BETWEEN RUSSIA AND EUROPE: THE ROLE OF NATIONAL IDENTITIES IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS OF ESTONIA, LATVIA AND LITHUANIA

Erica Simone Almeida Resende[1]

Graziela Dumard[2]

ABSTRACT

Thirty years after the restauration of their independence, Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania are now members of the European Union and demonstrate little affinity with Russia, heir to the USSR. What is the role identity discourses in their foreign policy choices? We argue that Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania define their national identities – and therefore the thrust of their foreign policies – according to a logic of triangular attraction and repulsion towards Russia and Europe. Based on the Self/Other dichotomy, this article identifies how meanings associated with Baltic national identities were incorporated into their foreign policies after the fall of URSS. More specifically, the article examines the discourses of Russification and/or Sovietisation and Europeanisation, how these discourses differ from one another, and how the Baltic states respond to those influences in constructing their foreign policies.
Keywords: Baltic States; Russia; Europe; identities; foreign policy

[1] Doutora em Ciência Política pela Universidade de São Paulo e bacharel em Ciências Jurídicas e Sociais, com Complementação de Estudos em Relações Internacionais. É Professora Adjunta da Escola Superior de Guerra. É pesquisadora com bolsa de produtividade CNPq nível 2 e Jovem Cientista do Estado do Rio de Janeiro da Faperj. Coordena o Laboratório de Estudos Críticos de Segurança (LABECS) da ESG. Email: ericaresendear@gmail.com / Orcid: https://orcid.org/0000-0001-5567-163

[2] Doutoranda em Sociologia pela Universidade Estadual de Londrina, Mestre em Ciência Política pelo Instituto Universitário de Pesquisas do Rio de Janeiro e bacharel em Relações Internacionais pela Universidade Cândido Mendes. Dedica-se a estudos relacionados a democracia e Relações Internacionais, tendo como área de interesse a política externa dos países bálticos e relações com a Rússia. Email: grazieladumard@gmail.com / Orcid: https://orcid.org/0000-0003-2113-1555

INTRODUCTION

The Baltic states – Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania – share a common history of foreign occupation: by Sweden, Denmark, Poland, Germany, the Russian Empire and, finally, the Soviet Union. Curiously, this legacy of successive occupations means these countries have gained independence[3] twice: once in 1918 and again in 1990 (Lithuania) and 1991 (Estonia and Latvia). After the restorations of independence, the post-Cold War scenario offered Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania a new opportunity: rapprochement and integration with Europe and Western institutions like NATO.

In the 1990s, the Baltic states realised that belonging to the European Union (EU) would help them to promote their aspirations for growth. In part, this thinking was based on the fact that after the collapse of the USSR, Russia plunged into a profound crisis. Faced with the imperative to reorganize itself internally, it was unable to withstand the multiple demands arising, such as successfully transitioning from a state-dominated economy to a free market model. As such, the way the Baltic states saw themselves and perceived Russia and the EU was pivotal in their envisaging closer ties with Europe and a retreat from Russia as their only viable foreign policy option.

In 2004, Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania did indeed join the EU and NATO, consolidating a process that began in the previous decade. Despite initial expectations that this would bring about an improvement in their relations with Russia – not least because of the balance of power NATO membership would introduce – in fact, the opposite occurred. Relations became increasingly problematic, leading to a virtual incompatibility between their respective national identities.[4]

In 2014, the crisis in Ukraine and Russia's annexation of Crimea caused the Baltic states to bring up some old Cold War issues with the EU, NATO, and the US, prompting, for example, President Barack Obama's speech in Estonia in 2014, which revolved around security in the region. Even if fears of Russian expansionism under Vladimir Putin have not materialized further, the Baltic states are still wary of Russia and manage

---

[3] The terms restoration and return to independence will be used to refer to the process witnessed in the early 1990s, in view of the fact that the three Baltic states chose to restore their political and legal systems of 1920s.

[4] EHIN, Piret; BERG Eiki. *Identity and foreign Policy: Baltic Russian relations and European integration*. Burlington: Ashgate, 2009

their bilateral relations very carefully to avoid tensions. At the same time, their speedy rapprochement towards Brussels has highlighted the problem of the Russian minorities in Estonia, Lithuania, and Latvia, clashing directly with Putin's project for a New Russia[5] in a region that was formerly in the USSR's sphere of influence.[6]

Today, thirty years after the restoration of independence and the end of communism, the Baltic states are now integrated into the EU and NATO. Yet some dilemmas associated with their Soviet past linger on, such as issues concerning Russian minorities. Despite more than forty years under Soviet rule, the Baltic states demonstrate little affinity with Russia; indeed, it was precisely this experience that was the lynchpin of their decision to distance themselves from Russia.

How have identity formation processes impelled the Baltic states towards Europe and away from Russia? Our hypothesis is that through mechanisms of discursive articulation, these countries are defining their national identities – and therefore the thrust of their foreign policies – in line with a logic of attraction and repulsion towards Russia and Europe. During the years under Soviet occupation, the Baltic states were exposed to the repressive identity enforcement policies of Russification and/or Socialization, yet since independence restored, they do not seem to have demonstrated any fundamental identification with the Russian identity. At the same time, fears of an expansionist Russia have inflamed their existential anxieties, causing them to turn to the EU and NATO to protect their independence.

Based on the Self/Other dichotomy and its adaptation into international relations[7], this article maps out the discourses of attraction and repulsion in the triangle between the EU, the Baltic states, and

---

[5] New Russia, or *Novorossiya*, is a historical concept in Russia which was reinstated by President Vladimir Putin in 2014. The term relates to the Tsarist era and was used to refer to much of the Russian Empire conquered from the Ottoman Empire in the eighteenth century. According to Taylor (2014), the memories caused unease amongst the European countries which were once subsumed under the Russian Empire or the USSR, while also sparking collective chaos internally. TAYLOR, Adam. *Novorossiya: the latest historical concept to worry about in Ukraine.* The Washington Post. 18th April 2014. Available at: https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/worldviews/wp/2014/04/18/understanding-novorossiya-the-latest-historical-concept-to-get-worried-about-in-ukraine/. Accessed on: 15/06/2021.

[6] FARIA FERREIRA, Marcus; TERRENAS, João. "Good-bye, Lenin! Hello, Putin! O discurso geoidentitário na política externa da nova Rússia". *Revista Brasileira de Ciência Política*, n. 20, 2016.

[7] NEUMANN, Iver. "Self and Other in International Relations", *European Journal of International Relations*, v. 2, n. 2: 139-174, 1996.

Russia, and identifies how meanings associated with Baltic national identities were incorporated into their foreign policy discourses after the fall of communism. More specifically, we will examine the discourses of Russification and/or Sovietisation, and Europeanisation, how these discourses differ from one another, and how the Baltic states perceive these different influences. It will conclude with an analysis of these countries' foreign policies and how their national policies are being conducted in relation to what we understand as an internal Other, namely, Russian minorities living inside the Baltics. The article wishes to make a contribution to a growing debate that articulates foreign policy, national identities, and historical memory.[8]

FROM FOREIGN OCCUPATION TO RESTORATION OF INDEPENDENCE IN 1991/1992

For geopolitical historical reasons, and to some extent because of a shared identity, the term "Baltic states" is often used to refer to Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania. However, its popular identification with Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania has more to do with common historical processes than geographical precision. What unites them is a history of successive occupations by foreign nations during the Modern Era, especially Sweden, Denmark, Germany, and Russia.

