to be adopted (SPYKMAN, 1942, p. 3-4).

The interventionism supporters stood by the idea that the security policy should have two defense lines: the first would extend itself at both ends of Eurasia, keeping the power balance in Europe as well in Asia. The second should be established for the occidental hemisphere's defense, that is, all American's influence area, from the Rio Grande to Tierra del Fuego.

The isolationism supporters, through geographic analysis, concluded that the United States was favored by an exceptional geographical situation by being protected by two oceans: the Atlantic and the Pacific. In this perspective, this spatial location would impose a natural barrier that

commanded by the continental Russian pivot state: the Soviet Union. (MELLO, 1999, p.68-69). Mackinder's geopolitical doctrine was influenced by Friedrich Ratzel's Political Geography. This work was in the Political Science field and covered topics such as the State, international relations, borders, or war. (MORAES, 1990, p.8)

Other works by the author: "On The Scope and Methods of Geography" (1887); "Britain and The British Seas" (1902); "The Rhine its valley and its History" (1908). In his 1887 work, he revealed that in his view Geography did not have a deterministic, but a conditioning character in human societies. By virtue and fortune, man changed his environment. (MACKINDER, J.H., 1897, p.153-156.).

The theory of maritime power's supremacy was developed by Admiral Alfred Thayer Mahan when the era of imperialism began in the United States. Mahan set out his ideas in a work entitled "The Influence of Sea Power Upon History" (1660-1783), which preached that there was a need for the United States to pursue a better relative position on maritime power on a regional and even on a global scale. (COSTA, WM 2008, p.78. [...] Mahan was urged to produce this work from the request made by Admiral Stephen Lucce, to teach at the then newly founded Naval War College.

would protect the American territory from being affected by any shift in the power balance on the European and Asian continents. Following this reasoning, they concluded that the security policy should have only one defense line: the United States' coast. The isolationist idea was in vogue even after the beginning of the Second World War, when the Americans extended the geographical coverage of the security policy and started to cover all the New World's hemisphere.

With the United States entry on the war, a new phase of discussion between the two schools started. The focus was not on what kind of defense and security policy should be adopted, but on what war strategy should be employed. Despite the change in direction, the discussion tackled the same problem: should the protection of the American interests refrain to its own hemispherical region influence area, or should it be broader and move beyond its borders (SPYKMAN, 1942, p.3-4).

In "Geography of the Peace"(1944), his posthumous⁶ work, the author supported his argument that the United States should employ a security policy with a realistic and interventionist bias. This conclusion was demonstrated in his last contribution: The Rimland Theory.

This conception put in check the Heartland Theory, presented by Mackinder in 1904, however, its great merit lay in the major influence that it would have in the formulation of the grand American strategy in the post-war that lasted for more than four decades (TOSTA, 1984, p. 72-73).

⁶ The work was entrusted to Miss Helen R. Nicholl of the Institute's staff, who had worked for two years with Professor Spykman, as his research assistant, and was thoroughly familiar with his views and methods of analysis. The result was the present volume. Miss Nicholl carried out her difficult assignment with great skill and imagination, as well as with real fidelity to Professor Spykman's own plan and intentions. Although a good proportion of the writing is new, she managed to keep closely to his thoughts and event of his phraseology and style. (SPYKMAN, 1944, p. x). The degree of importance of Miss Nicholl's work can be measured by the fact that it allowed us to have access to the author's last contribution in the field of strategy: the Rimland Theory.

POLAR CENTERED AZIMUTAL EQUIDISTANT MAP



Source: SPYKMAN, 1944, p.16

With that, I understand that it is feasible to make the connections between the geopolitical formulations of the geographers in the article by Kennan and the documents NSC 20/4 and NSC 68. In both documents, the concern over the dominance of planet's mainland continent, Eurasia, by a hostile power, which at that time was represented by the Soviet Union, is shown. And in NSC 68 (1950, p. 44-51), Spykman's idea is found: that the United States had to present an interventionist security policy by keeping its presence on the borders of Eurasia.

As it will be shown in the next sub-item, those ideas would stay present in the post-Cold War world, and it possible to identify them in the document "Defense Planning Guidance", produced by the Pentagon.

2.0 THE 1990S: DEFENSE PLANNING GUIDANCE: THE UNIPOLAR MOMENT & PNAC

A "new world order" was declared by President George Herbert Walker Bush in the early 1990s, coinciding with a sequence of changes in Eurasia, where several crises were underway.

Eurasia for forty years was the main arena for the major strategic rivalry between the United States and the former Soviet Union. The clash

manifested along three strategic fronts: one to the west, with NATO participation, another to the east, in the demarcation dividing Korea and the Formosa Strait, and in the south, at the Persian Gulf region. In this new reality, the new borders were defined by political, ethnic, and religious unrest in the Balkans, the Middle East, East Asia and especially within the Soviet bloc.⁷

Since the end of the Second World War, no American President had to face, both in extension and in intensity, such global turmoil. The reality of the world that H.W. Bush's administration had to deal with was coming to an end, and it was necessary to define new priorities. The progressive dismantling of the Soviet Empire ended roughly in his midterm, in December 1991, starting the beginning of the American global supremacy (BRZEZINSKI, 2007, p.21).

