

# AN ANALYSIS OF THE OCCIDENT'S RESPONSE TO THE RUSSIAN INVASION OF UKRAINE UNDER THE PRISM OF CLAUSEWITZ'S TRINITY WAR

Emerson Luis de Araújo Pângaro<sup>1</sup>  
Leandro Leite de Almeida<sup>2</sup>  
Felipe Pereira Barbosa<sup>3</sup>

## SUMMARY

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The invasion of Ukraine by Russian troops at the end of February 2022 brought the world to the danger of a new polarity: Russia x Western countries led by the NATO bloc (North Atlantic Treaty Organization). Historical factors, Ukraine's geographical importance to Russia and the risk Western nations see in Russia's territorial expansion into eastern Europe make resolving the conflict increasingly complex. Faced with this bleak picture, the West has been adopting solutions to try to discourage the Russian invasion without the use of NATO troops in support of the Ukrainian army. This article seeks to outline scenarios of possible strategies to be adopted by Western countries, focusing on NATO members, through the analysis of the trinity of Clausewitz's war.

Keywords: Ukraine; NATO; Russia; Clausewitz; Clausewitzian Trinity.

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1Instituto Meira Mattos (IMM), Rio de Janeiro-RJ, Brazil. Email: e.pangaro@gmail.com - ORCID <http://orcid.org/0000-0002-7589-8957>.

2 Instituto Meira Mattos (IMM), Rio de Janeiro-RJ, Brazil. Email: le39bil@bol.com.br - ORCID: <https://orcid.org/0000-0003-2465-5899>.

3 Instituto Meira Mattos (IMM), Rio de Janeiro-RJ, Brazil. Email: aspcavfelipe@hotmail.com - ORCID: <https://orcid.org/0000-0002-8717-7006>.

## INTRODUÇÃO

On February 24, 2022, Russia, eight years after the annexation of the Crimean Peninsula, invaded Ukrainian territory by three fronts (son, 2022). The Russian action was immediately condemned by the international community. An emergency meeting was called at the United Nations (UN) four days after the event. By eleven of the fifteen votes, Russian aggression was disapproved by the UN in the Security Council (SC), the body responsible for maintaining peace in the world (BERQUÓ, 2011). Russia, as a permanent member, used its veto power to nullify the resolution.

The territory, which today constitutes Ukraine, has a historical connection with Russia. It belonged to the Russians for a long period, from The Times of Peter the Great in the seventeenth century until the dismantling of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) in the year 1991 (MACHADO, 2020). The Crimean Peninsula, an important exit of the Russian fleet to the Black Sea and a strategic location for the Russian Navy, which has a naval base in the city of Sevastopol, was ceded to Ukraine in 1954 by Soviet leader Nikita Khrushchev (TREVIÑO, 2014).

With the end of the USSR and Ukraine's independence, presidents Boris Yeltsin of Russia and Leonidas Kravchuk of Ukraine made an agreement to maintain the Sevastopol naval base until 2017. In 2010, Russian President Vladimir Putin and Ukrainian President Viktor Yanukovich signed a new agreement to allow the Russian Black Sea fleet to use the Sevastopol naval base until 2042 in exchange for a reduction in the amount paid by Ukraine in the price of Russian gas (TREVIÑO, 2014). In 2004, after the Orange Revolution, which was a set of popular demonstrations in support of the opposition candidate, Viktor Yushchenko, Ukraine was ruled for the first time since 1991 by a pro-occidentals president (WOLCZUK, 2005). The loss of Russian influence over Ukraine, its approach to the European Union and the hypothesis of admission to NATO, caused the red light to light up in Moscow, which is less than five hundred kilometers from the Ukrainian border, or

that is, within the range of ballistic missile batteries (son, 2022).

In addition to its strategic importance as a "buffer" area between Russia and NATO, Ukraine has a relevant economic role for Moscow as a route for the passage of its gas pipelines to Western Europe (MILHAZES, 2021). The maintenance of Ukraine in the Russian sphere of influence meets the scope of the national strategic priorities defined in the National Security Strategy of Russia: defense of the country and economic security (Russia, 2021).

The Russian Federation, which has the second largest military power in the world and one of the five largest military budgets in recent years (SIEMON, 2020), owns one of the largest nuclear arsenals in the world, with about six thousand warheads. Direct confrontation with this “leviathan” could lead the world to an unprecedented nuclear conflict.

