

BEYOND GRAND STRATEGY AND THE STRATEGIC ENVIRONMENT: A PROPOSAL TO OUTLINE A GRAND BORDER STRATEGY

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ABSTRACT

The idea of “Strategic Borderlands” emerged in Brazil during the early 2000s as an elastic concept to address issues based on the Brazilian projection of power. Designing geographically delimited borderlands, Brazil sought to conceptually define priority areas to exercise its political and strategic influence. The article aims to articulate the axes to elaborate a “Great Border Strategy.” First, we will present the concept of “Strategic Environment,” from the Brazilian perspective. To this end, a review was carried out with the main official documents that guide Defense policies. Then, we tried to evaluate the relationship between “Strategic Environment” and “Grand Strategy,” a concept that evolved in the Anglo-Saxon literature throughout the 20th century. Based on the Strategic Border Plan, started in 2011, we seek to assess its impact on public policies for the northern region of Brazil. Finally, we conclude this paper with a brief conceptual proposal, outlining a “Grand Border Strategy,” first steps to propose a State policy in the near future.

Keywords: Strategic Borderlands. Grand Strategy. Grand Border Strategy. Brazil.

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INTRODUCTION

From geopolitics point of view, the concept of “Strategic Environment” represented a historic landmark to delimit geographically the national intentions in the field of strategic studies. By designing a geographically-delimited environment, Brazil sought to define conceptually areas considered to be priority and strategic to exert its political and strategic influence.

This article aims to work on this concept, based on a previous reflection on “Grand Strategy” already incorporated into the Anglo-Saxon literature. We draw attention to the importance of mobilizing these two concepts to reflect on the country’s strategic direction in the twenty-first century. We can observe that there was a concept broadening (from a geographical point of view), based on contributions from academia, both in Brazil and abroad. Then, the article proposes to highlight the relationship between the concept of “Strategic Environment” and “Grand Strategy.” To this end, a survey on authors who address the various definitions of the concept was carried out.

“Grand Strategy,” from a theoretical point of view, does not have a clear and definitive definition. Similar to the “Strategic Environment,” the concept has an elasticity that allows a modeling based on immediate and future needs, something that corresponds to a State’s ambitions in relation to its role in the international system. We also seek to analyze the Strategic Border Plan (PEF), developed mainly by the Ministry of Justice since 2011, seeking to strengthen development and security in the states located along the border.

The PEF represented an important step in the trajectory of public policies aimed at neighboring regions, but unfortunately, after an internal assessment in 2016, it was not sufficient to ensure an adequate response in relation to the initial objectives of the plan, based on medium- and long-term strategic goals. Finally, we want to conclude this work with a brief conceptual proposal, establishing the general framework for outlining a “Grand Border Strategy” (GEF), whose main objective is to redefine the path to overcome the rules of the Integrated Border Protection Program (PPIF), currently in force in Brazil.

The article does not intend to detail the theoretical and practical aspects of the future “Grand Border Strategy,” but offer the methodological

bases that can help guide a reflection on the concept of “Grand Border Strategy,” particularly in the domestic context.

1. THE INSERTION OF THE “STRATEGIC ENVIRONMENT” CONCEPT INTO BRAZILIAN ARMED FORCES’ OFFICIAL DOCUMENTS

In order to better understand the insertion of the concept into the Armed Forces, it is important to carry out a survey on the different publications that guided the country’s Defense Policy from 1996 onwards. The first official document that considered a “national strategic interest area” was published in the National Defense Policy (PDN), even before the creation of the Ministry of Defense, in 1999 (BRASIL, 1996).

This document, and the following updated versions, served as a beacon for State action and fulfilled a dual function: “domestically, they are often invoked to legitimize policy formulation at the ministerial level and for the planning and organization of the armed forces; externally, they reveal to other countries the concerns, priorities and guidelines that constitute their defense agenda, what tends to be taken into account by interested countries for their own strategic formulations” (SVARTMAN, 2012, p. 25).