All these events showed the new reality of the international scenario, in which the United States had become the only superpower, with unrivaled power, in the conventional military and nuclear aspect, experiencing what Charles Krauthammer called the unipolar moment.⁸ In the condition of a single global superpower and the shift in the worldwide political arena, a redefinition concerning Eurasia's Integrated broad strategy was imperative. Unlike other empires, the United States rose in the 1990s as the only truly global power of History (BRZEZINSKI, 1997, p.21).

The American global power is unique, such in reach as well as regarding the depth of its penetration. The United States dominates not only the oceans and seas, but it has also reached effective military capacity on land. They control amphibious regions, which allows the projection of

⁷ In 1993, Foreign Affairs Magazine published the article *The Clash of Civilizations* by Samuel P. Huntington, which had large repercussions, as it did with George Kennan in 1947. The author's thesis, which sought to interpret the post-Cold War world, was that the great divisions of Humanity and the fundamental source of the conflict in the new order was of a cultural order. The split lines between civilizations will be the battle lines of the future. The synthesis is: "Faith and family, blood and belief, are what people identify with and what they will fight and die for" (HUNTINGTON, 1993, p.68).

⁸ This term is associated with the New York Times journalist, Charles Krauthammer, who, in 1990, declared that that moment, just after the end of the Cold War, the United States presented itself as an uncontrollable power, which led him to affirm that the system assumed the form of unipolarity and not multipolarity. "[...] First, it has been assumed that the old bipolar world would beget a multipolar world with power dispersed to new centers in Japan, Germany (and / or" Europe "), China and a diminished Soviet Union / Russia [...] The immediate post-Cold War world is not multipolar. It is unipolar. The center of world power is the unchallenged superpower, the United States, attended by its Western allies" (KRAUTHAMMER, 1990/1991, p.48).

their power into the maritime coast. The American troops in the late 1990 were decisively deployed from the western to eastern ends of Eurasia, also completely controlled the Persian Gulf (OPERATIONAL TERMS AND GRAPHICS, 1997, p. 57).

In short, the United States would remain supreme in four decisive domains of global power: the military, the economic, the technological and the cultural. According to Brzezinski:

*In brief, America stands supreme in the four decisive domains of global power, militarily, it has an unmatched global reach; economically, it remains the main locomotive of global growth, even if challenged in some aspects by Japan” and Germany (neither of which enjoys the other attributes of global might); technologically, it retains the overall lead in the cutting-edge areas of innovation; and culturally, despite some crassness, it enjoys an appeal that is unrivaled, especially among the world’s youth—all of which gives the United States a political clout that no other state comes close to matching. *It is the combination of all four that makes America the only comprehensive global superpower.* (emphasis added by authors)*

(BRZEZINSKI, 1997, p.23-24)

The conditions above allowed the United States to exert a political influence so powerful that no other country met the requirements to minimize it or compete.

2.1 DEFENSE PLANNING GUIDANCE & PAX AMERICANA

In the face of this new international scenario, a small group of strategists was gathered at the Pentagon, under the command of then-Secretary of Defense, Richard Cheney. This group had the task of drafting a new strategy to guide the United States in the exercise of the role of a lonely superpower. The work consolidated what came to be known as the “1992 Defense Planning Guidance” and sought to outline America’s new objectives through budget’s remodeling and military planning.

According to Chollette and Goldgeier (2008, p.44), this was considered the first effort from the Government to lay out a strategy after the Soviet Union collapsed, drafted in a first moment by Zalmay Khalilzad⁹, Subdirector and Paul Wolfowitz's assistant.

The strategy was a message for the American allies, such as Japan and Germany, seen as potential rivals for regional domination by the Pentagon. The strategists understood that the United States should not demobilize its troops, but instead establish deterrence mechanisms for potential competitors who came to aspire a regional and global leadership position. In short, the concern was to prevent a rival power from gaining military dominance in the world.

The guideline for this action pointed that for the United States to maintain its leadership and guarantee its security it should: 1) safeguard democracy in Russia; 2) support the Atlantic Alliance (NATO) to expand partnerships in the countries of Central and Eastern Europe; 3) remain strong in the Pacific to halt China's growth and; 4) defend South Korea and Taiwan. Concomitantly with these actions, the maintenance of the oil supply should be preserved, as well as the establishment of a policy to prevent a nuclear arms race between India and Pakistan.