How to fight an enemy with such nuclear power? This question permeates NATO members. The answer lies necessarily in the study of the theories of war and, consequently, by Clausewitz. This Prussian, in his posthumously published work *The War*, studied in most Western armies, points us to the existence of three fundamental elements in any conflict: chance, violence and reason. Each of these elements being interpreted as the Armed Forces, the people and the Government respectively. They were given the name Clausewitz’s trinity of War (MOITA; FRANCHI, 2021).

In this way, in the light of the trinity of the Clausewitz War, this article will seek to analyze the measures adopted by Western countries, with a focus on those belonging to NATO, to seek a solution to the conflict between Russia and Ukraine.

## 1-THE CULTURAL ROOTS OF RUSSIA AND UKRAINE

The Russia-Ukraine conflict has historical and economic reasons. The formation of the Russian and Ukrainian peoples dates back to the twelfth century, when the Principality of Kiev fragmented into several other principalities, especially that of Vladimir Susdalia, origin of the Russian people and that of Galicia - Volhynia, origin of the Ukrainian people (GRANADOS, 2007). Orthodox Christianity has been adopted by the Peoples belonging to the Principality of Kiev since the tenth century under the influence of the Byzantine Empire (MACHADO, 2020). The Mongol invasions that occurred in the thirteenth century (MACHADO, 2020) brought distinct consequences for each of these two principalities. That of Vladimir Susdália was more receptive to Mongolian culture while that of Galicia-Volhynia demonstrated greater resistance and maintained its cultural traits (GRANADOS, 2007).

Between the thirteenth and mid-sixteenth centuries, the Principality of Galicia-Volhynia was dominated by Poland and Lithuania (GRANADOS, 2007). The autonomy of the peoples of Galicia (Ukrainians) was respected until 1569, when the signing of the Treaty of Lublin, the Union of Lithuania with Poland, occurred, causing the submission of almost the entire Ukrainian territory to the Warsaw government (BORUSZENKO, 1967). At the same time, the Vladimir

Principality of Susdalia was under the yoke of the Mongol Empire until its liberation in 1480 (HOSKING, 1997). In 1547, Ivan IV was crowned tsar and began the formation of the future Russian Empire (HOSKING, 1997).

The serfdom imposed by Warsaw created the conditions for the emergence of Cossacks, men who desired a free and independent life (TREVINHO, 2014). The Cossacks migrated to the lower Dnieper region. The growing occupation of this area gave rise to the embryo of a new independent state: the Republic of Ukrainian Cossacks, founded in 1648 under the leadership of Hetmans, that is, from military chiefs (BORUSZENKO, 1967). The territory that today encompasses Ukraine and its people has become composed of two regions: the western and the eastern.

The Polish reaction to keep the Cossack Republic under its influence forced the fledgling state created in the eastern portion of Ukraine to seek help from the Russian Tsarist Empire. The result of this rapprochement was the Treaty of Pereiaslav of 1654, with the Union of Moscow and the Ukrainian Hetmanate (GRANADOS, 2007). Progressively, the Russian tsars were integrating the eastern Ukrainian people into Russian culture. At the beginning of the twentieth century, the autonomy of the Ukrainian Hetmanate was withdrawn, which became another province of the Russian Empire. This region, predominantly on the eastern side of the Dnieper River, came to have in its people cultural ties more associated with Russia (KUBICEK, 2008).

Figure 1-map of Russian expansion in Ukraine between 1775 and 1795



Source: KUBICEK (2008)

The region of Galicia-Volhynia, the western portion of the territory of present-day Ukraine, came under Polish influence, and later, with the fragmentation of this state, under the rule of the Austro-Hungarian Empire. This situation persisted until the Russian Revolution of 1917, when Ukrainians gained their independence, and finally in 1919 obtained their resurgent geographical political integrity under the denomination of the Ukrainian national Republic (BORUSZENKO, 1967). The Crimean Peninsula, the last portion of the current Ukrainian territory was transferred by the Russian Federation to Ukraine in the context of the Soviet Union in 1954, through a decision of the Soviet leader Nikita Khrushchev (KUBICEK, 2008). Its geographical Constitution remained from 1991 until 2014 according to the map:

Figure 2-territory of Ukraine between 1991 and 2014



Source BING IMAGES

## 2-CLAUSEWITZ AND THE TRINITY OF WAR

The Prussian Carl von Clausewitz is arguably the most influential military thinker in history. His ERA was marked by the transition between the Moderna and contemporary ages, the events of the French Revolution and the rise of the Corsican military genius, Napoleon Bonaparte. For Herbert (2007), Clausewitz's theory was deeply influenced by Napoleonic methods of warfare.