The PDN, although important due to its unprecedented nature, drew attention for being a brief document (eight pages). Obviously, this did not mean that it was irrelevant, as it served as a framework for the formulation of successive defense policies at the national level. The PDN, in its item 2.7, highlighted that: “For Brazil, which comprises different regions and has a very diversified profile—ranging from the Amazon and the Atlantic, to the River Plate and the Southern Cone in a single country—the concept of regional space expands the South American continental landmass to the point where it includes the South Atlantic” (BRASIL, 1996, p. 5). We observe that the State’s framework at that moment passes through a geographical representation, that is, a clearly defined regional space. Despite this progress, the PDN did not consider the presence of non-regional actors to be of concern (the USA, exerting its influence with Plan Colombia, France with French Guiana and the insular presence of the United Kingdom in the South Atlantic).

More than twenty years after the publication of the first version of the PDN, the Strategic Environment has increased in importance,

reinforced by the alignment between a Defense Policy and a “proud and active” Foreign Policy emphasized by the then chancellor Celso Amorim (AMORIM, 2014; 2016). We can observe that between 1996 and 2016, there was an assertiveness of its character, when we moved from the “regional space,” a vague relative concept from the geographical point of view, to an “area of priority interest.” The assertive and priority formulation of the Strategic Environment in this period showed how the area (understood as an academic and intellectual environment) began to consider strategic areas more precisely, using geopolitical perspectives in its interpretations.

As highlighted by Almeida, despite significant advances, the two versions of the PDN (1996 and 2005) exemplified this hermetic nature of the theme, with no public parliamentary debate being held, as “they are presidential decrees and not laws produced with a broad legislative debate” (ALMEIDA, 2010, p. 229). On the other hand, it can be said that the National Strategy of Defense (END) (BRASIL, 2008) brought in its proposal the idea of a broader debate; however, it was still an incipient construction. A consequence of this conceptual delimitation is the document explicit recognition of the need for extraterritorial protection to national defense interests.

To conclude this point, it is interesting to note that the National Defense White Paper (BRASIL, 2012b) offered a different interpretation of the concept. The document alters the definition of the 2005 PDN, which was maintained in the preparation of the National Strategy of Defense (BRASIL, 2008). When it addresses this point, explaining that “With regards to other countries, Brazil gives priority to its *immediate neighbors* in South America, the South Atlantic region and Africa’s western coast ” (BRASIL, 2012b, p. 12, emphasis added). Finally, we can agree on the mature definition of the concept based on the National Strategy of Defense and the National Defense Policy, which mentioned in item 4.1:

“South America is the regional environment in which Brazil is inserted. Seeking to deepen its cooperation ties, the country envisages a strategic environment that goes beyond the South American region and includes the South Atlantic and the neighboring countries of Africa, as well as Antarctica. To the north, the proximity of the Caribbean Sea requires that increasing

attention be given to this region” (BRASIL, 2012a, p. 21).

Within the scope of national academic production, contributions followed the same guidelines, emphasizing a geographical expansion of the concept. In 2011, Vaz reinforced that “the Brazilian strategic environment is much more than its regional environment. And it is the maritime projection that leads to this, since, on the continental projection side, our strategic environment is defined as encompassing from South America to the Pacific coast – that is, the South American continent itself. This puts Brazil in a more regional conception” (VAZ, 2011, p. 53). Another important point of the debate is to note that from 2012 to 2016, the “regional” dimension of the Strategic Environment was no longer mentioned and even removed from the official documents (END and PDN). In replacement of the regional dimension, the document recognizes two other ones: the national and the international dimensions. Thus, the document may have anticipated, or even recognized, the severe distrust of South American players in the ability to articulate an efficient cooperation in the area of defense and security in the South American environment (FAGUNDES, 2017).

The concept of Strategic Environment gained a greater repercussion in the academic sphere from the contribution of Fiori (2013). An assertive posture is glimpsed in Brazil’s international insertion in that period, augmented by strategic considerations. For the author, the “concept of the country’s strategic environment, the region where Brazil preferentially wants to radiate – its influence and its diplomatic, economic and military leadership, which includes South America, sub-Saharan Africa, Antarctica and the South Atlantic” (FIORI, 2013, p. 32). It is important to point out that this definition comes after ten years of good results in the economic sphere, based on the so-called “proud and active diplomacy” and, as of 2005, the launch of three strategic plans (FX-2, PROSUB and SISFRON).