The Defense Planning Guidance outlined a discussion process that had four main goals: the first was the analysis of the international political scenario to situate the new role of the United States in the Post-Cold War world. The second, connected to the latter considerations, was to identify regions in which territorial conflicts could create political instability that would threaten American's interests and disrupt the regional power balance. The third emphasized reaching a status of scientific advancement

⁹ Khalilzad's draft echoed some of the ideas Wolfowitz had been putting forward in his speeches. "In the Middle East and Southwest Asia, our overall objective is to remain the predominant outside power in the region and preserve U.S. and Western access to the region's oil", the statement said. In Western Europe and East Asia as well as the Middle East, the goal of American policy should be "to prevent any hostile power from dominating a region whose resources would, under consolidated control, be sufficient to generate global power." The draft suggested the possibility of bringing the new states of Central and Eastern Europe into the European Union and giving them new security commitments from the United States that would protect them from an attack by Russia. The part of Khalilzad's draft that attracted most attention was its suggestion that the United States should work actively to block the emergence of any potential competitor to American power. Vague as it was, this language seemed to apply to Japan, Germany or a united Europe, as well as to China and Russia. The draft said the United States should discourage the "advanced industrial nations" from challenging America's leadership, in part by taking these countries' interests into account, but also through unmatched military strength. (MANN, 2002, p.113-119, emphasis added by author).

in military affairs that, at the very least, was a generation ahead of any rival powers. Lastly and most importantly, permanent control to the access to the raw material vital to the maintenance of the United States' might: the Persian Gulf's oil.

In the February 18th, 1992 memorandum, in which the development of an initial draft was presented, the document clearly states, in section B "Defense Strategy Objectives", that the first objective of the United States was to prevent the rise of another rival power inside the former Soviet Union territorial space, whose resources could turn such country into a new global actor that could contradict American interests. It mentions the following regions: in central Europe, the space occupied by the former Soviet Union, in addition to the states of the Caucasus, Central Asia, and southwest Asia. The goal was that the United States should institute mechanisms to deter any other competing powers from aspiring to regional domination in these strategic areas or seeking global ascension. (THE NATIONAL SECURITY ARCHIVE).

However, the contents of this memo were leaked to the New York Times and published in an article signed by journalist Patrick Tyler, on March 7, 1992. It revealed that the defense strategy's objectives considered the improbability of the emergence of a challenging power from within the heart of Eurasia. Therefore, the plan was that the United States would keep the status of first magnitude military in Southwest Asia and the Middle East. The objective was to guarantee the flow and access to the region's oil. Moreover, the newspaper reported that the five scenarios, used as analytical tools for the formulation of a defense program, indicated regions prone to regional crises, namely: Cuba, North Korea, Iraq, Pakistan, Iran, Russia. In short, what the newspaper article had shown was that the establishment of a *Pax Americana* was underway. However, the content leaked to the press had a very negative repercussion, receiving harsh criticism from the political class, intellectuals, and public opinion, since the issues raised there were too ambitious.

Over the final year of George W. Bush Administration's, the document underwent a review to become more acceptable to public opinion. It was reworked into a new version called the "Defense Strategy for the 1990s: The Regional of Defense Strategy", of 1993 (THE NATIONAL SECURITY ARCHIVE).

2.2 THE 90'S: THE PROJECT FOR THE NEW AMERICA CENTURY

Despite its rejection, this project was not abandoned, and it resurfaced throughout all the 1990s through the third generation of the neoconservative movement¹⁰. Led by William Kristol, Robert Kagan, and Norman Podhoretz, the new group had revived the neoconservative movement through two initiatives: the launching of the "Weekly Standard"¹¹ Magazine and the creation of the think tank called: "The Project for The New America Century" (PNAC)¹².

Their main political positions were also established in Foreign Affairs' articles and echoed on PNAC principles, namely: (a) the American power would be the promoter of good, (b) the United States should reshape the world, in order not to be dominated by hostile powers, (c) the United States should act unilaterally when and if necessary. (VAISSE, 2009).

To Fukuyama (2006, p. 40), what was postulated was an expansionist position:

The expansive, interventionist, democracy – promoting position that has come to be seen today as the essence of neoconservatism – what Max Boot

¹⁰ The first generation of neoconservatives will soon give way to the second. Irving Kristol, Jeane Kirkpatrick, Midge Decter, and Norman Podhoretz are either approaching or are already over 70. Although they are still active and may remain so for years to come, they and the other veterans of the vital center will gradually fade away. Their heirs are prepared to take their places. William Kristol, Irving's son, served as chief of staff to Vice President Dan Quayle and appears to have a bright future in conservative politics and intellectual affairs. Daniel Pipes, son of historian Richard Pipes, edits the foreign affairs journal *Orbis*, and is a respected Middle East specialist. Elliott Abrams will remain an important voice as well, although his conviction on charges related to the Iran-contra scandal will probably keep him from ever holding another appointive office. The second-generation neoconservatives will be an important part of the conservative movement. Some of the major traditional conservatives, like Patrick Buchanan or the leaders of the religious right, have a good chance of marginalizing themselves as national leaders, either by alienating potential supporters or by leading their movements to electoral disasters reminiscent of George McGovern's. The younger neoconservatives, whose Reagan and Bush era credentials give them good standing in conservative circles, will not be as ideologically suspect as their predecessors and are already skilled at building and working within coalitions. Predominantly northeastern and Jewish, they will bring their intellectual tradition as well as an ethnic and scholarly balance to American conservatism. Consequently, they may be expected to play major roles in any future conservative administration. (EHRMAN, J.1995, p.192, emphasis added).