The earliest occupation came against the backdrop of the Great Northern War (1700-1721) between Russians and Swedes that brought to an end with the Treaty of Nystad, which transferred Estland and Livland to Russia, and confirmed the dominance of the Russian Empire in the region. During the Tsarist era, the Baltic provinces retained a degree of self-governance, as they were allowed to maintain their laws and tax systems, the Lutheran faith, German as a vernacular, and their most important customs.[9] However, Russian cultural dominance was strong, leading the elites who owned German-Baltic lands to draw closer to the elites of the Russian Empire.

In Lithuania, occupation came later and by a different route: it was only incorporated into the Russian Empire in 1795, with the Third

---

Partition of Poland.[10] In an attempt to restore their Commonwealth, the Lithuanians rebelled twice against Russian rule, which resulted in a process of forced adaptation to the empire. According to Karjahärm, adaptation was only brought about by Russification policies[11], which targeted not only Lithuania, but also parts of Poland, in order to stifle nationalist movements, especially as of 1860.[12]

Interestingly, the awakening of nationalism in the Baltic states did not come out of the blue. As Enlightenment fostered nationalisms throughout Europe, in the Baltic states, a new sense of national identity was not so much a catalyst for independence as an attempt to diminish the subservience of the Germanic nobility.[13] As Baltic nationalism grew, the Russian Empire started to fear that the region – mostly composed of Baltic Germans who enjoyed a degree of political and administrative autonomy – would be attracted to the newly unified Germany. In addition, the Baltic provinces bordered Finland to the north and the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth to the south, causing great insecurity in St. Petersburg and Moscow. In response, the Russian Empire began to ramp up its Russification policies in the region. The policies were quite harsh and were enforced simultaneously on the cultural and administrative level.[14]

From 1888 on, the political and administrative systems in the Baltic provinces were adapted along the lines of the Russian system, which led to the abolition of the courts based on the German system, grounded on the principle of equality between citizens. Russian language and culture became mandatory.[15] Schools and universities started to use Russian, resulting in mass layoffs of teachers who did not speak the language. As for religion, even though the peasantry were mostly followers of the Lutheran faith, the Tsar had large Russian Orthodox churches built in every major city in the province, between the end of the nineteenth century and the beginning of the twentieth century.

---

[10] A series of successive losses of territory by the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth in 1795 to their Russian Empire neighbours, Austria and Prussia.

[11] Forced adoption of the language, culture and institutions of Russia in a non-Russian community as well as the appointment of Russian nationals to administrative posts.

[12] KARJAHÄRM, Toomas. *Russification period*. Available at: http://www.estonica.org/en/History/1850-1914_National_awakening/Russification_period/. Accessed on: 11/01/2021.

[13] O'CONNOR, Kevin. *The history of the Baltic States.* WestPort: Greenwood Press, 2003.

[14] RAUN, Toivo U. *Estonia and Estonians*. 2ed. California: Hoover Institution Press, 2001.

[15] KARJAHÄRM, Toomas. *Russification period*. Available at: http://www.estonica.org/en/History/1850-1914_National_awakening/Russification_period/. Accessed on: 11/05/2021

The early twentieth century was turbulent for the Baltic states. Modernization forced by Russification was not restricted only to the economic, cultural, administrative, and aesthetic spheres, it also impacted politics. New political parties sprang up, mainly of a nationalist and left-wing inclination, which began to gain supporters in the region. These parties were successful in articulating with the main groups, which led the 1905 revolution in Russia. Strikes quickly became a recurrent feature of life and the imperial guard took increasingly harsh measures in an attempt to curb the popular uprisings, which mainly called for changes in culture, education, and land reform.

With the outbreak of World War I, the Baltic region became strategic for the Russian Empire. While Lithuania was occupied by the Germans, Estonia was left virtually untouched. Latvia, however, was used as a line of defense to protect St. Petersburg. In addition, Estonians, Latvians, and Lithuanians were recruited to serve in the Tsarist army. With the Russian Revolution of 1917 and the ensuing climate of civil war, the three countries were able to take advantage of the prevailing chaos to declare their independence: Lithuania on February 16, Estonia on February 24 and Latvia on December 5, 1918.

Having achieved independence, the Baltic states now had to overcome a new challenge: how to structure themselves as independent states. First, they established constituent assemblies to draft new constitutions, which were modelled after the German Weimar, Swiss, and the French Third Republic. Having structured their legislative systems, they then turned their attention to other areas, especially cultural and security policies. National museums, art galleries and music conservatories were opened, the education system was modernized and nationalized. As Von Rauch points out, schools and universities were renamed to remove all traces of Russification[16] [17] The Baltic states negotiated their borders through agreements and treaties in order to prevent a possible Soviet or German invasion. In 1934, a Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation was signed, later called the Baltic Entente, which aimed to bring stability to the region.

However, in the 1940s the rise of Stalin in the USSR, Hitler in Germany, and the shift of the European conflict to the west rapidly

---

[16] For example, Dorpat University was renamed Tartu University in 1919

[17] VON RAUCH, Georg. *Baltic States: The Years of Independence Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania 1917-1940*. California: University of California Press, p. 81-85, 1974.

threatened the fledgling countries' independence.[18] In that decade, the region was invaded and occupied by two foreign powers in succession, and all the three countries lost their independence. As Kasekamp explains, although the occupation of the Russian Empire during the nineteenth century had meant Russian military presence, imperial bureaucracy, and an influx of Russian workers to the Baltic states, there was no comparison between this and what happened under the Soviet Union between 1944 and 1991.[19] During this period of Sovietisation, the Baltic states were not just Russified. The Soviet way of life was imposed on them in the form of an ideal Soviet citizen, who was superior, educated, scientific, forward-looking, and fluent in Russian.[20]

The early years of Soviet occupation were marked by permanent tension between the Baltic states and Soviet policies. In 1947, a new policy was brought in for the region which went beyond security to introduce widespread ideological control in a bid to shore up the new regime. Through propaganda, the USSR extolled communism and coerced nationals to accept its ideologies, mainly through its censorship bureau, Glavlit. At the same time, mass deportations began. In a single week about 100,000 people from Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, and Moldova were deported to far-flung regions of the USSR.[21] Religion and culture were also Sovietised. National artistic expression, especially literature, was repressed. Textbooks were rewritten to highlight the elements that united the Baltic states and the USSR. Several historical churches were destroyed. According to Kasekamp, Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania were psychologically beaten to submission and put in a state of fear.[22]

The death of Stalin in 1953 and the rise to power of Nikita Krushchev in 1955 heralded a new stage of Sovietisation in the region. The overall thrust of the policy was retained, but it was de-Stalinised. Political arrests were still made but were fewer in number and on a smaller scale, and political prisoner numbers declined. Krushchev granted amnesty to political prisoners and those deported who were still alive were

---

[18] The 1939 Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact signed by Hitler and Stalin divided the Baltic states between them.