The definition presented by Fiori corroborates the assessment made by Brands (2010) when he stated that “Lula has done so by emphasizing three diplomatic strategies: soft balancing against the United States, building coalitions to magnify Brazilian negotiating power, and seeking to position Brazil as the leader of a more united South America” (BRANDS, 2010, p. 6). In fact, Fiori’s definition seems opportune due to the diplomatic efforts carried out by Itamaraty at the time, particularly

in the articulation of the Union of South American Nations (UNASUR). On the other hand, Guevara (2019) drew attention to the diversification of the Brazilian agenda, where: “this geopolitical vision incorporated a multidimensional paradigm in which military security approached environmental or food security, among other issues within the framework of non-traditional aspects of security” (GUEVARA, 2019, p. 300).

Based on these definitions, we can formulate our own definition and consider that the Strategic Environment is the geopolitical space considered a priority, in a given period, by the Brazilian State, seeking to strengthen its capacity to project its power and influence, whether at regional or global level. Therefore, the concept of Strategic Environment gained strength and projection in the academic world, and politically transformed the State’s capacity to project power and influence.

2. CONCEPTUAL APPROACH BETWEEN “STRATEGIC ENVIRONMENT” AND “GRAND STRATEGY” IN CLASSIC AND CONTEMPORARY AUTHORS

Among the road works that can integrate MS into South America, the BioAfter the presentation of the Strategic Environment” concept and its insertion in the epistemic environment, we sought to highlight its relationship with what is known as “Grand Strategy” in Anglo-Saxon literature. From this perspective, the influence of Clausewitz’s reflections on strategic studies is clear, when he proposes to think about the relationship between war and politics (CLAUSEWITZ, 1996). Evidently basing his argument on the German strategist’s writings, Liddell Hart explained that if war is the continuation of politics, which is governed and directed by a central political objective, then war and Grand Strategy must be oriented from a coherent vision of the post-war moment, in which one seeks results and benefits from statesmen and also that their policies can produce these objectives. This definition underpinned the concept of “Grand Strategy” for a good part of the Cold War period. In his work “Strategy,” Liddell Hart formulated the concept as follows:

“For the role of grand strategy — higher strategy — is to coordinate all the resources of a nation, or a band of nations, towards the attainment of the political object of the war — the goal defined by

fundamental policy. Grand strategy should both calculate and develop the economic resources and man-power of nations in order to sustain the fighting services" (LIDDELL-HART, 1967, p. 322).

In the 1980s and 1990s, authors from the field of International Relations and Strategic Studies contributed with different approaches to the concept. John Lewis Gaddis, for example, considered Grand Strategy to be "the process by which ends are related to means, intentions to capabilities, objectives to resources" (GADDIS, 1982, p. 8). This definition appeared to be rather vague or imprecise, and a step further was taken with Paul Kennedy's contribution, who noted that:

the most important point of Grand Strategy lies in politics, that is, in "the capacity of nation's leaders to bring together all of the elements, both military and nonmilitary, for the preservation and enhancement of the nation's long-term (that is, in wartime and peacetime) best interests" (KENNEDY, 1987, p. 5).

This definition centralized the role of political elites in ordering and planning the elaboration of Grand Strategy. Therefore, it was not an improvised or aimless project. In fact, it demanded from the political elites the posture of a firm statist, concerned with defining a long-term state policy.

In this line of thought, in addition to political plans, thinking about Grand Strategy obliged people to open up the range of resources made available to the statist. Thus, for Rosecrance & Stein (1993), Grand Strategy considers "all the resources at the disposal of the nation (not just military ones), and it attempts to array them effectively to achieve security in both peace and war" (ROSECRANCE & STEIN, 1993, p. 4).