¹¹ WEEKLEY STANDARD. Available in: <http://www.weeklystandard.com/>. Accessed on March 28, 2009.

¹² NEW AMERICAN CENTURY PROJECT. Available at: <https://web.archive.org/web/20130609154959/http://www.newamericancentury.org/>

labels “hard Wilsonianism” and others “Wilsonianism on steroids” – is much more the product of younger writers like Irving Kristol’s son William and Robert Kagan, who began arguing for this kind of foreign policy in the pages of William Kristol’s magazine *The Weekly Standard* during the mid- to – late- 1990s.[...] The Kristol – Kagan effort to refine neoconservative foreign policy was first laid out systematically in a 1996 article they wrote for *Foreign Affairs* (expanded into a book entitled *Present Dangers* [2000]) defining “neo Reaganite” agenda for the Republican Party.

Those authors argued in favor of a “benevolent hegemony” under the leadership of the United States, which policies should resist or prevent the rise of dictators and ideologies hostile to American interests. In this new neoconservative agenda, instead of favoring international institutions, Kristol and Kagan emphasized three instruments for United States’ power projection: (a) overwhelming military superiority; (b) renewed dedication to United States alliances; (c) missile defense as a means of protecting American soil from counterattacks. They explicitly advocated a regime change as a central component of their neo-Reaganite policy. They supported this argument because in their understanding it was impossible to make tyrannical regimes follow civilized rules. To the authors, only re-democratization could ensure submission and interest converge.

For Kristol and Kagan, in the early nineties Gulf War, the United States was wrong in not proceeding to Baghdad to overthrow Saddam Hussein. Likewise, they criticized NATO forces, which in their view, should have followed beyond Kosovo to depose Milosevic in Serbia. They advocated not only the political regime changes in the so-called malevolent states, such as Iraq, North Korea, and Iran, but also in China, which, so far, prior to the September 11 terrorist attacks, was considered the main member.

This new neo-conservative group’s¹³ objective through “The Project for the New American Century – PNAC” was to support the

¹³ Among the most influential members we find: Elliott Abrams; William J. Bennett; Jeb Bush; Dick Cheney; Eliot A. Cohen; Aaron Friedberg; Francis Fukuyama; Fred C. Ikle; Donald Kagan; Zalmay Khalilzad; I. Lewis Libby; Norman Podhoretz; Dan Quayle; Donald Rumsfeld and Paul Wolfowitz. Available at: <https://web.archive.org/web/20130609154959/http://www.>

restoration of the American's global leadership, as they understood that America was before a singular opportunity: to reshape the international system, given its political, military, and economic prominence.

The statement exposed in these principles was a harsh critique of President Clinton's foreign policy, considered aimless and incoherent. Besides, the Government was not making investments in the military areas, instead it promoted cuts in the defense budget, which, for the authors, compromised the nation's ability to cope with new threats¹⁴.

The neoconservative group recalled that 20th-century history taught how important it is to be prepared to face crises before they arise. They thus reiterated the same objectives already discussed in 1992, namely:

- we need to increase defense spending significantly if we are to carry out our global responsibilities today and modernize our armed forces for the future;
- we need to strengthen our ties to democratic allies and to challenge regimes hostile to our interests and values;
- we need to promote the cause of political and economic freedom abroad;
- we need to accept responsibility for America's unique role in preserving and extending an international order friendly to our security, our prosperity, and our principles.¹⁵

newamericancentury.org. Accessed on: March 28, 2009.

¹⁴ They argued that the United States, to maintain its leadership, should recover the Reagan Government's actions. As follows: [...]We seem to have forgotten the essential elements of the Reagan Administration's success: a military that is strong and ready to meet both present and future challenges; a foreign policy that boldly and purposefully promotes American principles abroad; and national leadership that accepts the United States' global responsibilities. [...] the United States must be prudent in how it exercises its power. But we cannot safely avoid the responsibilities of global leadership or the costs that are associated with its exercise. America has a vital role in maintaining peace and security in Europe, Asia, and the Middle East. [...] If we shirk our responsibilities, we invite challenges to our fundamental interests.

¹⁵ THE PROJECT FOR THE NEW AMERICAN CENTURY. Statement of Principles. Available at :<https://web.archive.org/web/20130609154959/> <http://www.newamericancentury.org/>. Accessed on: Sept.10 2005.