In short, Clausewitz lived in a world of transformations, be they economic, political, social or technological. His teachings are gathered in the book *The War*, work published posthumously by his wife, Marie Von Clausewitz, in 1832, who organized the manuscripts her husband produced throughout his professional life (CLAUSEWITZ, 1989).

Among its main concepts are fog, friction, the difference between absolute war and real war, historical relativism, and the dynamic relationship between defense and attack. However, he is best known for having given the war a political meaning, that is, a continuation of it by other means. In this sense, Clausewitz brings the concept of the paradoxical Trinity or trinity of War, which he defines:

War is more than a real chameleon, which adapts its characteristics a little to a certain situation. As a total phenomenon, its prevailing tendencies always make war a paradoxical Trinity - composed of the primordial violence, hatred and enmity, which must be seen as a blind natural force, of the game of chance and probability, in which the creative spirit is free to roam; and of its subordinate elements, as an instrument of politics, which makes it subject only to reason. (CLAUSEWITZ, 1989, p. 92)

Within this concept, some experts differ as to the interpretation of the paradoxical Trinity. For Strachan (2007), the elements of the Trinity should not be understood as being the people, the Armed Forces and the government, since these would be elements of the state, not of War. For the author, the elements are hatred, luck and reason, Associated, respectively, with the passion of the people, the commander and his army, and the political direction of the government.

For Hoffmann (2019), the Trinity is an interaction of three parts of forces.

The first would be irrational force: primordial violence, hatred and enmity. The second is related to the non-rational force: the game of chance and the probability of the commander. The ultimate step is purely rational force: the subordination of war to politics and reason. Thus, the interaction of these three elements influences the violence that exists within the Trinity.

While for Souchon (2020), the Trinity is a research method that enables a holistic understanding of the situation of the conflict. This is why it is a Trinity and not a triad. Souchon (2020) complements that the ability to conceive of the Trinity in a three-dimensional system helps to analyze the origins and characteristics of war and its dynamic interactions in quantitative and qualitative terms.

Much has been conjectured as to whether Clausewitz's work is still current. It is a remarkable fact that war has evolved since the wars of the early nineteenth century, either by technological or tactical increment. However, according to Ferezin (2012, p.16), "the Trinity can radically change its character, adapting to the historical, political and social context of each time, since the nature of war is determined by a set of social forces and the spirit of its time".

In this context, the present paper assumes that Clausewitz's Trinity remains current and applicable in the conflict between Russia and Ukraine. The relationship between its integrating elements constitutes an excellent tool to analyze the dynamics of the phenomenon of war.

### **3-NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY ORGANIZATION (NATO) AND ITS ROLE IN EASTERN EUROPE**

Created in 1949, in the context of the Cold War, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization is a military alliance idealized by The Washington Treaty to counter the growth of the Soviet Union's influence in post-World War 2 Europe. It is a military alliance to guarantee the collective security of its members (BERTAZZO, 2010).

In the context of the time of its creation, Europe, the main theater of operations of the 2nd World War, was under reconstruction. The main powers of the Old World Order: France, Germany and the United Kingdom, were suffering the consequences of the large volume of resources spent on the war effort and the effects of the destruction caused in their territories during the conflict (KISSINGER, 2015).

The world then came to be ruled by two powers: the United States and the Soviet Union. The ideological spectrum governed relations between nations: on one side the capitalist bloc led by Washington, and on the other, the Socialist,

led by Moscow. Samuel Huntington (1993), in his article that later became the work *The Clash of Civilizations*, calls this period, which lasted until 1991, as one of conflicts based on ideology. The Soviet Union, as a great European land power, expanded its borders and its ideology across the continent. It came to dominate one-sixth of the Earth's surface with about twenty-two million square kilometers (DEWDNEY, 2013). Halford John Mackinder, English geopolitician of the first half of the twentieth century, developed the theory of land power published in his work *The Geographical Pivot of History*. In this book, Mackinder created the concept of the heartland or pivot area, which due to its strategic and economic importance would allow its holder the dominance of the entire Eurasia or "island world" and, consequently, the world. In Mackinder's theory, the Heartland of Europe is the region encompassing the present territories of Russia and Germany. The expansion of the Soviet Union, in the period after World War II, therefore meant, according to Mackinder's theory, a threat to all of Europe and the rest of the world (BEZERRA, 2019).

