

GEOPOLITICS AND GEOECONOMICS: HISTORY AND CONTEMPORANEITY IN ZBIGNIEW BRZEZINSKI'S THINKING

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ABSTRACT

US hegemony was established in 1945 and has been built over previous decades based on geopolitical and geoeconomic concepts, counting on the contribution of different thinkers. The goal of this article is to analyze the nature and origins of the reflections of one of those thinkers, Zbigniew Brzezinski, his contributions and impacts on the area of strategic studies based on his works, his tenure ahead of the National Security Council in the US and as a consultant for the White House. Along with the Introduction and Conclusion, the article presents a study regarding the 1950s and 1970s, focusing on Brzezinski's early performance as an academic, his influence as analyst and strategist of the Cold War, the specific features of the American political system, the geopolitical and geoeconomic thinking of bipolarity and, finally, the post-Cold War world.

Keywords: Geopolitics. Geoeconomics. United States. Zbigniew Brzezinski.

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INTRODUÇÃO

In May 2017, the death of Zbigniew Brzezinski (1928/2017), former United States (US) National Security Adviser in the Democratic Administration of Jimmy Carter (1977/1981), represented the closure of one of the most significant trajectories of the US strategic thinking. Brzezinski played a prominent role as a writer of periodicals, with appearances in cable media (CNN) and open television (major American networks ABC, NBC, CBS). He portrayed extensive bibliographic production, remaining active as an academic, analyst and researcher, being also one of the top critics of US foreign and domestic policy. In one of his last articles with Paul Wasserman, he stated:

The global order (...) is sliding into significant disorder with no international structure capable of handling the kinds of problems that are likely to erupt almost simultaneously (...) chaos among the major powers could generate truly disastrous consequences. So far, President Trump has failed to formulate any significant, relevant statements (...) Instead, the world has been left to interpret the sometimes irresponsible, uncoordinated and ignorant statements of his team (...) While we did not support Mr. Trump, he is the president of the United States. He is our president, and we want him to be a success. Right now, he does not look like that to the rest of the world, or to us (...) Given the Trump administration's abysmal performance so far in installing a leadership capable of strategic decision making, it is crucial that America and the world hear a vision of leadership and commitment (...) A Trump Doctrine, any doctrine more or less, is sorely needed. (BRZEZINSKI and WASSERMAN, 2017, s/p)

Such absence of directions and crises did not begin with the election of Donald Trump to the presidency at the head of the Republican Party with his nationalist, xenophobic and unilateralist agenda, but it has been a matter of concern since the 1970s, as pointed out by some of his works, such as *Between Two Ages: America's Role in the Technetronic Era* (1970), *Grand Failure: The Birth and Death of Communism in the Twentieth Century* (1989) *Out of Control: Global Turmoil on the Eve of the 21st Century* (1993) and *Strategic Vision: America and the Crisis of Global Power* (2012), texts that span the history of the Cold War to the Post-Cold

War. The tensions of the 21st century reflected a summation of moral, social, political, strategic and economic declines, which could be reversed by rethinking practices and ideas.

Brzezinski took part as adviser of one of Washington's most relevant think tanks², the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), and his focus was on the need to retrieve and strengthen methods and tools for thinking about domestic and international realities. The former National Security Adviser's proposal concerned the basics: studying geography and economics, history and strategy, territory and society and resuming his views on geopolitics and geoeconomics. As Hamre (2017), CSIS President and Director highlighted, this "new discipline" was merely the reactivation of short, medium and long-term multidisciplinary and critical thinking that seems to be ignored by current generations.

The goal of this paper is to evaluate the nature and origins of Brzezinski's thinking³, his contributions and impacts in the area of strategic studies. Although his time at the White House may have been brief, it has influenced an agenda of reflections and actions that precedes and follows his presence on the National Security Council (NSC), from Carter to Obama, between 1977 and 2017. Such an agenda has global impacts. The text is divided into three parts: in addition to this Introduction and the Conclusions there is a study of the 1950s and 1970s, focusing on Brzezinski's early acting as an academic and the interrelationship of his rise as an analyst and strategist to the Cold War and the particularities of the American political system, the geopolitical and geoeconomic thinking in bipolarity and, finally, the post-Cold War.