[19] KASEKAMP, Andres. *The history of Baltic States*. Hampshire: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010.

[20] WEEKS, Theodore R. *Russification/Sovietization*. 2010. Available at: http://ieg-ego.eu/en/threads/models-and-stereotypes/russification-sovietization#Conceptsanddefinitions. Accessed on: 03/05/2021.

[21] It is estimated that around 90,000 Estonians, Latvians and Lithuanians were deported to Siberia between 25 and 29 March 1949.

[22] LASEKAMP, op. cit., p.147.

repatriated.[23] A milder form of censorship was employed, and a degree of decentralization was introduced, giving individual countries greater autonomy and space:

> Consumption increased; TVs and other domestic technology started to appear in people's homes. Urbanization gained pace, and the building of individual houses started. Relations with relatives who had escaped to the West were restored. Tallinn was opened to foreign tourists in 1965. Western music and clothing, and hippy ideology spread.[24]

In 1964, Leonid Brezhnev came to power, promising a new form of Russification. The Soviet citizen had to have national roots but speak Russian and were able to live and work anywhere in the USSR.[25] For Laar, Russification directed policies in the Baltic states after the occupations, with the objective of turning locals into minorities in their own nations and thus forming a civilian garrison to justify the externally imposed rules.[26]

The effect was a segregation policy that meant newcomers (mostly Russians) got priority in housing allocation, especially in Estonia. After World War II, local residents were prevented from returning home. Subsequently, Estonians were banned from entering certain cities in the country, like Sillamaë[27], and nationals became second-class citizens compared to Russian residents, and this was reflected in the allocation of jobs. Russians got the best jobs, as well as the best housing and consumer goods and even extra food. By 1965, there were already around one million Russians in the Baltic states. At the same time, the Estonian population of Estonia was just 68%, while Latvians accounted for just 50% of the

---

[23] LAAR, op. cit.

[24] Id., p. 190.

[25] A typical example of this is the 1978 pop song performed by Samotsvety, "My Address is the Soviet Union", with the lyrics, "my address isn't a house or a street, my address is the Soviet Union".

[26] LAAR, op. cit.

[27] Today, the northeast of Estonia is inhabited primarily by people of Russian descent.

population of Latvia. In contrast, there were about 80% Lithuanians living in Lithuania.[28]

The tentative reforms led by Mikhail Gorbachev in the 1980s – the policies of glasnost (openness) and *perestroika* (restructuring) – were decisive for the transformation of the Soviet bloc and the restoration of independence for the Baltic states. In Estonia, the new national awakening began with the Singing Revolution[29] of 1987, which Lieven describes as a period of great euphoria.[30] National symbols, which had been banned, reappeared on the city streets. The following year, Latvia and Lithuania followed suit, promoting music and art festivals.[31] National political parties were created[32], and by 1989, the pro-independence movements were more visible and organized.[33]

In Estonia, on 24 February 1989, the date of the country's 1918 declaration of independence, the blue, black, and white flag was hoisted in place of the hammer and sickle at the Pikk Hermann Tower in the capital, Tallinn. On 23 August, on the fiftieth anniversary of the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact, some two million people held hands to form a human chain that crossed the Baltic states, stretching more than 600 km. The symbology of the gesture was indicative of a shared desire to reinstate their nationhood after decades of foreign occupation

On 11 March 1990, Lithuania became the first Baltic republic to restore its independence. On 20 August 1991, Estonia did likewise, concluding a process that had begun in November 1989. Finally, on 21 August 1991, Latvia brought up the rear. On 17 September 1991, all three countries were admitted to the United Nations. By the end of 1991, their status as restored states were recognized, just as the USSR collapsed.

However, the international system the countries emerged into in 1991 was much changed from the reality of 1940. They had to make

---

[28] LAAR, op. cit.

[29] Around 250,000 Estonians – about a quarter of the population – went to the capital, Tallinn, to take part in a music festival.

[30] LIEVEN, Anatol. *The Baltic Revolution: Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania and the Path to Independence*. New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1993.

[31] According to Kasekamp, one of the best-known symbols of Baltic nationalism was its music festivals. KASEKAMP, op. cit.

[32] The Estonian Popular Front was created in Estonia, and similar parties were created in Latvia and Lithuania. Later that year, dissidents formed the Nationalist Party in Estonia. In Latvia, a party of the same name was also created, while in Lithuania, the Lithuanian Liberty League was formed.

[33] LAAR, op. cit.

major internal adjustments, but their reconstruction efforts immediately ran into their decades-long Soviet legacy. The most obvious way to offset the legacy of their occupation was to adopt a Western reorientation. In Kasekamp's view, the ultimate goal – to join the European Community – was very ambitious and would call for profound and sweeping reforms in the political, economic, administrative, social and legal arenas.[34]

This much-needed reform immediately ran into a problem caused by the years of Soviet occupation: a civil society entirely unprepared for participation in a democratic system. This became something of a wedge between society and organized politics. First of all, the new parties had trouble aligning their political interests, focusing more on drawing in celebrity names than tackling the needs of the people. This inevitably gave rise to volatility in the political party system. Domestically, there was instability, for all three countries' populations started to reject the governments in office. However, while their internal politics was shaky, when it came to foreign policy, all three countries kept their sights on their main goals: free market reform and integration with Western multilateral entities.[35] In 2004, after lengthy negotiations, the Baltic states were granted entry to the EU and NATO. There was real symbolism in this: "Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania are leaving Russia's sphere of influence and entering the Western world... We are part of the West now, and Russia has lost its control over us", said Atis Lejins, then director of the Latvian Institute of International Affairs.[36]

Nonetheless, there were certain obligations attached to membership of the EU, which had consequences for these societies already traumatized by long foreign occupations. To join the EU, Estonia, Lithuania, and Latvia had to be Europeanised that is reform their institutions, make commitments to the defense of democracy, the rule of law, human rights, respect for minorities and free market rules, while also internalizing the acquis communautaire produced until then by the European Court of Justice, and undertaking to continue promoting integration.

Even though they were keen to reorient themselves to the West and its institutions, the Baltic states still needed to manage their relations with post-Soviet Russia. What would the basis for this new relationship

---

[34] KASEKAMP, op. cit.

[35] Id.

[36] Quoted in FREITAS, Márcia. *Países bálticos querem escapar de influência da Rússia*. BBC Brasil, 2005. Available at: http://www.bbc.com/portuguese/noticias/story/2004/04/040420_balticos-russiamp.shtml. Accessed on: 21/05/2021.

be? Initially, it remained stable despite some critical episodes.[37] However, this began to change when Russia dragged its heels over the ratification of the international treaties negotiated with them, especially those relating to border issues.

Each of the Baltic states had a different border situation to manage. In Estonia and Latvia there was more trepidation, since they had been part of the Russian Empire and were occupied right after World War II. They were initially hopeful that Russia would recognize the 1920 treaties, but this proved unfounded. In 2005, Estonia and Russia signed an agreement that was later invalidated when Russia apparently withdrew its signature, hampering any formal agreement. In 2007, Russia signed and ratified a border treaty with Latvia. In Lithuania, an agreement had to be reached on the movement of goods and people towards Kaliningrad. In 2002, Kaliningrad citizens coming into Lithuania received a visa waiver.