2.3 THE 90s: REBUILDING AMERICA'S DEFENSE

In 2000, the group published the article "Rebuilding America's Defense" to discuss a new defense review so that the United States could keep the exercise of its leadership. The authors noted an absence of new defense planning for the United States, since as far as the end Cold War, the country was struggling to formulate a coherent national strategy that would maintain the prevalence of American power in the 21st century's new realities.

The criticisms were because even after the victories in the last century, two World Wars, the Cold War and the Gulf War, the United States found itself in the position of the single powerful leader. However, they experienced a paradoxical situation, because while the American power and its influence were at their peak, the Armed Forces had lost their dynamism and were showing signs of fatigue and exhaustion.

The necessity of renewal related a change in the international scenario, as the United States exited a bipolar world to a world that tends to be unipolar. A world in which America was, and still enjoys to this day, the status of the only global and multidimensional superpower.

From 1945 until 1990, the United States Armed Forces were prepared for a single enemy or a single global war throughout multiple theaters, and, in the new century, the perspective is a variety of theaters of war around the globe, against different opponents, having distinctive and separated goals.

Over the Cold War period, the main theater of rivalry was between the United States and the Soviet Union, and the strategic center of gravity was Europe, the region where the United States and NATO prepared themselves with conventional and strategic forces to deter a Soviet attack.¹⁶

In the 21st-century, the new strategic center shifted to East Asia, and the American Armed Forces' missions not only decreased but also changed, since the new threats now come within new locations, are regionalized and have different characteristics. These aspects represent the reasons for an urgent need of a defense review, and it should meet four aspects as goals: a) maintaining internal defense; b) being able to fight on several large-scale wars; c) to lead peace operations and, lastly, and

¹⁶ THE PROJECT FOR THE NEW AMERICAN CENTURY p.3 Available in: <https://web.archive.org/web/20130609105634/http://www.newamericancentury.org/RebuildingAmericasDefenses.pdf>. Access on: 10. Set.2005.

perhaps more importantly, d) to carry out a transformation of the Armed Forces.¹⁷

To Fukuyama, Kristol and Kagan's agenda had become undeniably associated with the George Walker Bush administration, making it, according to the author, hard to try to redefine a neoconservative foreign policy (FUKUYAMA, p.40-41).

Therefore, my concern in this sub-item was to pinpoint the passages that demonstrate the influence and repercussion that the Defense Planning Guidance document reached throughout the 1990s in official articles and documents such as: the 1993 Department of Defense document, Defense Strategy for 1990s: The Regional Defense Strategy document; the think tank principles' declarations; The Project for the New American Century; in the article Rebuilding America's defenses.

In the next and last sub-item, the article will examine the materialization of these perceptions in the official documents of the George W. Bush Government: "Quadrennial Defense Magazine", from September 2001, and in the "National Security Strategy", from September 2002.

3.0 GEORGE W. BUSH: QDR - 2001 & NSS -2002

In his first term, the USA was attacked inside its territory by the Islamic group Al Qaeda. George W. Bush's administration reacts to that event by announcing a new strategic doctrine of preemptive action that would bring the war to the enemy, replacing the old Cold War strategies, such as the containment or dissuasion doctrines. The Afghanistan invasion to overthrow the Taliban regime that had given shelter to Al Qaeda, and the Iraq invasion under the allegations that Saddam Hussain possessed weapons of mass destruction were the outcome of this new strategy. They were substantiated in the following documents:

3.1 QUADRENNIAL DEFENSE REVIEW - 2001

This report exposes the same themes and issues already pinpointed ten years before in the Defense Planning Guidance draft and

¹⁷ THE PROJECT FOR THE NEW AMERICAN CENTURY. p. 6 Available in: <https://web.archive.org/web/20130609105634/http://www.newamericancentury.org/RebuildingAmericasDefenses.pdf>. Access on 10.Set.2005.

were also exposed by the Secretary of Defense, Donald Rumsfeld himself, in his article “Transforming the Military”, published in 2002 by the Foreign Affairs Magazine.

When analyzing the world’s differences between the Cold War and the post-Cold War era, Rumsfeld heeds that the new threats that have emerged in the wake of the Soviet Union’s disappearance will decisively imply the change of the 21st century American strategic thinking. Says the Secretary:

During the Cold War, we faced a fairly predictable set of threats. We knew a good deal about our adversary and its capabilities, and we fashioned the strategies and capabilities needed to deter them. And we were successful [...] For almost half a century, that mix of strategy, forces, and capabilities allowed us to keep the peace and defend freedom. But the Cold War is now over, and the Soviet Union is gone—and with it the familiar security environment to which our nation had grown accustomed. Our challenge in this new century is a difficult one: to defend our nation against the unknown, the uncertain, the unseen, and the unexpected. That may seem an impossible task. It is not. But to accomplish it, we must put aside comfortable ways of thinking and planning—take risks and try new things—so we can deter and defeat adversaries that have not yet emerged to challenge us. (RUMSFELD, 2002, p.23)

In the new strategy, the “two major-theater war” concept is reformulated, since this approach was only useful in the immediate post-Cold War period to keep two major occupation forces, capable of invading and taking capitols from two aggressors and simultaneously changing their regimes, however, it would not fit in the world of the new 21st century threats.