² According to Teixeira (2007), think tanks are an advisory thinking and policy-making space composed of members of academia, civil society, politicians, entrepreneurs and interest group representatives aimed at developing purposeful agendas. They proceed on systematic reflection on national and international themes, with different political inclinations - centrist, liberal, conservative, according to Rosati and Scott (2011, p. 405). For these authors, CSIS is one of the most outstanding of these think tanks in foreign policy the and was founded in 1962 with centrist tendency. Other examples are the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace (liberal) and the America Enterprise Institute (conservative). In addition to CSIS, Brzezinski served at the Council on Foreign Relations (centrist) and Brookings Institution (liberal), and was one of the mentors of the 1973 Trilateral Commission (centrist).

³ Not all US foreign policy events will be fully described in this paper. See PECEQUILO, 2011 and PECEQUILO, 2013.

GOVERNMENT, SOCIETY AND FOREIGN POLICY: BRZEZINSKI AND THE AMERICAN SYSTEM (1950/1970)

Zbigniew Brzezinski's rise to the post of Jimmy Carter's Democratic government National Security Adviser reflects a specific phenomenon associated with the consolidation of US hegemony in the 20th century and its government structure⁴. In this country, drawing the line that separates theory from practice and the academy of power is a complex phenomenon that underestimates the intersection between society, politics, and the education sector. According to Stanley Hoffman (1977), there is a kind of "revolving door" between the government and universities aimed at recruiting the best human resources. This favors both the mastery of the academic field of international relations and the world politics.

The US policy making and decision making system is permeable. As Wittkopf, Jones and Kegley (2008) highlights, this indicates the prevalence of a Society-Dominant system in which power is exercised from bottom up (as opposed to a State-Dominant structure characterized by the hierarchy of power). The interaction between Executive, Legislative, Judiciary and society, and their respective social actors, such as political parties, individuals and interest groups, becomes more frequent. Influence and interaction with think tanks and universities is a constant dynamics.

As pointed out by Rosati and Scott (2011), this situation is deepened by the constitutional nature⁵ of power division, characterized by the idea of mixed government with shared powers and checks and balances. As maintained by the authors, this situation leads to a strong interdependence between the sources that influence public policies and government action. The premise of shared powers with regard to foreign policy and international relations generates an overlap of tasks between the executive and the legislative, and to a real dispute. Thus,

The president and Congress share power; in fact, there is no constitutional power provided to the president that the Congress does not share in some way. Therefore, while the president initiates and can veto legislation, Congress is often a major constraint on the exercise of presidential power. (ROSATI and SCOTT, p. 63, 2011).

⁴Other key people such as Henry Kissinger, Joseph Nye and Stephen Krasner are examples of the same White House-Academy interaction phenomenon.

⁵For the historical process see *The Federalist Papers* (HAMILTON, MADISON, JAY, 1981).

In this process the Executive tends to take advantage given the scope and weight of international issues, especially in times of crisis. In addition, this favors intra-power and power disputes, noting that “(...) two central points need to be understood about the nature of US foreign policy. 1. It is a very complete process; and 2. It is a very political process”.

The structural nature of power and the decision-making system favored the interpenetration of theory and practice, power and academia, coupled with the changing profile of the US as an international actor. In post-1945, this permeability associated with the new status of US global power raised the government's concern to broaden its autonomy and capacity for action. To this end, three ways stood out: first, the expansion and reform of the economic apparatus; second, the edition of the National Security Act (1947) by the government of Harry Truman, restructuring the political-strategic dimension; and, third, the formation of a new generation of analysts specializing in international affairs.