According to Ehin and Kasekamp, the enlargement of the EU was propitious for the restructuring and renewal of relations between the Baltic states and Russia. Russia now saw Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania as "normal" states rather than "close foreigners" still under its influence.[38] It was also felt that entry to the EU would enable improvements in some specific areas. To negotiate trade agreements with the region, Russia would now have to deal with the whole of the EU, not with each country individually. Politically, the new status quo would also be advantageous, since the Baltic states would now approach Russia on an equal footing as members of a bloc with comparable "clout".

The issue of Russian minorities was one more topic that sparked considerable hopes of change. Thanks to the EU's minority protection laws, it was believed that the Baltic states would have to enact reforms to ensure more equal treatment for their nationals and Russian minorities. Moscow had similar expectations. According to Lukyanov, with the guarantee of independence and security that membership of the EU and NATO represented, "the Baltic states would be able to react to their Eastern neighbor with more composure".[39] However, hopes for a peaceable

---

[37] Such as the agreement for the withdrawal of Russian troops from their territories. This happened in Lithuania in 1993, and in Estonia and Latvia in 1994. Russia was critical of the countries because it felt their Russian minorities would be the target of persecution.

[38] EHIN, Piret; KASEKAMP, Andres. "Estonia-Russian Relations in the context of EU enlargement". In: ANTONENKO, Oksana; PINNICK; Kathryn (eds). *Russia and European Union: Prospects for a new relationship* Tallinn: Eesti Välispoliitika Instituut, p. 9-26, 2005.

[39] LUKYANOV, Fyodor. "Russia and the Baltic States: a moratorium on the past?". In: BUH-BE, Matthes; KEMPE, IRIS (eds). *Russia, the EU and the Baltic States: enhancing the potential*

relationship proved unfounded. Instead, the two sides became increasingly distanced after a series of events, most notably the deterioration of the situation in Ukraine.

When we look at the historical backdrop, it seems almost natural that with the legacy wrought by decades of foreign occupation the Baltic countries would end up turning to the West once they had restored their independence. Indeed, this movement away from Russia and towards Europe was confirmed in the early years of the twenty-first century. We will now see how much this political option depended on how Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania see themselves and how they see Russia and the EU.

RUSSIFICATION AND/OR SOVIETISATION AND NOW EUROPEANISATION: DIFFERENT BUT YET SIMILAR?

Once the euphoria at having entered the European bloc and their hope for better relations with Russia had waned, Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania faced two ever-present alternating elements from their history: Russification and/or[40] Sovietisation or Europeanisation. As we have already seen, Russification first appeared in the Baltic countries in the nineteenth century. Sovietisation occurred in the twentieth century during the Soviet occupation. Europeanisation gained popularity in the Baltic states as they embarked on their journey to join the EU. These concepts, when perceived by the Baltic countries, appear to be different, but when analyzed in their essence, could be seen to have certain similarities.

Russification and/or Sovietisation have been present for a considerable part of the history of the Baltic states. Although both policies were devised in Russia, they had distinct features and different effects in the way they were enforced. In the Tsarist and Soviet periods, the aim was to bring about state control of diverse populations. However, one of the distinguishing features of Russification was that it was enforced more moderately by the Russian Empire as a form of adaptation to the imperial system, but without envisaging colonisation. For Weeks (2010),

---

for cooperation. Moscow, 2005, p. 5. Available at: http://www.fes-baltic.ee/public/Tekstid/Russia_the_EU_and_Baltic_States.pdf. Accessed on: 22/05/2021.

[40] Although they have some differences, "and/or" is used here to explain USSR policies in the Baltic states during the occupation. Unlike the Russian Empire, which only employed Russification, the USSR employed both Russification and the Soviet lifestyle as the basis for its policies. The use of "and/or" is therefore appropriate because sometimes only Russification or Sovietisation was enforced while at others both were.

the Russification seen after 1893 was designed to curtail potential revolts against the Russian Empire, while simultaneously disseminating Russian culture among the inhabitants of the empire's western frontiers. Sovietisation, on the other hand, was designed to create a homogeneous bloc through the promotion of the Soviet identity. This meant the repression of non-Russian Soviet citizens, particularly during the Stalin years, prohibiting them from using and expressing their local languages and cultures.

At the other end of the spectrum was the Europeanisation felt in the Baltic region, especially after they regained their independence in the 1990s. This can be seen particularly in the context of the negotiations for accession to the EU. According to Robert Ladrech, Europeanisation is an "incremental process reorienting the direction and shape of politics to the degree that EC political and economic dynamics become part of the organizational logic of national politics and policy-making".[41][42]

The alternating experiences of Russification and/or Sovietisation and Europeanisation in the Baltic states gave the impression they were distinct and, indeed, opposite processes. In part, this came from a Western perception that Europeanisation was better than Russification and/or Sovietisation, especially in post-Cold War. However, it is worth inquiring whether they are indeed so very different from one another, or were just being articulated under the mythical idea that there was something that distinguished them. In fact, both processes involve bowing to a number of rules and regulations that constrain national policies of members and partners, whose full acceptance is a prerequisite for membership. Thus, both Russification and/or Sovietisation and Europeanisation are designed to bring about conformity and integration, making members more homogeneous in order to preserve a political project, whether they hail from Moscow or Brussels.

As a result, Sovietisation and Europeanisation are not that different in their attempt to rally members around a common identity. One primary goal of the USSR was to create the Soviet man with his single Soviet identity. The EU, on the other hand, because of the plurality of its member countries, cannot exactly enforce a single European identity.

---

[41] LADRECH, Robert. "Europeanization of Domestic Politics and Institutions: The Case of France", *Journal of Common Market Studies*, v. 32, n. 1, p. 69-88, 1994.

[42] For Bobbio (1998), European unification has led to a loss of the exclusively national nature of domestic policies, which have taken on supranational European features. BOBBIO, Norberto. *Dicionário de Política*. 11ª ed. Brasília: Editora UnB, 1998.

Nonetheless, as Hancock and Herz point out, membership of the EU has prompted a Europeanisation of political parties in Poland and the Baltic countries. Even if there is no unanimity, Europeanisation does help to build a European identity – albeit not unified or standardized – whose main characteristic is the diversity of the parties.[43]

However, it also true that Sovietization included a significant use of brutal force, especially during the period of Stalin's rule, which included a more than fair amount of deportations, repressions, and forced exile. And it was this use of violence that became the backbone of the constructed trauma discourse for the Baltic states. Therefore it could be argued that Sovietization was nothing similar to Europeanization from that point of view. Both processes were complicated, multilayered, and nuanced, and they were distinct during different periods of time. At the same time, both created and reinforced a triangular dynamic of attraction and repulse between the Baltic states, Russia, and Europe that remains tangible to this date.


Figure 1. Triangular attraction and repulse.

Source: author's own illustration.

[43] HANCOCK, M. Donald; HERZ, Dietmar. "Parties, party systems, and patterns of governance." In: HAMPTON Mary N.; HANCOCK; M. Donald (eds). *The Baltic security puzzle: regional patterns of democratization, integration and authoritarianism*. Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2015.