In a more synthetic way, Thomas J. Christensen's definition drew attention to the duality of approaches and conceived "grand strategy as the full package of domestic and international policies designed to increase national power and security" (CHRISTIENSEN, 1997, p. 7). This last definition brought the concept closer to the central aspects of the offensive realism theory (MEARSHEIMER, 2001).

In the field of international relations, Walt's contribution came when he argued that "state's grand strategy is its plan for making itself secure. Grand strategy identifies the objectives that must be achieved to produce security, and describes the political and military actions that are believed to lead to this goal" (WALT, 1989, p. 6). These definitions were produced exclusively in the core of the main power of the international system (the United States), in a time of great triumphalism. The authors presented defined "Grand Strategy" based on the American reality, and mainly on military power and the State's capacity to articulate its productive forces, particularly in the field of Defense, from its thriving military-industrial complex (SWANSON, 2013).

In this sense, Russell and Toktalian (2015) recognized that the definition proposed by Brands (2012) corresponded to this more realistic posture, imagining Grand Strategy as a "theory, or logic, that [sic] binds a country's highest interests to its daily interactions with the world (BRANDS, 2012, p. 3) [...] grand strategy represents an integrated conception of interests, threats, resources and policies" (BRANDS, 2012, p. 4). In short, it is possible to state that the concept of "Grand Strategy" has several definitions and also sui generis characteristics, such as being at the same time a vision, a plan, a capacity, a paradigm, a model, and even a culture (VENKATSHAMY, 2012).

In search of a definition of Grand Strategy that could correspond to the middle or regional powers, we drew attention to South American countries' posture in the international system. In fact, we need to adapt the concept, not as an articulated package of policies oriented towards a high-strategic objective, but as South American countries' external action organizational principle.

In this sense, Russell and Toktalian (2015) argued that "Latin American small grand strategies have attempted to respond in fundamental terms to situations and processes involving neighboring countries; that is, they have been conceived and developed to face local challenges and threats independently of the dynamics typical of the global power games. However, their implementation had a direct and important impact on the display of the strategic options related to the logics of autonomy and acquiescence and consequently on the relationships of the region with the rest of the world, particularly with the United States" (RUSSELL & TOKTALIAN, 2015, p. 62). In other words, Latin American countries' strategy was mainly aimed at aligning their strategic interests without threatening US influence in the region.

In relation to Brazil, the ambition was greater. In 2014, the then chancellor Amorim affirmed that: “for today’s Brazil, the concept of grand strategy should refer to a coordination of policies aimed at defense of the national interest and contribution to world peace. These two objectives complement and reinforce each other” (AMORIM, 2014, p. 2). The Minister of State continued to explain that:

“although defense policy involves broader dimensions, its fundamental reference – as it should be – is Brazil’s strategic environment. Our surroundings are composed of South America, on the one hand, and the South Atlantic (seen in its geopolitical and not exclusively geographic sense) and Africa’s western edge, on the other” (AMORIM, 2014, p. 4)

Therefore, the definition proposed by Milani and Nery (2019) was not surprising, when explaining that “grand strategy presupposes a self-conscious identification and a calculation of priorities in terms of foreign policy, defense objectives, international cooperation and partnerships with national businesses” (MILANO and NERY, 2019, p. 74).

For Brazil, and particularly from the perspective of Itamaraty, the Strategic Environment, understood as a space for the projection of national power, was aligned with the principles of a Grand Strategy, which was outlined after the publication of the END. Seeking to delimit the concept in a comprehensive way, one of the authors who interpreted the Grand Strategy issue from a Brazilian perspective was Alsina Junior (2014). In his doctoral thesis, he stated that: “It must be kept in mind that a given State’s grand strategy will always obey particular constraints, inherent to its specific circumstances (history, geography, population, culture, economy, institutional arrangements, politics, leadership, perception of threats, etc.)” (ALSINA JUNIOR, 2014, p. 48). Thus, despite being mentioned by Amorim (2014; 2016), then Minister of Defense, the Brazilian draft of “Grand Strategy” did not come to fruition, as evidenced by the absence of a published official document, or even an updated version of the END. Both Celso Amorim and Alsina Júnior emphasized that diplomacy and defense are sectors that must walk together. In this sense, soft power formed by diplomacy cannot be conceived without the existence of hard power, backed by military power.