Figure 3-Mackinder pivot area



Source: MACKINDER (1904)

The United States, by contrast, as the other power in this bipolar order, sought to oppose the Soviet advance. Nicholas John Spykman, a Dutch geopolitician based in the United States, created the geopolitical theory of Rimland or fimbriae. According to his theory, whoever dominated the maritime fimbriae of the European continent would control the Eurasian "Island World". His theory



served as the basis for the strategy of containment used by the United States in the Cold War period to curb the advance of the USSR (NASCIMENTO, 2021). Thus, two tools they were essential for the materialization of Soviet containment: the economic recovery of Western Europe through the Marshall Plan of 1947 and the creation of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) in 1949 (KAPLAN, 2019).

The founding members of NATO: Belgium, Canada, Denmark, France, Iceland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, the United Kingdom and the United States committed to mutual assistance in the event of a military aggression. In 1952, Greece and Turkey joined the military alliance, followed by the Federal Republic of Germany in 1955 and Spain in 1982. (NATO, 2009). Its main decision-making body is the North Atlantic Council. Each member state has a representative with *status* ambassador. The council meets once a week. There are regular meetings of the ministers of Defense and sometimes the heads of State of the member countries. NATO's leadership is exercised by the secretary general, who is appointed for a term of approximately four years. NATO does not have its own armed forces. Most of its troops remain under the command and control of member countries until they are assigned to collective defense missions or peacekeeping missions. Currently the alliance has thirty members, with fourteen countries affiliated after the Cold War period in two stages of NATO enlargement, the first in 1999 with the entry of the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland and the second in 2004 with the accession of Bulgaria, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania, Slovakia and Slovenia. Albania, Croatia, Montenegro and North Macedonia were able to join NATO recently by completing the requirements foreseen in the enlargement stages that took place in 1999 and 2004 (NATO, 2009).

The expansion of NATO to Eastern European countries, primarily in the Baltic countries, is a factor of concern for the security of the Russian Federation. The possibility of installing ballistic missiles at the gates of Moscow means a threat to that country (BEZERRA, 2019). Another point to be emphasized is that the increase in NATO's sphere of influence in eastern Europe occurred precisely after the end of the Cold War, especially with the ties that occurred in 1999 and 2004 (NATO, 2009). In this way, we can observe a real NATO siege of Russia at a historical moment of few tensions between these parties.

#### 4-NATO'S RESPONSE UNDER THE TRINITY FOCUS OF CLAUSEWITZ'S WAR


Clausewitz's trinity of War refers to the three elements present in all wars. His contemporary interpretation of Harry Summer in the works *On Strategy: a Critical Analysis of the Vietnam War* 1982 defines the elements of the trinity of war as: the government, the people and the Armed Forces (VILLACRES; BASSFORD, 1995). In the Russia-Ukraine conflict, we can identify the vertices of the trinity of war as: President Putin of Russia, the Russian people and the Russian Armed Forces.

From the analysis of these three elements present in the Russia-Ukraine conflict, the member countries of the North Atlantic Treaty Alliance can adopt the following scenarios as a response to the Russian invasion of Ukraine, in the light of Clausewitz's trinity of war:

- 1) Contribute to the overthrow of President Putin and support the rise of a replacement government opposed to the invasion of Ukraine;
- 2) Impose a military defeat on the Russian Armed Forces; or
- 3) Shaping the public opinion of the Russian people to take a stand against conflict.

As for the first scenario, it should be noted that the approval ratings of President Putin, in power in Russia since December 1999, remain high even during the conflict. A survey conducted by the Levada Institute (LEVADA Center, 2022), an independent Russian opinion research organization, demonstrated in its report published at the end of March 2022 that the people's approval rating of President Putin's actions rose from sixty-nine percent in January 2022 to eighty-three percent in March 2022, as shown in the table below.

Figure 4-Levada Center Research



Source Levada Center

Opposition to Putin’s rule has weakened over the two decades he has been in power. Thus, its deposition by external pressure would create a power vacuum in Russia with unpredictable consequences and, perhaps, with the opposite effect to this action: an aggravation of hostilities against Ukraine in a framework of internal dispute for power in Russia.