With regard to the economic apparatus, the building of the Bretton Woods system, focusing on the financial and trade agenda, has been replicated internally with the adaptation of traditional mechanisms (such as the Treasury Department and the Federal Reserve), and the creation of new channels in line with the leadership role. These include the Council of Economic Advisers (1946), U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID, 1961), the office of the United States Trade Representative (USTR, 1962), and the National Economic Council (NEC, 1993).

The political-strategic apparatus followed a similar dynamic: it was designed around the existing Department of State (DOS) and Department of Defense (DOD), and by the creation of new mechanisms: the “Intelligence Community”, having as pillars the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), the Federal Bureau of Investigations (FBI), and the National Security Council (NSC). Defined as the White House's principal advisory body, the NSC focuses on long-term planning, elaborating strategic and National Security Strategy (NSS), the coordination and integration of the White House with other agencies.

The NSC replicates the functions of DOS, but allows the Executive greater control of the external agenda, as its composition is defined by the President, and his/her full and variable members. The full members are the President, the Vice President, the DOS and DOD Secretaries, the Military Chief of Staff, the CIA Director and the National Security Adviser, and the

variables depend on each management. This favors the formation of an inner circle and the overlap of the NSC to the other decision levels.

Rosatti and Scott (2011) presented a historical trajectory of NSC highlighting that this overlap became more frequent from the 1970s on, a period that encompassed what is called the “Golden Age” of this organism, from 1969 to 1981. This phase followed the institutionalization (1947/1960) and the reform (1961/1968) phases. At the time, the position was held by Henry Kissinger (1969/1975), Brent Scowcroft (1975/1977) and Brzezinski (1977/1981), with wide access to the White House, occupied by Richard Nixon (1969/1974), Gerald Ford. (1974/1977), and Jimmy Carter (1977/1981).

The Nixon-Kissinger and Carter-Brzezinski relations are cited as the most efficient and relevant not only of this period, but of the whole history of the NSC. This would have occurred, according to the authors, due to the personal, ideological and intellectual proximity between the Advisers and the Presidents, which gave them a kind of “*carte blanche*” to the detriment of other government agencies. Although the power of the NSC remained high in other phases pointed out by Rosatti and Scott (2011) after 1981, and remains so until the 21st century, the same level of personal convergence would no longer have been achieved.

But how are these advisers chosen? They are part of the power-strengthening tactic pursued by the presented third way to increase the projection of US power: the formation of a new generation of analysts specializing in international affairs. Such analysts would come from both Washington’s political frameworks and traditional human resource careers, as well as from “outside the system.” This process was responsible for the rise of key names in US politics and strategy from the 1950s, including Zbigniew Brzezinski and Henry Kissinger.

This was a state project not limited to the international area, but extended to the most diverse fields of knowledge, and was called “Cold War University”. This project, as Vaisse (2013) points out, sought to train staff in the academic world, identifying the best brains in various educational institutions, providing government funding for teaching and research. These investments were directed at, but not limited to, top Ivy League universities (such as Harvard, Columbia, and Stanford). At the same time, there was a process of mapping human resources in lesser known universities to attract researchers. In the international field, the US has devoted itself to providing scholarships and project funding, as well as strengthening ideological adherence to the western bloc.

The purpose of this action was to establish a comparative advantage over the Soviet Union (USSR) in the field of reflections and knowledge, making use of alternative power mechanisms such as culture, science and technology, not just warfare. According to Ikenberry (2011), these alternative mechanisms, including the economic agenda, reinforce the liberal character of hegemony. Nye Jr (1990) calls this process institutional and ideological consolidation of power through the well-known concept of soft and co-optive power.

One of the additional tactics of the Cold War University project was the development of area studies. The analysis of specific themes and states was seen as a necessity to increase the efficiency of hegemonic power projection. This implied the creation of specialized study centers and think tanks. As indicated by Vaisse (2013), this was Brzezinski's gateway to the process of interrelation between academy and public power: his role as a USSR specialist in his doctorate at Harvard, an institution in which he was a professor and researcher from 1950 to 1960. His undergraduate and master's degrees had been taken in Canada from 1949 to 1951 at McGill University of Montreal. Subsequently, the US was Brzezinski's final destination, whose personal trajectory included family travels through Nazi Germany and the USSR. These experiences allowed a direct contact with totalitarian societies, which guided his reflections on the nature of authoritarianism and how to combat it.