In this context, the process of setting the boundaries between Self and Other becomes central to the foreign policy of the Baltic states. During the Cold War, the boundaries between the inner Self and the external Other were more visible in the region, especially under the impact of Sovietisation, bringing the Baltic states closer to the USSR and pushing them away from Western Europe. With the breakup of the USSR and the return to independence in 1991, the pendulum swung, pushing Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania away from Moscow and back towards Brussels. Thus, the dynamics of Russification and/or Sovietisation vs. Europeanisation were instrumental in positioning the Baltic countries in a regional and global political context dominated by two poles of power: Western Europe to the west, and Russia to the east. Even so, they functioned under the same logic of attraction and repulsion, as their actions were designed to promote unity within their respective blocs and exclude those who were not perceived as belonging to them, thus impacting on the way in which the Baltic countries interacted with Russia and Europe.

HOW I SEE YOU AND HOW I SEE MYSELF: THE BALTIC STATES AND THEIR PERCEPTIONS OF RUSSIA AND EU

The Baltic states' newly reinstated independence and reorientation towards the West signaled to the international community that they were not, at least at that moment, willing to align with any parties who did not share the same Western ideals, Russia included. From the 1990s on, the region's relationship with Moscow was largely based on a triangular othering that included the EU. The discourses on post-communist Russia played a prominent role in the production of this triangular othering, especially with the publication of secret parts of the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact[44] and the reconfiguration of the narratives of victimization under Soviet occupation

At this time, the Baltic states were keen to gain recognition for their national claims through new discursive articulations of their national identities. One of the cornerstones of this discourse was the impact that Sovietisation had had on them, especially during the Stalin years. The main thrust of this narrative brought into play the notion of a "Soviet Holocaust", articulated in the conception of a trauma which, no

---

[44] In one of the two parts of the pact, the states situated between western and central Europe were secretly divided up between Nazi Germany and the Soviet Union.

longer restricted to Europe, took on a global and universal profile as the symbol of human suffering.[45]

According to Alexander, the Holocaust had become a universal reference, a "trauma-drama", due to its flexibility and potential to transcend borders in the construction of national narratives designed to garner political legitimacy based on claims of victimhood.[46] In the Baltic states, memories of the Soviet occupation were reconfigured to associate Estonian, Lithuanian and Latvian suffering during the years of Soviet occupation with Jewish suffering in Europe under Nazi rule.

For Budryte, the Western diasporas from Lithuania began to build the trauma-drama of the "Soviet Holocaust", although she prefers the word *genocide* to describe Stalinist repression.[47] Indeed, back in 1949, Pelèkis already compared the Nazi and Soviet regimes as equally destructive, given that both had been planned to take the Baltic region by force, in line with their expansionist political projects.[48] In this way, narratives of victimization were instrumental in promoting integration with the EU: the focus placed by the Baltic countries on their Soviet past foregrounded similarities between this and Europe's recent past, both of which involved regimes guided by extremist ideologies.

The calls for international recognition were followed by a second phase: calls for reparations, now more related to how post-communist Russia came to see the Baltic states. The desire for recognition and reparations was at the heart of the controversy surrounding the boycotting by European leaders of the official Victory Day celebrations in Moscow in 2005.[49] Indeed, throughout the 1990s and 2000s, national narratives experienced a resurgence in the Baltic states, especially with the celebration of national dates and the organization of national music and song festivals

---

[45] MACDONALD, David B. *Identity Politics in the Age of Genocide: The Holocaust and Historical Representation*. London: Routledge, 2008.

[46] ALEXANDER, Jeffrey C. "The Social Construction of Moral Universals". In: ALEXANDER Jeffrey C.; JAY, Martin; GIESEN, Bernhard; ROTHBERG, Michael; GLAZER, Nathan; KATZ, Elihu (eds). *Remembering the Holocaust: A Debate*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009.

[47] BUDRYTE, Dovile. "Travelling trauma: Lithuanian transnational after World War II". In: RESENDE, Erica; BUDRYTE, Dovile (Eds.). *Memory and Trauma in International Relations: theories, cases and debates*. New York: Routledge, 2014.

[48] PELĖKIS, K. *Genocide: Lithuania's Threefold Tragedy*. Venta, 1949.

[49] The presidents of Estonia and Lithuania did not attend the parade in Moscow. For more on the boycott, see: https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/europe/russia/11490770/Leaders-snub-of-Moscow-victory-parade-insult-to-soldiers-says-Russia.html. Accessed on 02/04/2019.

In 2004, relations with Russia were reset as the Baltic states gained membership of the EU and NATO. Initially, it was felt that their membership would improve their relations by making the Baltic states feel less insecure and adjusting the balance of power with Russia, using the tools of multilateralism to promote dialogue between the parties. Another factor that raised hopes for improvement was that the EU accession process compelled Estonia and Latvia to ease their citizenship policies and improve the rights of their minorities. There were also expectations of more trade agreements due to the 1994 EU-Russia Partnership and Cooperation Agreement.[50] Finally, it was hoped that border problems would be resolved, as the Baltic countries' western borders were with Europe and would therefore be increasingly subject to the strict Schengen rules.[51]

The reality was, however, somewhat different. Five years after their accession, there was still no sign of any thaw. For Ehin and Berg, relations with Russia were hampered by the prevailing feeling that the identities of Russia and the Baltics were inherently incompatible.[52] The perception of a Russia that had not shaken of its Soviet authoritarianism and still had expansionary aspirations fueled a sense of insecurity in the newly re-established – and therefore still fragile and insecure – countries of the region. Baltic-Russian relations continued to be marred by mistrust, animosity, difficulty and ultimately non-cooperation. For Russia, the accession of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania to NATO was intolerable, symbolizing in its eyes the loss of territories formerly within its sphere of influence to Germany, France and ultimately the US.[53] As Putin said, it was "a real catastrophe".[54]

In addition to these issues, there was one more mechanism impinging on the way the Baltic states viewed Russia: the way Europe itself viewed Russia. For Neumann (1998), for at least five centuries Europe had viewed Russia as different – politically, socially, religiously, militarily,

---

[50] The agreement provides for cooperation in political dialogue, trade relations, investments and business activities.

[51] EHIN; BERG, op. cit.

[52] Id.

[53] MIHKELSON, Marko. "Baltic-Russian Relations in Light of Expanding NATO and EU." *Demokratizatsiya. The Journal of Post-Soviet Democratization*, v. 11, n. 2, 2003.

[54] OSBORN, Andrew. "Putin: collapse of the Soviet Union was 'catastrophe of the century'". *The Independent*, October 6th, 2011. Available at: https://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/europe/putin-collapse-soviet-union-was-catastrophe-century-521064.html. Access: 24/05/2021.

and economically.[55] However, if, as he argues, we assume that identities are in constant flux, the meaning of Russia will also change: while more often than not it will still figure as an Other, this differentiation resides in the characterization of *similar* or *different*, which oscillates at different times and in different contexts. In any case, framing Russia as Other of Europe was one of the mechanisms for reifying Russia as Other of the Baltic states. Participation in the EU implied accepting its policies: the Others of Europe would become the Others of the Baltic states.