The United States should be prepared to act in unexpected contingencies and for that, there was a necessity to reformulate the military apparatus. In other words, the United States should place more emphasis on containment in four crucial theaters simultaneously.

Another change was to abandon the old “threat-based strategy” and move to the “new capabilities-based approach”, i.e.: “one that focuses less on who might threaten us, or where, and more on how we might be threatened and what is needed to deter and defend against such threats” (RUMSFELD, 2002, p. 24).

At the introduction of the new strategy for the maintenance of peace and defense in the 21st century, he points out six transformation goals, already discussed in the document “Defense Planning Guidance” and the articles of the PNAC:

[...] we had already decided that to keep the peace and defend freedom in the twenty-first century, the Defense Department must focus on achieving six transformational goals: first, to protect the U.S. homeland and our bases overseas; second, to project and sustain power in distant theaters; third, to deny our enemies sanctuary, making sure they know that no corner of the world is remote enough, no mountain high enough, no cave or bunker deep enough, no SUV fast enough to protect them from our reach; fourth, to protect our information networks from attack; fifth, to use information technology to link up different kinds of U.S. forces so they can fight jointly; and sixth, to maintain unhindered access to space, and protect our space capabilities from enemy attack.
(RUMSFELD, 2002, p.24)

Corroborating to the guidelines of the Pentagon’s experts’ group who made the 1992 defense guide, Rumsfeld presented the proposals for boosting funds to meet not only investments in technology, but also the process of military transformation. According to the Secretary:

The goal is not to transform the entire U.S. military in one year, or even in one decade. That would be both unnecessary and unwise. Transforming the military is not an event; it is an ongoing process. There will be no point at which we can declare that U.S. forces have been “transformed”. (RUMSFELD, 2002, p.27)

Summarizing a few points that support the process of military transformation, to meet the 21st-century new strategy, the author defends a United States' assertive action:

First, wars in the twenty-first century will increasingly require all elements of national power: economic, diplomatic, financial, law enforcement, intelligence, and both overt and covert military operations. Second, the ability of forces to communicate and operate seamlessly on the battlefield will be critical to success. [...]. Third, our policy in this war of accepting help from any country, on a basis comfortable for its government, and allowing that country to characterize how it is helping (instead of our creating that characterization for it), is enabling us to maximize both other countries's cooperation and our effectiveness against the enemy. Fourth, wars can benefit from coalitions of the willing, to be sure, but they should not be fought by committee. The mission must determine the coalition, the coalition must not determine the mission, or else the mission will be dumbed down to the lowest common denominator. Fifth, defending the United States requires prevention and sometimes preemption. It is not possible to defend against every threat, in every place, at every conceivable time. Defending against terrorism and other emerging threats requires that we take the war to the enemy. The best—and, in some cases, the only—defense is a good sense. Sixth, rule nothing out—including ground forces. The enemy must understand that we will use every means at our disposal to defeat them, and that we are prepared to make whatever sacrifices are necessary to achieve victory. Seventh, getting U.S. special forces on the ground early dramatically increases the effectiveness of an air campaign.

(RUMSFELD, 2002, p. 31, emphasis added).

In short, this new doctrine was announced in the form of speeches, political statements like those of the State of Union lectures at West Point, in 2002, the speech at the American Enterprise Institute [1], and in the formulation of “The National Security Strategy of The United States”, published in September 2002, that it will be discussed next.

3.2 THE NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY - 2002

One of the characteristics of this new strategy was the adoption of a unilateralist posture based on the ideas present in “1992 Defense Planning Guidance”, which stated that the US was committed to keeping an unpolarized world, which meant the interest of having no competitor of the same level, that is, without the USA, no major powers coalition would be able to reach a hegemonic position. In other words, the United States would not seek security by a realistic strategy, nor would it act in a global system power balance, neither it sought a liberal strategy in which the institutions, democracy, and integrated markets would end up reducing the importance of the power’s policies. The goal was to keep the United States stronger than any other major states regarding security and strategic rivalry.¹⁸

As for the analysis on the global threats, and how they should be fought, it was understood that a new reality had to be faced. This meant the emergence of terrorist groups, possibly aided by delinquent states, that could acquire nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons and thus inflict catastrophic destruction. This diagnosis can be verified in President Bush’s statement at the West Point Academy, on June 1, 2002, as part of the “National Security Strategy” document (UNITED STATES MILITARY ACADEMY, 2002; THE NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY OF THE UNITED STATES, 2002, p.13-14):

But new deadly challenges have emerged from rogue states and terrorists. None of these contemporary

¹⁸ This goal made an unsettling early appearance at the end of the first Bush administration in a leaked Pentagon memorandum written by then Assistant Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz. With the collapse of the Soviet Union, he wrote, the United States must act to prevent the rise of peer competitors in Europe and Asia. (IKENBERRY, 2002/2003, p.28).

threats rival the sheer destructive power that was arrayed against us by the Soviet Union. However, the nature and motivations of these new adversaries, their determination to obtain destructive powers hitherto available only to the world's strongest states, and the greater likelihood that they will use weapons of mass destruction against us, make today's security environment more complex and dangerous. In the 1990s we witnessed the emergence of a small number of rogue states that, while different in important ways, share several attributes.