From Canada to the US, where he was naturalized in 1958, Brzezinski reinforced his capacity as analyst, policymaker and decision maker. His belief in the American political-economic and social system as an example to other nations in regard to democracy and the expansion of freedom, innovation, and force runs through his work. Although in recent decades this perception has been tinged with a sense of decline, he has never ceased to believe in the possibility of reform and rebirth.

At Harvard, Brzezinski developed his analyst profile for the Soviet system at the head of the Russian Research Center and the Center for International Affairs. When he went to Columbia University, from 1962, until 1977, he took part of the Russian Institute and the Research Institute of International Affairs. The 1960s were the beginning of a greater presence in think tanks that would elevate him to more active participation in politics: the Council on Foreign Relations and the Brookings Institution.

From 1966 to 1968, he served as a member of the DOS Planning Council, focusing his participation on issues associated with the USSR.

In 1968, his transition from academia to government was consolidated. The first step was his participation as adviser to Hubert Humphrey's presidential campaign that year. Humphrey was Lyndon Johnson's Vice President, and ended up defeated in his White House dispute by Richard Nixon, of the Republican Party.

This failure represented a frustration in his expectations of rising to the public sphere. At the same time, he brought lessons that were applied to support Carter's election, but paradoxically, he would forget in the day-to-day running of the White House (and that contributed to the failure of the Democratic reelection). Humphrey would not have been able to grasp the prevailing mood of discouragement in the country and to present himself as an alternative. Much of Nixon's victory can be attributed to a context of political and social disruption related to the failure of intervention in Vietnam, the economic crisis, and the impacts of civil, racial and gender rights movements. While Humphrey sought accommodation, Nixon sought to confront the Democratic agenda and reform these trends. In addition, he favored a policy of strength and pride.

In 1976, Carter explored the same tactic: the country remained in crisis as a result of Nixon's troubled withdrawal from power by the Democratic Party (Watergate) espionage scandal associated with prolonged economic shrinkage (breach of the gold-dollar standard, first oil crisis), and offered as a counterpoint. Carter won the election against Republican Gerald Ford, and Brzezinski came to the White House by his side in 1977 as a National Security Adviser, and applied his geopolitical and geoeconomic agenda.

GEOPOLITICS AND GEOECONOMICS OF COLD WAR (1970/1990)

As analyzed, Brzezinski's arrival at the White House and Washington power circles is a product of the Cold War. Systemic conflict between the US and the USSR over the expansion and consolidation of their respective ways of life has polarized the world around two different models, Soviet communism and US capitalism. As an expert in Soviet affairs, Brzezinski benefited from university investments and human resource recruitment processes to serve as a government analyst, and rose to the post of National Security Adviser. Even with his departure from NSC, he remained one of the top advisers to US presidencies, regardless of party.

Such a trajectory became possible because the basis of his thinking extended beyond Soviet studies and introduced a new level of analysis: the relevance of economic and technological power to hegemony. Leadership in these sectors rose to a different level in the 1970s and generated phenomena such as interdependence and globalization. The author thought of geopolitics and geo-economics as different strategic and tactical spaces, not one set to which the same actions applied.

This view was groundbreaking for that context. According to Blackwill and Harris (2016), there is an analytical tendency to consider the terms geopolitics and geo-economics as interchangeable. However, they are not synonymous and should be understood beyond traditional diversity and conceptual fluidity. To analyze Brzezinski's thought, both concepts of geopolitics and geo-economics are distinguished from the following references. Geopolitics

(...) is a method of foreign policy analysis that seeks to understand, explain, and predict international political behavior primarily in terms of geographical variables (...) is really a set of assumptions about how a state exercises power over territory (...) by reference to a host of geographic factors. BLACKWILL and HARRIS, *s/p*, 2016)