Although the three republics now view Russia as Other, they do so in different ways. That is, Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania oscillate in the way they characterize Russia. For example, one of the biggest stumbling blocks between Estonia and Russia is their understandings of the Tartu Peace Treaty[56] and border delimitations. In 2015, Estonia began looking into building a wall at the Russian border. However, the Baltic states are dependent on Russia for energy, as are as some other European countries. For Duckenfield, "it would be a mistake to regard Russia as an outsider to Baltic economic relations.[57] It is the second largest trading power in the region and as the region's predominant supplier of the oil and gas, it is deeply integrated into strategic sectors of the regional economy".

Although the EU had several agreements with Russia, there were still some areas where European discourse was more inflexible, which the Baltic states borrowed as a basis for their actions. As mentioned, after the end of communism, and in an attempt to forge closer ties with the West, the Baltic states framed themselves as victims of a Soviet genocide. Although it appears to be contradictory, since a similar discourse was not applied to Germany, this discourse was based precisely on their view of Russia as a successor to the Soviet Union, threatening their very integrity. However, even if at times the Baltic states saw Russia as undesirable and threatening, the presence of it as Other would be of great importance for the construction of their respective Baltic Selves.

---

[55] NEUMANN, Iver. "Russia as Europe's other". *Journal of Area Studies*, v. 6, n. 12, p. 26-73. 1998.

[56] Considered one of the founding documents of today's Estonia, it contains border provisions between Russia and Estonia.

[57] DUCKENFIELD, Mark. "The Baltics and the political economy of regional integration". In: HAMPTON Mary N.; HANCOCK M. Donald (eds). *The Baltic security puzzle: regional patterns of democratization, integration and authoritarianism*. Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2015, p. 34.

Considered an ambitious target, accession to the EU and NATO in 2004 was an important milestone for Baltic foreign policy.[58] Although their participation was initially viewed with some skepticism, it seemed the most plausible alternative at the time for them to achieve their goal of joining the ranks of international and Western organizations as quickly as possible in order to bolster their respective independence. There was a sense of urgency to this, an opportunity that should be seized while Russia was still weak and absorbed by its internal restructuring.[59] In addition to meeting the political and economic EU requirements, the Baltic states had to understand what Europe was so they could achieve common ground with it, in terms of their identity, and hence avoid isolation after accession.

Europe is actually a contested concept [60], and the politicization of its geographical boundaries (re-)arose in the context of negotiations for the EU, in particular about whether or not Russia's borderlands were part of Europe. For Huntington, the Baltic countries straddled the West and Orthodox culture, embodying the dividing line between Russia and Europe.[61] For Toomas Ilves, president of Estonia during the accession negotiations, "geographically and spiritually our European identity has never been in doubt".[62]

In this sense, Europeanisation via narratives of a Soviet genocide coupled with cultural openness to the West gave legitimacy to a Baltic identity as European and non-Russian.[63] As Lane argues, Estonia, Latvia

---

[58] Although the negotiations to join NATO and the EU ran parallel to each other and were not officially connected, they reinforced each other in spreading a common Western, European identity. See KASEKAMP, op. cit.

[59] EHIN, Piret. "Estonia: Excelling at Self-Exertion". In: BULMER, S.; LEQUESNE, C. (eds.). *The Member States of the European Union*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, p. 213-235, 2013.

[60] WALLACE, William. *The transformation of Western Europe*. London: Printer, 1990.

[61] HUNTINGTON, Samuel P. *O choque das civilizações e a recomposição da Ordem Mundial*. Rio de Janeiro: Objetiva, 1997.

[62] ILVES, Toomas H. Estonia's return to Europe. Speech given at the Societa Italiana per le Organizzazione Internazionale, 20th March 1997. Available at: http://www.vm.ee/et/node/42681 Accessed on: 09/06/2020.

[63] Some authors point out that the creation of transnational memory from the Holocaust in Europe is more complex. For Subotic (2019), the Baltic states (as well as other post-Communist states such as Serbia and Croatia) have experienced ontological insecurities when processes of Europeanization took place and they had to embrace the narrative about the Holocaust. As part of accession to the EU, East European states were required to adopt, participate in, and contribute to the established Western narrative of the Holocaust. This requirement created anxiety and resentment in post-communist states: Holocaust memory replaced communist terror as the dominant narrative in Eastern Europe, focusing instead on predominantly Jewish suffering in World War II. In a sense, it could be argued that the narrative about the Soviet genocide in the Baltic region may have hindered, and not helped, the processes of Europeanization. SUBOTIC, Jelena. *Yellow Star, Red Star: Holocaust Remembrance after Communism*.

and Lithuania reinforced an European Self, which enabled them to "to see themselves, and be seen by others, as part of the Western sphere of civilization", thereby closing the door on their Soviet past.[64] For Mälksoo, since Eastern Europe has been deemed legitimately European in its geographical and political characteristics, it has undergone an intense process of transformation to become "more European", especially by adopting the norms, institutions and values irradiating from Brussels.[65] As they have joined the bloc, Eastern European states have come to be perceived as part of Western European civilization. By definition, those who remain outside are regarded as Others.[66]

THE FOREIGN POLICIES OF THE BALTIC STATES: SOME CONCLUDING REMARKS

The purpose of this article was to shed light on a region of great strategic relevance, warranting the characterization of a pivot-area in international relations. Although the Baltic region went through a period of practically 'frozen' international relations between 1945 and 1989, it sprung back to the headlines after the collapse of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War. In fact, the Baltic region did not enjoy the same high visibility of the Middle East in terms of ethnic conflicts during the Cold War, and the ethnic tensions did not go away during the long years of Soviet dominance, despite policies of Sovietization implemented by the Kremlin. After the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989, and the tumultuous, sudden collapse of the Soviet Union, Estonia, Lithuania and Latvia regained their lost political autonomy and were welcomed back in the international system as sovereign nations.

At the same time, the article pointed to how national and ethnic identities are being made, reforged and resignified in the post-Soviet space, adequately also known as the borderlands of Europe. Following the break-

---

Cornell University Press, 2019.

[64] LANE, Thomas A. The Baltic States, the enlargement of NATO and Russia. *Journal of Baltic Studies*, v. 28, n. 4, p. 295-308. 1997, p. 296.

[65] MÄLKSOO, Maria. "From existential politics toward normal politics? The Baltic States in the enlarged Europe". *Security Dialogue*, v. 37, n. 3, p. 275-297, 2006.

[66] MOLE, Richard. *The Baltic States from the Soviet Union to the European Union: identity, discourse and power in the post-communist transition of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania*. New York: Routledge, 2012.

up of the Soviet Union, the Baltic region had to reflect on urgent questions around how the newly emerging nations of Estonia, Lithuania and Latvia would set out the creation of convincing identities for themselves and their citizens. What kinds of national myths and narratives could now anchor their nationhood? What new tensions would emerge from Russian and Soviet legacy in the region? Which new meanings of nation would arise, and which ones had to be exacerbated or suppressed? Who are Estonians, Lithuanians and Latvians in relation to Russians and Europeans? And what about the small, but still politically relevant, Russian-speaking nationals? What kind of mix of religion, language, ethnicity and homeland are at play in defining the national identities in that borderland region?