The concept of “Grand Strategy” was approached by classic and contemporary authors from different angles. As a way of offering some contribution, we consider that “Grand Strategy” involves the coordination of political, social, diplomatic and economic variables, with the projection of military power in a given country, in relation to the international system. After presenting several definitions of the concept of “Grand Strategy” both in the Anglo-Saxon and in the Brazilian context, we will focus our attention on the most recent attempt at public policy aimed at the region of the Strategic Environment: the Strategic Border Plan (PEF).

3. STRATEGIC BORDER PLAN: AN ATTEMPT TO APPLY THE PRINCIPLES OF THE GRAND STRATEGY TO THE BRAZILIAN STRATEGIC ENVIRONMENT?

After unraveling the “Strategic Environment” and “Grand Strategy” concepts, emphasizing the relationship between them, we want to analyze the development of the Strategic Border Plan (PEF) for the national Strategic Environment. Decree no. 7896 of June 8, 2011 determined the legal framework for the Strategic Border Plan and the National Border Strategy (ENAFRON) (BRASIL, 2011). In broad terms, the PEF established, in its article 4: I – development of federative integration actions between the Union and the states and municipalities located along the border; II – elaboration of structuring projects to strengthen the state presence, and III – performance of international cooperation actions with neighboring countries (BRASIL, 2011). The Plan developed its actions based on the concentrated effort between the Integrated Border Management Offices (GGIF) and the Joint Operations Center (COC). The GGIF were created to decentralize executive power and help coordinate joint actions between the Armed Forces and Public Security Forces. The PEF was structured around three ministries (Ministry of Defense, Ministry of Justice and Ministry of Planning). The Ministry of Justice’s National Secretariat for Public Security (SENASP) was responsible for the program organizational logistics. Its headquarters are located in Brasília, DF, and it seeks to centralize the demands of the eleven border states that participate in the program.

According to the data collected on the border strip, mainly from the report published by the National Secretariat for Public Security (SENASP), the border was characterized by two central issues: public power’s fragmented action and absence of a strategy to induce benefits for

public security (BRASIL, 2011). Given this situation, the search for a new conception of the border around three principles began to become evident: integration, cooperation, and articulation (BRASIL, 2016b).

Thus, there was a structuring effort between several federal government ministries, gathered around the Permanent Commission for the Development and Integration of the Border Strip (CDIF).

SENASP was responsible for the analytical structure of the Strategic Border Plan. The issue of public security within the border strip was marked from the 2000s onwards by new initiatives to increase the State's presence in the most remote areas of the national territory (BRASIL, 2005).

Based on the Border Strip Development Plan (PDFF), the federal government sought to continue the efforts made so far, mainly in the most isolated municipalities in the border strip (BRASIL, 2010). This reflection was decisive factor in understanding the "boomerang effect," issue, that is, when "administrative political experiences located in spaces considered to be on the margins of governmental forms become incorporated in the center of power devices" (HIRATA, 2015, p. 30). In short, the Strategic Border Plan unites Defense and Public Security, which made the experience "a reference and/or a legal framework that guides security policies for the border strip, but it has found its limit with regard to establishment of instances for joint action between federal and state bodies" (COSTA, 2017, p. 115).

Despite the advances made in the field of security, the PEF did not manage to reconcile the interests of the various parts involved in the process, due to mismatches between the administrative units. In 2016, the PEF and ENAFRON were absorbed by the Integrated Border Protection Program (PPIF), established by Decree n. 8903 of November 16, 2016. This new document subordinated the management of the Ministry of Justice's public security policies on the borders to the Institutional Security Office of the Presidency of the Republic (GSI/PR), through participation of SENASP in the Executive Committee of the Integrated Border Protection Program (NEVES et al., 2016). Among several changes, the issue of the cross-border movement of people and goods was the object of great concern on the part of the competent federal and state bodies (BRASIL, 2016b).