Following the guidelines of the "Quadrennial Defense Review" document, the new strategy sustained that the concept adopted at the Cold War, based on the concept of restraint, was outdated since the concept operated in conjunction with the concept of sovereignty and balance of power. The old defensive strategy of building missiles and other weapons capable of surviving the first attack, and their following deployment in retaliation to punish the aggressor no longer constituted a security guarantee. The terrorist attack was not represented by other major powers, but by subversive international networks without a fixed address.

Therefore, the only option would be to keep an offensive attitude that would have to be preemptive and even preventive. In other words, engage potential threats before they manage to become a huge problem. The old realistic and liberal strategies that underpinned the Doctrine of Containment have depleted themselves, as the September 11 attacks had demonstrated that the United States was living in a world of asymmetric threats (IKENBERRY, 2002/2003, p. 32).

The claim for the right to use of military force in a preemptive manner can be seen in the formulation of the "The National Security Strategy of The U.S.A." document:

The United States of America is Fighting a war against terrorists of global reach. The enemy is not a single political regime or person or religion or ideology. The enemy is terrorism— premeditated, politically motivated violence perpetrated against innocents. [...]

defending the United States, the American people, and our interests at home and abroad by identifying and destroying the threat before it reaches our borders. While the United States will constantly strive to enlist the support of the international community, we will not hesitate to act alone, if necessary, to exercise our right of self-defense by acting preemptively against such terrorists, to prevent them from doing harm against our people and our country.

(THE NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY OF THE UNITED STATES, 2002, p.5-6, emphasis added by the author).

The similarity between “1992 Defense Planning Guidance” and “2002 National Strategy Security” documents from President George Walker Bush’s first term is noticed by both Brzezinski and Mann, as follows:

For Brzezinski:

Nonetheless, the document planted the intellectual seeds for the policy of unilateralism preemption and prevention that emerged a decade later.

By then the authors of the working draft, who were mid level officials in 1992, had reappeared as senior Defense Department and NSC Officials, while its principal sponsor, Secretary of Defense Cheney, resurfaced in 2001 as the vice president of the United States. (emphasis added by author).

(BRZEZINSKI, 2007, p.81)

For Mann:

The search for a new post-cold war rationale for American military power culminated a few months later in one of the most significant foreign policy documents of the past half century. It set forth a new vision for a world dominated by a lone American superpower, actively working to make sure that

no rival or group of rivals would ever emerge. The document, written by Wolfowitz's assistant Zalmay Khalilzad, leaked out of the Pentagon in draft form. After it had become public, the administration, embarrassed, ordered it rewritten. Yet this document, both in its original form and in the sanitized version that was finally approved, had a lasting impact. It outlined many of the specific ideas and policies that the Vulcans were to pursue when they returned to office in the George W. Bush administration. In a more general way, the document set down some themes that even the Vulcans' Democratic opponents borrowed in the 1990s. As a guide to where American foreign policy was headed it had no peer.

The Pentagon document envisioned a future in which "the world order is ultimately backed by the U.S." The concept of collective security, on which the United States had relied during the cold war, was no longer at the heart of American strategic thinking. The United Nations was given short shrift. Alliances like NATO would also be of reduced importance, the document asserted. In the future the United States would deal with the world less with permanent, formal alliances and more through "coalitions" or "ad hoc assemblies, often not lasting beyond the crisis being confronted. (emphasis added) (MANN, 2002, p.77)

In sum, both authors qualified it as the most significant document of the last century as it defended the establishment of the *Pax Americana*.

CONCLUSION

Returning to my initial statements, in which I argue that the military actions in the Afghanistan War and Iraq War were based ultimately on both, Mackinder and Spykman's thoughts, I will return to its origin point, namely: "US Objectives with Respect to the USSR to Counter Soviet Threats to US Security" (NSC 20/4 November 23, 1948); "United

States Objectives and Programs for National Security” (NSC 68 of April 7, 1950).

In both documents that represent the expression of the Doctrine of Containment, there was a striking concern to prevent the planet’s main continent, Eurasia, from being conquered by the Soviet Union, which would mean the unconditional defeat of the United States. This translates the geopolitical dialectic of expansion - containment, which directed the relationship of the two powers throughout the 45 years of the Cold War.