In turn, geo-economics is perceived as

"(...) the use of economic instruments to promote and defend national interest and to produce beneficial geopolitical results; and the effects of other nation's economic actions on country's geopolitical goals (...) geo-economics stands as both a method of analysis and a form of statecraft (...) providing a parallel account of how a state builds and exercises power by reference to economic factors. (BLACKWILL and HARRIS, *s/p*, 2016)

THE GREAT GEOPOLITICAL LINES

Evaluating Brzezinski's work from a geopolitical reflection standpoint, we begin with his specialization in Soviet studies in the 1950s and 1960s, followed by analyzes of the United States, Eurasia, and state and transnational phenomena of world politics, as well as the implementation of these agendas during his time at the White House.

A first set of works is composed of individual works such as *The Permanent Purge: Politics in Soviet Totalitarianism* (1956), *The Soviet Bloc: Unity and Conflict* (1960) and *Ideology and Power in Soviet Politics* (1962) and co-authored with Carl Friedrich, *Totalitarian Dictatorship. and Autocracy* (1956), and *Political Power: USA/USSR* (1964) with Samuel Huntington. The focus is an examination of the Soviet system, from its historical evolution and its political, economic, social and strategic characteristics.

We add to them a second set⁶ with more practical and far-reaching insight into the Cold War and US strategies and tactics such as *Between Two Ages: America's Role in the Technetronic Era* (1970), *Power and principle: Memoirs of the National Security Adviser, 1977-1981* (1983), *Game Plan: A Geostrategic Framework for the Conduct of the U.S.-Soviet Contest.* (1986) and *The Grand Failure: The Birth and Death of Communism in the Twentieth Century.* (1989). The latter two works focus on bilateral US and USSR relations, both historically and tactically and, in addition, present a set of political-strategic scenarios that eventually materialized: the defeat of USSR, Eurasian instability and Asian rise.

We observe that the core of thought in the US-USSR-Eurasia tripod is repeated and subsequently influenced his perception of the post-Cold War as it will be analyzed. The author identifies that the USSR, and its antecedents of pre-communist empire of 1917, and after the Revolution, has an authoritarian character. This character derives from undemocratic practices in social and political relations, due to the centralization of the state and the personalization of leaderships, starting with Lenin and deepening with Stalin. The liberation of social forces was contrary to the maintenance of the state and should be contained. By suppressing human nature, the Soviet system was led to the degeneration of creativity and popular force and to decline.

Another source of decline, externally grounded, refers to the imperialist nature of the regime. In order to maintain oppression, the regime developed military forces that become, over time, its only power projection capacity. With this, and because of its inability to renew and modernize, the Soviet system had to seek its survival and legitimation through the conquest of the peoples who oppose its model.

⁶ Other works are: *Africa and the Communist World* (1964), *Alternative to partition: for a broader conception of America's role in Europe* (1965) e *The Fragile Blossom: Crisis and Change in Japan* (1972).

Expansion was focused on the USSR's natural geographical space, Eurasia, a strategic region for mastering world geopolitics, as defined by Mackinder's classical analysis (MELLO, 1999). By imposition, the USSR became a multinational empire, which allowed it to control an extensive land mass. However, the combination of these contradictory factors, imperial enlargement and state centralization, combined with ideological dissemination and the limitation of individual freedoms, brought the source of the Soviet self-destruction "oligarchic petrification, militant fundamentalism and political disintegration" were some of the terms used by BRZEZINSKI, 1970, p. 156).