According to the decree, the PPIF objectives are: 1) to integrate and articulate actions of public security of the Union, intelligence, customs control and the Armed Forces with the actions of the States, Municipalities and neighboring countries located in the border strip, including their inland waters, and on the maritime coast; 2) to improve human resources

management and management of the structure aimed at prevention, control, inspection and repression of cross-border crimes; and 3) seek articulation with the actions of the Permanent Commission for Border Strip Development and Integration (CDIF). We need to consider the program cross-border dimension, which was updated with Decree No. 9.818 of June 3, 2019, which amended Decree No. 8903 of November 16, 2016. In broad terms, there was an effort to integrate new players into the PPIF, as stated in article 5, such as, for example, the Secretariat for Integrated Operations and the General Secretariat of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (BRASIL, 2019).

We cannot say that there was a clear change on the part of the Executive Power in updating the advances that took place between 2011 and 2016. But there was an effort to develop and carry out joint actions, as emphasized in article 4 of the Decree:

“PPIF shall promote the following measures: 1) - joint actions of federal integration of the Union with the States and Municipalities located on the border strip, including its inland waters, and on the maritime coast; 2) - joint actions of public federal and state security bodies, the Special Secretariat of the Federal Revenue of Brazil and the Joint General Staff of the Armed Forces; 3) - sharing of information and tools between public federal and state security bodies, intelligence bodies, the Special Secretariat of the Federal Revenue of Brazil and the Joint Chiefs of Staff of the Armed Forces” (BRASIL, 2019).

Despite published decrees, in practice, a capacity to operate along the nearly 16,000 kilometers of dry border has not been verified. Thus, SENASP final report explained that “if control and inspection never fully materialized in a small border area, then one can imagine how misleading the representation of an effective or complete control of the Brazilian border is” (BRASIL, 2016b, p. 22). The scope in which ENAFRON was created, with personnel and attribution limitation, in addition to not being institutionally consolidated, resulted in its limitation in the face of institutional challenges before the resistance from greater institutional scope entities that have their own *modus operandi* (DHENIN & CORREA, 2018). As pointed out in the

report published by the Federal Court of Accounts (TCU), the difficulty in creating solid mechanisms that support the articulation of various bodies in the field and policy management and initiatives for borders were the main limiting factors to the PEF, and barriers that limited the ENAFRON (BRAZIL, 2016a). Finally, Amazônia SAR program, SISFRON, CENSIPAM transfer to the Ministry of Defense, CDIF and the *Calha Norte* program expansion demonstrated the increase (in quantitative terms) of Brazilian initiatives in the field of security and defense to the borders (RAZA, 2014).

On the other hand, the discontinuity of public policies and government programs has resulted in few positive effects on the border social issue, which continue to be “marked by low levels of education, employment and income. The time factor is essential in the implementation of such policies, in order to allow the region to absorb the benefits that can be generated from a social perspective” (CARNEIRO FILHO & CAMARA, 2019, p.14). As we can see from the elements presented, the Strategic Border Plan, despite having been maintained, was absorbed by the Integrated Border Protection Program without a deeper reflection, by decision maker, on its long-term strategic objectives. Despite the efforts made, it was not possible to apply the principles of “Grand Strategy” to the national Strategic Environment.

4. ACHIEVE MORE WITH FEWER RESOURCES: HOW TO THINK THE GRAND BORDER STRATEGY?

After presenting the Strategic Border Plan (PEF), which was transformed into an Integrated Border Protection Program, we want to open a reflection on the possibility of thinking a “Grand Strategy” for borders. As a starting point, we emphasize the structural importance of the theme, so that it can be debated, analyzed and questioned in the area of international relations and in strategic studies, both in Brazil and abroad.