In the new scenario, choices had to be made. Indeed, with the restoration of their independence in the early 1990s, Estonia, Lithuania and Latvia appear to have three potential international relations policy options: neutrality, reintegration with the East (Russia) or integration with the West (EU). The choice of neutrality, briefly contemplated in the early 1900s, was rejected for History had shown that being neutral did not work before in preventing German or Soviet occupation during the Second World War and the Cold War. The choice for the East rekindled memories of a long period of domination – first by Russia and then by the USSR – in which national sentiments in the region were repressed. This rejection of Russia accordingly led all three countries to turn to the EU, NATO, the West and its civilization.

Nonetheless, for the Baltic states, what mattered most in the post-communist era was the capacity to remain independent and thereby retain their national sovereignty and integrity. This concern was incorporated into the national security laws passed by Lithuania[67], Estonia[68] and Latvia[69].

---

[67] Lithuanian security priorities include: safeguarding its sovereignty, territorial integrity and constitutional order, an open civil society and integrated ethnic and cultural identity. LITHU-ANIA. *Republic of Lithuania Law on the Basics of National Security*, 2012.

[68] Estonia's national security objectives are: "to promote national welfare and preserve the cultural heritage, to safeguard the preservation of the Estonian people, Estonian language and culture as well as Estonian identity" (Estonia, 2001, item 1.2, p. 5).

[69] For Latvia, the legal definition of security involves threats prevention by assuring the unity of civil society, by which the official language should be Latvian, bringing about the preservation of the national identity and thus security for the state and for society. The document also stresses the importance of bringing about "the integration of Latvian society into a broader space of European values and culture by strengthening the European identity and understanding of Latvia as a European country". LATVIA. *Latvian National Security Concept*. Riga,

However, the slide into this triangular relationship with Russia and the EU was largely driven by the dynamics behind the reconfiguration of national identities that had long been subjected to Russification, Sovietisation and, more recently, Europeanisation.

Despite the changes in the Baltic states in the 1990s, there was a feeling that the option of joining the EU and NATO would also fulfil their desire for security and protection for their political and physical integrity, as well as their desire to be recognized as part of a community of peoples who share a European and Western identity. At the same time, the option also shielded Estonia, Lithuania and Latvia from Russia's expansionist ambitions in its borderlands. This can be seen from U.S. President Barack Obama's 2014 speech on a visit to the region.[70] At the time, he stated that NATO would defend all allies, regardless of whether they were old or new members. In his speech, Obama even quoted a verse by the Estonian poet Marie Under, saying: "Who will come to help, right here, at present, now?". In a response that circled the world and warmed Baltic hearts, Obama promised that Estonia, Lithuania and Latvia would never ask that question again, because "we'll be here for Estonia. We will be here for Latvia. We will be here for Lithuania. You lost your independence once before. With NATO, you will never lose it again".

Even so, 2015 witnessed a heightening of tensions in Russia's borderlands. Relations between Russia and the West deteriorated, mainly due to the civil war in Ukraine and the annexation of Crimea.[71] As the NATO Secretary General, Anders Fogh Rasmussen, put it, "we must adapt to the fact that Russia now considers us its adversary". This statement, quoted by Williams, which could be interpreted as appearing in isolation, was actually based on the fact that Putin's 2014 military doctrine was a revision of a 2010 defense statement, in which NATO was identified as

---

10 March 2011, p. 6.

[70] OBAMA, Barack. *Remarks by President Obama to the People of Estonia*. Tallinn, 03 September 2014. Available at: https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2014/09/03/remarks-president-obama-people-estonia. Accessed on: 11/05/2021.

[71] HAMPTON, Mary N. "Unfinished Business: NATO enlargement in the Baltic Sea Region". In: HAMPTON Mary N.; HANCOCK; M. Donald (eds). *The Baltic security puzzle: regional patterns of democratization, integration and authoritarianism*. Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2015.

Russia's main adversary and the use of nuclear weapons was authorized to prevent any aggression that might threaten Russia's existence.[72]

If at first Russia seemed inclined to accept closer ties with the West, as initiated by Gorbachev and continued under Yeltsin, to rise of Putin coincided with a change in stance towards the transformations in Eastern Europe. As put by Putin[73], "the collapse of the Soviet Union was the great geopolitical catastrophe of the twentieth century". Furthermore, the conflicting situations in Georgia in 2008 and Ukraine in 2014 brought even more instability to the Baltic states' relations with Russia, and Russia's with NATO. Both sides had quite different interests, because even as a "new Russia" is being nurtured by Putin, Europe is still keen to maintain peace and stability in the region.

In their attempts to strike a balance between internal and external forces, the Baltic states have managed to meet their primary goal of reorienting themselves towards Europe and its institutions. But the balance is tricky. With the issue of identities as the backdrop, the Baltic states are managing their relations with Russia and the EU, and cautiously dealing with their inner Self(s) and Other(s) as they discover themselves and their peers in the international system. The perils, however, continue to escalate, especially under Putin revisionist plans to build a "New Russia" from a favorable position in Ukraine, which aggravates their perceptions of regional insecurity.

---

[72] WILLIAMS, Heather. *Negotiated Trust: U.S.-Russia Strategic Arms Control, 1968-2010*. Doctoral thesis, King's College, London, UK, 2015.

[73] Annual address to the Federal Assembly of the Russian Federation given by President Putin on 25 April 2005.

ENTRE RÚSSIA E EUROPA: O PAPEL DAS IDENTIDADES NACIONAIS NAS RELAÇÕES INTERNACIONAIS DE ESTÔNIA, LETÔNIA E LITUÂNIA

RESUMO

Passados trinta anos da restauração das independências, Estônia, Letônia e Lituânia são hoje membros plenos da União Europeia e demonstram ter pouca afinidade com a Rússia, herdeira da antiga URSS. Qual o papel dos discursos de identidades nacionais na definição das preferências de política externa desses países nas relações com UE e Rússia? Entendemos que Estônia, Letônia e Lituânia definem suas identidades nacionais – e, portanto, a direção de suas políticas externas – de acordo com uma lógica triangular de atração e repulsa com Rússia e a Europa. Com base na literatura pós-estruturalista e na dicotomia Eu/Outro em Relações Internacionais, este artigo identifica como significados associados às identidades nacionais bálticas foram incorporados aos discursos de política externa daqueles países após o colapso da União Soviética. Mais especificamente, o artigo examina os discursos de russificação e/ou sovietização e europeização desses países, mostrando suas diferenças, e como esses países reagem a essas influências na definição de suas políticas externas.

Palavras-chave: Estados bálticos; Rússia; Europa; identidades; política externa.

REFERENCES

ALEXANDER, Jeffrey C. The Social Construction of Moral Universals. In: AL-EXANDER Jeffrey C. et al. (eds). **Remembering the Holocaust:** A Debate**.** Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009.

BOBBIO, Norberto. **Dicionário de Política.** 11. ed. Brasília: Editora UnB, 1998.