The second scenario brings as an option the direct military confrontation and defeat of the Russian FA. NATO has adopted a conservative stance on the conflict. Its support for Ukraine has been restricted to armaments and military equipment, such as man-portable air defense systems, anti-tank weapons and man-portable weapons, however, without the use of its troops (KUMAR, 2022).

Ukraine is not a member of NATO, so it is not protected by NATO.

Article 5 of this organization, which deals with the collective defense of its members:


Article 5: The parties agree that an armed attack against one or more of them in Europe or North America shall be considered an attack on all of them, and accordingly

agree that, if such an armed attack occurs, each, in the exercise of the right of self-defence, individual or collective, recognised by Article 51. under the Charter of the United Nations, it shall render assistance to the party or parties so attacked, by taking without delay, individually and in agreement with the other parties, such action as it deems necessary, including the use of armed force, to restore and ensure security in the North Atlantic region (NATO, 1949).

A direct NATO military intervention in the conflict could escalate into a nuclear crisis with serious repercussions for the whole of Europe. The spokesman for the Russian government, Dmitry Peskov, stated on some occasions, during the first weeks of the conflict, that Russia will only use nuclear weapons if its existence is threatened, not ruling out, in this way, the use of this alternative (DUGGAN, 2022).

Another relevant aspect is the heavy dependence of NATO members and major European economies on gas supplies from Russia. The graph of the European Union Agency for Energy Regulation demonstrates the degree of dependence on Russian gas for some European countries (ACER, 2020):

Figure 5-dependence on Russian gas by NATO members in 2020



Source: European Energy Regulatory Agency (ACER)

Thus, a direct military campaign against the Russian FAs could cause the blockade of gas supplies to these countries and, consequently, cause a significant impact on the economy of the entire bloc. It should also be noted that an armed campaign between two military powers, Russia and NATO, on Ukrainian soil, could cause irreversible damage to the structure of pipelines that cut the country towards western Europe for hydrocarbon supplies, as shown below (PIRANI; YAFIMAVA, 2016):

Figure 6-network of pipelines crossing Ukrainian territory



Source Oxford Institute for Energy Studies

The third scenario brings the option for NATO to seek mechanisms of shaping Russian public opinion towards the end of hostilities and the invasion in Ukraine. Acting at this apex of the Clausewitz war Trinity offers NATO a range of resources. The European Union has been adopting some measures that not only impact on the Russian government, but also on its people. In this way, internally, it seeks to generate a climate of popular discontent against the war. Among the most forceful measures, one can cite the withdrawal of Russian financial institutions from the SWIFT system (Society for Worldwide Interbank Financial Telecommunication), which brings together 11000 financial institutions and enables the circulation of financial capital between the various nations of the world (CNN, 2022). The Russian withdrawal from this system has a direct impact on the country's economy, as it limits the form of payment for import/export of goods and services made by the government and, especially, by Russian companies and citizens.

The blocking of bank accounts of Russian tycoons has been adopted by

NATO and European Union member countries. Even though it is a questionable practice, since hostilities occur between nations and not between individuals, some countries such as Switzerland have blocked access to the money of Russian tycoons deposited in their banking system (CNN, 2022). The adoption of these measures is aimed at shaping Russian public opinion, that is, of its people to be against the conflict, mainly due to the internal economic imbalance caused by these sanctions. France, Spain, Italy and the United Kingdom have taken the stance of blocking a series of private assets of Russian billionaires allegedly linked to President Vladimir Putin. The most emblematic case is that of the Russian Roman Abramovich, owner of the Chelsea Football Club, who had his assets confiscated in the United Kingdom and even cannot sell his football club until the end of hostilities (GLOBO, 2022).


### FINAL REMARKS

Ukraine and Russia have historical ties dating back to the 12th century. The two peoples emerged from the dismantling of the Principality of Kiev or Kievan Rus giving rise to their cultural roots (GRANADOS, 2007). Throughout history, Ukrainian territories east of the Dnieper River, which divides Ukraine into two parts, have been dominated by Russian tsars (KUBICEK, 2008). For this reason, the cultural link between the Ukrainian people east of the Dnieper River and Russia is stronger. The Crimea's peninsula strategic outlet to the Black and Azov seas belonged to Russia until 1954, when Soviet leader Nikita Khrushchev decided to hand that area over to Ukrainian rule. Today this region occupies a prominent place in the escalation of hostilities between Russia and Ukraine. In 2014, President Vladimir Putin, through military action, invaded Crimea to ensure the free use of the Sevastopol naval base, where the Russian Black Sea Fleet is located.