That being said, the link that I have identified between these two documents from the 1950s, the Defense Planning Guidance document, and the military actions from Bush’s Administration in his first term guide us to a conclusion with the following strategical and geopolitical perspectives.

From a strategic perspective, the “2001 Quadrennial Defense Review” and “2002 National Security Strategy” reproduced the points discussed a decade earlier as relevant, namely: the development of a set of technological innovations that would promote the transforming process of the Armed Forces. The interest was, as mentioned early, to increase military projection capabilities at distant battlefields.

From a geopolitical perspective, I verified two aspects: the theoretical and the empirical. Concerning theoretical formulations, it is noticeable in the document the ideas of Mackinder and Spykman, even though they are not explicitly mentioned. For example, the memo of February 18, 1992, leaked to the press, evidenced that there was a concern to prevent the rise of a power in the region occupied by the former Soviet Union, in a region rich in energy resources: oil and gas.

This passage highlights that this region is no other than the Heartland, described by the English geographer, Halford Mackinder, and which, in the distant year of 1904, was called the planet’s pivot-region, not only for its vastness, but also by its inexhaustible resources. The Defense Planning Guidance document also warns that if another power dominates this territorial space, it could emerge as a major global actor. The document did not mention it by name, but it can be inferred that this is about the Caucasus and Central Asia. There is nothing new in this strategic thinking since, as I mentioned earlier, this had already been suggested in NSC 68.

The Defense Planning Guidance also points that the United States’ role is to be present in southwest Asia, in the Middle East, and in Central

Europe. The interest is to dissuade potential competitors from aspiring to regional dominance and seek rivalry with the United States.

Again, one cannot read the document's passages and the five scenarios discussed by these strategists, according to the New York Times, without referring to Professor Spykman's warnings in his ultimate work *The Geography of The Peace*. The document's suggestions bear a striking resemblance to Spykman's arguments in his *Rimland Theory*, in which he argued that focusing on Eurasia would be his eternal concern in times of peace and war.

Regarding the empirical aspect, the military actions of the George Walker Bush's administration seem to confirm that the adopted strategy in the two aforementioned events followed the geopolitical orientations from both geographers, but with an important advance made. Instead of remaining near Eurasia and taking advantage of the rapprochement's process with the Muslim former Soviet socialist republics, the United States would enter the Eurasian territory by installing bases in the two regions, as shown in the maps below:

CENTRAL ASIA: U.S. BASES



Source: KLARE, 2004, p. 163

In Central Asia, as shown in the map above, the following bases are found: Manas Air Base, in Kazakhstan; Khanabad Air Force Base in Uzbekistan, and Bagram Air Force Base in Afghanistan.

PERSIAN GULF: U.S. BASES



Source: KLARE, 2004, p. 92

In the Middle East, the following bases are found: Camp Doha Army Military Base and Ahmed al Jaber Air Base in Kuwait; Al Udeid Air Base, CENTCON, Qatar; Al Dhafra Air Base, in the United Arab Emirates; Thumrait and Masirah Island air bases in Oman.

In the end, one can note a significant convergence of issues, themes, and problems in these documents. Those are evidence that confirms that the Theories of Heartland and Rimland kept the same explanatory worth to the interpretation of several actions of the grand American strategy in the 21st century.

Geopolitics allows the connection between geography and strategy, seeking to establish the interactions between geographic space

and state power, aiming to produce prescriptions for the politics of power. Remembering Nicholas Spykman warning, geography is one of the fundamental factors - for being the most permanent - in the foreign policy of any great power.

DOUTRINA TRUMAN (1946); ORIENTAÇÃO DE PLANEJAMENTO DE DEFESA (1991) & ESTRATÉGIA DE SEGURANÇA NACIONAL (2002) : A DIALÉTICA MACKINDER & SPYKMAN REVISITADOS

RESUMO

O objetivo deste artigo é testar a hipótese de que as teorias geopolíticas de Halford Mackinder e Nicholas Spykman, que sustentaram a grande estratégia dos Estados Unidos com a implementação da Doutrina Truman em 1946, permaneceram relevantes após o seu encerramento. Os resultados alcançados apontam que suas matrizes intelectuais estão presentes nos documentos da grande estratégia dos Estados Unidos em dois momentos. O primeiro, em 1992, no governo de George Herbert Walker Bush no documento Defense Planning Guidance, formulado no âmbito do Pentágono, em fevereiro de 1992. Em um segundo momento, foram encontradas replicadas dez anos depois, no primeiro mandato do Presidente George Walker Bush, que tomou posse em 2001. Aqui as repercussões das formulações teóricas encontram-se nos documentos oficiais Quadrennial Defense Review (2001) e no National Security Strategy (2002). A conclusão é de que as ideias dos autores permanecem válidas para explicar e interpretar a ação da grande estratégia dos Estados Unidos no cenário internacional.

Palavras-Chave: Doutrina Truman; Defense Planning Guidance; Estratégia de Segurança Nacional; Pax Americana.

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