BUDRYTE, Dovile. Travelling trauma: Lithuanian transnational after World War II. In: RESENDE, Erica; BUDRYTE, Dovile (eds.). **Memory and Trauma in International Relations:** theories, cases and debates. New York: Routledge, 2014.

DUCKENFIELD, Mark. The Baltics and the political economy of regional integration. In: HAMPTON Mary N.; HANCOCK M. Donald (eds). **The Baltic security puzzle:** regional patterns of democratization, integration and authoritarianism. Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2015.

EHIN, Piret. Estonia: Excelling at Self-Exertion. In: BULMER, S.; LEQUESNE, C. (eds.). **The Member States of the European Union**. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013. p. 213-235.

EHIN, Piret; BERG Eiki. **Identity and foreign Policy:** Baltic Russian relations and European integration. Burlington: Ashgate, 2009.

EHIN, Piret; KASEKAMP, Andres. Estonia-Russian Relations in the context of EU enlargement. In: ANTONENKO, Oksana; PINNICK; Kathryn (eds). **Russia and European Union:** Prospects for a new relationship. Tallinn: Eesti Välispoliitika Instituut, 2005. p. 9-26.

FARIA FERREIRA, Marcus; TERRENAS, João. Good-bye, Lenin! Hello, Putin! O discurso geoidentitário na política externa da nova Rússia. **Revista Brasileira de Ciência Política**, n. 20, 2016.

FREITAS, Márcia. Países bálticos querem escapar de influência da Rússia. **BBC Brasil**, 2005. Available at: http://www.bbc.com/portuguese/noticias/story/2004/04/040420_balticosrussiamp.shtml. Accessed on: 21 may 2021.

HAMPTON, Mary N. Unfinished Business: NATO enlargement in the Baltic Sea

Region. In: HAMPTON Mary N.; HANCOCK; M. Donald (eds). **The Baltic security puzzle:** regional patterns of democratization, integration and authoritarianism. Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2015.

HANCOCK, M. Donald; HERZ, Dietmar. Parties, party systems, and patterns of governance. In: HAMPTON Mary N.; HANCOCK; M. Donald (eds). **The Baltic security puzzle:** regional patterns of democratization, integration and authoritarianism. Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2015.

HUNTINGTON, Samuel P. **O choque das civilizações e a recomposição da Ordem Mundial**. Rio de Janeiro: Objetiva, 1997.

ILVES, Toomas H. Estonia's return to Europe. Speech given at the Societa Italiana per le Organizzazione Internazionale, 20th March 1997. **Väliministerium**. Available at: http://www.vm.ee/et/node/42681. Accessed on: 09 june 2020.

KARJAHÄRM, Toomas. Russification period. **Estonica.org**. Available at: http://www.estonica.org/en/History/1850-1914_National_awakening/Russification_period/. Accessed on: 11 jan. 2021.

KARJAHÄRM, Toomas. Russification period. **Estonica.org**. Available at: http://www.estonica.org/en/History/1850-1914_National_awakening/Russification_period/. Accessed on: 11 may /2021.

KASEKAMP, Andres. **The history of Baltic States**. Hampshire: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010.

KLYMENKO, L.; SIDDI, M. Exploring the link between historical memory and foreign policy: an introduction. **International Politics**, v. 57, p. 945-953, 2020.

LAAR, Mart. **Estonia's way**. Tallinn: Pegasus, 2006.

LADRECH, Robert. Europeanization of Domestic Politics and Institutions: The Case of France. **Journal of Common Market Studies**, v. 32, n. 1, p. 69-88, 1994.

LANE, Thomas A. The Baltic States, the enlargement of NATO and Russia. **Journal of Baltic Studies**, v. 28, n. 4, p. 295-308. 1997.

LATVIA. **Latvian National Security Concept**. Riga, 10 March 2011.

LIEVEN, Anatol. **The Baltic Revolution:** Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania and the Path to Independence. New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1993.

LITHUANIA. **Republic of Lithuania Law on the Basics of National Security**, 2012.

LUKYANOV, Fyodor. Russia and the Baltic States: a moratorium on the past?. In: BUHBE, Matthes; KEMPE, IRIS (eds). **Russia, the EU and the Baltic States: enhancing the potential for cooperation**. Moscow: [S. n.], 2005. p. 5. Available at: http://www.fes-baltic.ee/public/Tekstid/Russia_the_EU_and_Baltic_States. pdf. Accessed on: 22 may 2021.

MACDONALD, David B. **Identity Politics in the Age of Genocide:** The Holocaust and Historical Representation. London: Routledge, 2008.

MÄLKSOO, Maria. From existential politics toward normal politics? The Baltic States in the enlarged Europe. **Security Dialogue**, v. 37, n. 3, p. 275-297, 2006.

MIHKELSON, Marko. Baltic-Russian Relations in Light of Expanding NATO and EU. **Demokratizatsiya. The Journal of Post-Soviet Democratization**, v. 11, n. 2, 2003.

MOLE, Richard. **The Baltic States from the Soviet Union to the European Union: identity, discourse and power in the post-communist transition of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania**. New York: Routledge, 2012.

NEUMANN, Iver. Self and Other in International Relations, **European Journal of International Relations**, v. 2, n. 2, p.139-174, 1996.

NEUMANN, Iver. Russia as Europe's other. **Journal of Area Studies**, v. 6, n. 12, p.26-73, 1998.

O'CONNOR, Kevin. **The history of the Baltic States**. WestPort: Greenwood Press, 2003.

OBAMA, Barack. Remarks by President Obama to the People of Estonia. **The White House**, Tallinn, 03 sept. 2014. Available at: https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2014/09/03/remarks-president-obama-people-estonia.   Accessed on: 11 may 2021.

OSBORN, Andrew. Putin: collapse of the Soviet Union was 'catastrophe of the century. **The Independent**, 6 oct. 2011. Available at: https://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/europe/putin-collapse-soviet-union-was-catastrophe-century-521064.html. Access: 24 may 2021.

PELĖKIS, K. **Genocide:** Lithuania's Threefold Tragedy. Venta, 1949.

RAUN, Toivo U. **Estonia and Estonians**. 2. ed. California: Hoover Institution Press, 2001.

SUBOTIC, Jelena. **Yellow Star, Red Star:** Holocaust Remembrance after Communism. Cornell University Press, 2019.

TAYLOR, Adam. Novorossiya: the latest historical concept to worry about in Ukraine. **The Washington Post**. 18 apr. 2014. Available at: https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/worldviews/wp/2014/04/18/understanding-novorossiya-the-latest-historical-concept-to-get-worried-about-in-ukraine/. Accessed on: 15 june 2021.

VON RAUCH, Georg. **Baltic States:** The Years of Independence Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania 1917-1940. California: University of California Press, 1974.

WALLACE, William. **The transformation of Western Europe**. London: Printer, 1990.

WEEKS, Theodore R. Russification/Sovietization. **EGO**. 2010. Available at: http://ieg-ego.eu/en/threads/models-and-stereotypes/russification-sovietization#Conceptsanddefinitions. Accessed on: 03 may2021.

WILLIAMS, Heather. **Negotiated Trust:** U.S.-Russia Strategic Arms Control, 1968-2010. Doctoral thesis, King's College, London, UK, 2015.