From the elements mentioned above, the absence of a concept that could establish a strategic model to be developed as a priority by the Armed Forces and the Public Security Forces on the border strip was

evident. In order to solve this issue, in recent years the proposal for the creation of the National Border Guard – whose work would be exclusively aimed at inspecting the border strip –, has been raised. According to França (2018), “in Brazil it is not put aside that the formation of a border police, or a national guard, will end up taking over some assignments of some of the institutions currently responsible for tasks on the borders” (FRANÇA, 2018, p. 287). The author indicated a series of difficulties for this new security force to be created and implemented in national territory. Among other things, he drew attention to:

“existence of a gap in the current model, (where) the lack of interagency activities between the institutions that are part of the mentioned system was brought to the debate, not discarding, yet, the also present overlapping of functions and attributions on the border strip, which obviously entails waste of public resources and poor provision of services” (FRANÇA, 2018, p. 293).

From this point onwards, it is not surprising that there is resistance from public security actors, since, as highlighted by França (2018), “the creation of a new institution within the Brazilian security structure represents new burdens, new costs and, mainly, sharing of attributions linked to other bodies of the same system. Therefore, even if projects have been presented for this purpose, there are serious arguments that support the unnecessary need for this measure” (FRANÇA, 2018, p. 293). The above reflection is particularly pertinent in the current economic and social context. From the examples cited, we conclude that we need an outline to carry out a grand border strategy. It is not enough just to think of the border in the sense of a front, or as a supposed empty space to be occupied, thus avoiding a loss in geostrategic terms.

In Brazil, recent years have shown that the government put a great deal of effort to launch a series of strategies and programs that were marked by different phases, which had real socioeconomic impacts and changed the military protagonism to the detriment of civil matters (BRASIL, 2017; 2019). The search for balance was interrupted with the impeachment process of then president Dilma Rousseff (2011-2016). This

rupture weakened the country's institutions to this day. The (failed) attempt to continue the PEF through the PPIF demonstrated inability to promote an ambitious state policy aimed exclusively and continuously at the issues of the border strip development and security.

Therefore, the emergence of a great border strategy could be thought of based on guiding axes and/or force ideas aimed at a State policy, much more than a bureaucratic and directed project. The long search for implementing a "Grand Border Strategy" requires constant political efforts of academia, government, and legislators. But bringing together military and civilian authorities in the recent past to debate these issues – Grand Strategy – Strategic Environment – Grand Border Strategy – was not enough to guarantee continuity in the strategic reflection process.

From these premises, and even before thinking about the creation of a Grand Border Strategy, with specific attributes and distinct missions on the border strip, we draw attention to the need to offer epistemic elements that can help in the preparation of an unprecedented proposal for a "Grand Border Strategy." This posture will be marked by the effort to overcome institutional, technical and operational limitations linked to the performance of the Public Security Forces and Armed Forces on the border strip.

The elements of reflection that were presented in this article highlighted the potential for reflection that an analytical work on the concept of Grand Strategy can provide for Brazil.

To make such an effort, it is necessary to understand to what extent this initiative is particularly relevant, although the current context is not the most appropriate. But thinking about long-range State politicians requires prolonged dedication, seeking to innovate in the relationships between players and the concepts produced. Then, moving towards the end of this article, we will make some final remarks about the first steps that can be taken to establish a solid proposal, continuing the efforts made so far.

5. FINAL CONSIDERATIONS HOW TO FORMULATE A GRAND BORDER STRATEGY PROPOSAL?

In order to outline an initial proposal for a "Grand Border Strategy" for Brazil, we stress the importance of breaking with the formulation of a Strategy in a linear manner, being just another federal program to be

developed within a certain period. As observed on several occasions in the past, the final result of this policy did not reach the expected level (BRASIL, 2016; FRANÇA, 2018). So that, in order to be able to develop a meaningful theoretical proposal, we look for how to present this proposal, in an objective and concise manner. To this end, this task is performed based on three axes, or three goals: grand plans, grand principles and grand behavior, according to Silove (2018).