The end of the USSR in 1991 represented a huge loss of influence for Russia in eastern Europe. The country that once had an area of more than 22 million square kilometers (DEWDNEY, 2013) was dismantled into several smaller nations. While Russia was disorganized in the early post-Cold War period, NATO maintained its strategy of containing Russia through the process of eastward expansion in two waves of new members: 1999 and 2004 (NATO, 2009). During this period, Russia was threatened by the siege of NATO (BEZERRA, 2019), which made a cordon of isolation from Estonia at the Russian exit to the Baltic Sea to Bulgaria in the Black Sea. In this context, Ukraine has become a matter of national security for Russia and of strategic importance for NATO. If Ukraine joins the

organization, as its leaders have demonstrated after the Orange Revolution (WOLCZUK, 2005), Russia will be totally surrounded on its western border by NATO, in addition to losing its exit to the Black Sea. Therefore, from a Russian geostrategic point of view, the annexation of Crimea in 2014 and the maintenance of Ukraine in its sphere of influence are fundamental for the defense and security of its nation (Russia, 2021). The current invasion of Ukraine was inevitable and necessary for Russia because of the possibility of its membership in NATO and what it would mean for Russian national security.

Figure 7-NATO Cordon on Russia



Source: NATO

Proceeding from the premise that Ukraine is of strategic importance for Russia and NATO, it can be concluded that the end of hostilities is a complex problem that is difficult to solve. Using Clausewitz's trinity of war as a model to draw the viable alternatives to NATO's response to the conflict, it is verified that of the three vertices of the elements present in the war proposed in this theory, the one that would cause the least collateral damage is the one represented by the people, in this case, the Russian people. The overthrow of Putin through external actions of NATO countries has proven to be ineffective. Despite the international media campaign against the Russian President and the disapproval of his actions against Ukraine, in the internal field, his popular support has been growing as observed in recent polls conducted by the Levada Center,

which demonstrates the significant increase in popular support for his actions in the course of the conflict (LEVADA Center, 2022).

Direct confrontation with the second largest military power on the planet, possessing a nuclear arsenal of about six thousand warheads, also does not seem like a viable option for NATO member countries. The collateral damage and military spending would be incalculable even in a non-nuclear war. It should also be noted that Ukraine is not a NATO member, therefore, is not under the umbrella of Article 5 of the Mutual Defense Treaty of that organization (NATO, 1949).

Thus, the viable option for NATO's response to the conflict is pressure on the Russian people. The imposition of sanctions, boycotts and confiscations of assets of Russian citizens and companies are part of this strategy. NATO members seek to create internal divisions in the Russian people, mainly due to economic strangulation, to create a question about the relevance of the Russian invasion of Ukraine and the harm that this action has caused to its economy. It should be noted that this is a long-term strategy with unexpected effects. So far it has proved ineffective and has even caused internal Russian cohesion, since its people are being isolated by the international community. The recent research of the Levada Center is an important parameter for NATO to analyze and re-evaluate its response strategies to the conflict between Russia and Ukraine, since at the present time support for actions is growing within the Russian people.



# UMA ANÁLISE DA RESPOSTA DO OCIDENTE À INVASÃO RUSSA DA UCRÂNIA SOB O PRISMA DA TRINDADE DA GUERRA DE CLAUSEWITZ

## RESUMO

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A invasão da Ucrânia por tropas russas no final de fevereiro de 2022 trouxe o mundo ao perigo de uma nova polaridade: Rússia x Países Ocidentais liderados pelo bloco da OTAN (Organização do Tratado do Atlântico Norte). Fatores históricos, a importância geográfica da Ucrânia para Rússia e o risco que as nações ocidentais veem na expansão territorial russa rumo ao leste europeu tornam a solução do conflito cada vez mais complexa.

Diante desse quadro sombrio, o ocidente vem adotando soluções para tentar desestimular a invasão russa sem o emprego de tropas da OTAN em apoio ao Exército Ucrainiano. Este artigo busca traçar cenários de possíveis estratégias a serem adotadas pelos países ocidentais, com enfoque nos integrantes da OTAN, por meio da análise da trindade da guerra de Clausewitz.

Palavras-chave: Ucrânia; OTAN; Rússia; Clausewitz; Trindade Clausewitziana.

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