For the author, these principles are understood as consisting of two constituent elements (ends and means) and must have the characteristics of being “long-term,” “holistic,” and “important”: 1. The grand plans represent the detailed result of individuals’ deliberate efforts to translate a state’s interests into specific long-term goals, establish orders of priority between those objectives, and consider all spheres of state policy (military, diplomatic and economic) in the process of identifying the means by which they can be achieved. 2. The grand principles are the overarching ideas that are consciously held by individuals about the long-term objectives that the state should prioritize and the military, diplomatic and/or economic means that should be mobilized in pursuit of those objectives. 3. Grande behavior represents the long-term pattern in the distribution and employment by a state of its military, diplomatic and economic resources for its purposes. In this context, the ends that receive the greatest relative resources may be considered a priority, but the concept of grand behavior does not imply an inference that those ends were necessarily prioritized as a result of a grand plan, a grand principle or any other factor (SILOVE, 2018).

With these elements presented, it is necessary to think to what extent these axes provide a timely reflection to formulate a “Grand Border Strategy” in the Brazilian context. According to Silove (2018), “the entire literature on grand strategy fundamentally depends on the assumption that there are positive relationships between grand plans, grand principles and grand behavior. Yet, that assumption is rarely articulated and - more importantly - rarely examined empirically, because the three concepts have been conflated under the umbrella term grand strategy” (SILOVE, 2018, p. 30). This reflection is particularly useful to reflect on Brazil’s shortcomings in relation to Grand Strategy and its formulation.

First, grand plans allow a series of questions to be asked that help the researcher in formulating the strategy. They include, among others: why are plans made? When are they made? What mechanisms translate

plans into state products? What determines which plans are implemented? Second, grand principles provide a solid framework for researching some specific, and even somewhat unique, ideas or concepts. These are ideas kept away from the object, such as: what are the State's central or general objectives? How can these objectives be achieved in the long term? How to provide continuity between ideas and achieved objectives? Finally, grand behavior allows us to evaluate the general framework to investigate the state' long-term behavior, seen as a whole. Today, we can see that the dominant trend in the Foreign Policy Analysis (FPA) subfield and in foreign policy commentaries remains the interest in focusing attention on governments. Thus, grand behavior offers an alternative framework that facilitates observations of state behavior over periods of decades or more.

In conclusion, we can say that the mobilization of two or three of the principles presented should facilitate the decision maker's search for a robust response to the definition of a State policy for borders. From these premises, the planning of a "Grand Border Strategy" was demarcated in three basic principles (grand plans, grand principles and grand behavior) that will hardly be articulated by the federal government. In this work, the researcher was responsible for stimulating a reflection on this issue. The current moment, for internal and external reasons, raises a great doubt regarding the possibility of applying a Grand Border Strategy in the medium term. But, first of all, it is necessary to outline which path to follow and which questions should be asked so that we can direct, as soon as conditions are more favorable, the elements to materialize this reflection.

ALÉM DA GRAND STRATEGY E DO ENTORNO ESTRATÉGICO: UMA PROPOSTA PARA ESBOÇAR UMA GRANDE ESTRATÉGIA FRONTEIRIÇA

RESUMO

O conceito de “Entorno Estratégico” surgiu no Brasil no começo do século como proposta elástica para abordar questões pautadas na projeção de poder. Ao desenhar um entorno geograficamente delimitado, o Brasil procurou definir conceitualmente áreas consideradas prioritárias para exercer sua influência política e estratégica. O artigo tem como objetivo a formulação de eixos para elaborar uma “Grande Estratégia Fronteira”. Em primeiro lugar, apresentaremos o conceito de “Entorno Estratégico”, a partir da perspectiva brasileira. Para tal, foi realizado um levantamento com os principais documentos oficiais que norteiam as políticas de Defesa. Em seguida, procuramos avaliar a relação entre “Entorno Estratégico” e “Grande Estratégia”, conceito que evoluiu na literatura anglo-saxônica ao longo do século XX. A partir do Plano Estratégico de Fronteiras, lançado em 2011, procuramos avaliar seu impacto nas políticas públicas para a região norte do Brasil. Finalmente, encerramos esse trabalho com uma breve proposta conceitual, balizando uma “Grande Estratégia Fronteira”, primeiros passos para propor uma política de Estado num futuro próximo.

Palavras-Chave: Entorno Estratégico. Grande Estratégia. Grande Estratégia Fronteira. Brasil.

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