But even though considering this process to be inevitable, Brzezinski argues that the US could no just wait for it, as there was a real contradiction between the two powers. USSR control of Eurasia would doubly represent a historic failure and a risk for the Americans and all nations that adopt democratic regimes, as it would allow that country to oppress its opponents, with countless resources. It should be US policy not only to contain Soviet advances, but to develop mechanisms for totally overcoming it. After all,

the American-Soviet confrontation is not a temporary aberration, but a historical rivalry that will continue to exist for a long time... But it is more than a merely national conflict. It is also a struggle between two imperial systems (...) for nothing less than global dominance (...) clash between an oceanic with a continental power. (BRZEZINSKI, 1986, p. 9, p. 16 e p. 20)

These assessments cannot be taken from those of diplomat George Kennan in the immediate post-1945 (KENNAN, 1946 and X, 1947). There is a continuity line in these agendas, stemming from the policy of containment since its launch by Democratic President Harry Truman in 1947. The central problem will always be the same because

The one who controlled Eurasia would rule the world. If the Soviet Union captured the peripheries of this continental mass - Western Europe, the Far East and South Asia - it would not only gain huge human, economic and military resources, but also access to geostrategic passages to the western hemisphere - the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans (BRZEZINSKI, 1986, p. 31-32)

Because of being a maritime power, the US began its policy in Eurasia at a disadvantage: the country had “few possibilities for deep defense and no withdrawal position” (BRZEZINSKI, 1986, p. 61). This made it necessary to expand its actions through partnerships with linchpin states on three strategic fronts: Western Europe (extending to Eastern Europe), the Far East and the Southwest of the USSR. This last region corresponds to Central Asia, the Middle East and North Africa, the “Arc of Crisis”.

The regions within the “Arc of Crisis” represented strong zones of vulnerability for the USSR, but also for the US, as their political fragmentation and economic fragility raised the risk of being absorbed by the Soviet system. Partnerships with key states in this region should be developed as a way of facilitating US projection into this geopolitical space away from the influence of Moscow. A more decisive presence in the “Arc of Crisis” was essential to contain the USSR. A public perception prevailed that the country was “losing” the Cold War to the USSR. The correlation of forces between the superpowers would be unfavorable to the US because of the Soviet presence in the Third World: it was necessary to contain this presence and promote the reversal of communism (regime change)⁷.

For the Middle East, the priority was stabilization, seeking a definitive solution to the problem of Israel’s insertion and the reaffirmation of US leadership to the oil-producing countries. In the case of North Africa and Central Asia, the main objective was the containment and retreat of the Soviet Union.

Concerning the other fronts, Western Europe and the Far East, the tactics combined advances in US power, allied co-optation and containment of the USSR, with the identification of an essential pivot to be engaged in the US sphere: China. While Western Europe and Japan (this within the Far East) were already under the US hegemony, and functioned as barriers to Soviet advancement, China followed a peculiar path: pressured by its difficulties of internal modernization and the risk of Soviet interference and international isolation, the country showed signs of autonomy to Moscow and a rapprochement interest with the US to strengthen itself politically, economically and strategically.

Although communist, China did not share the same characteristics as the Soviet regime, and the opportunity for Sino-

⁷ The idea of rollback was not new and was previously implemented under the administration of both Dwight Eisenhower (1953/1961), and John F. Kennedy’s (1961/1963).

American rapprochement was not missed in Washington. The process of resuming bilateral relations was initiated in 1969 by the government of Richard Nixon, led by Henry Kissinger, and resulted in the building of a solid partnership and principles such as the One China Policy. This policy states that the US only recognizes the People's Republic of China (PRC or Mainland China) as the only China, relinquishing its preferential relationship with Taiwan (Nationalist China), which had prevailed since 1949 after the Communist Revolution. The standardization process was completed in 1979 under the Carter-Brzezinski management. In the words of Brzezinski,

China will join the front ranks of world powers and in this way will claim its previous status for itself. In the process (...) it will redefine the substance of its communism... The ideological dilution will be the price of such success. Modern China may enter the 21st century still ruled by communism, but it will not be a communized China. (BRZEZINSKI, 1989, p. 194)

The continuity of Nixon-Kissinger's actions is not restricted to China, but extends to the Middle East. In both cases, the negotiations were started by the Republican administration and ended by the Democrat. In the Middle East, the Israel-Egypt negotiation process was consolidated in 1979, and the Camp David Agreement enshrined the formula "land for peace" based on the logic of mutual recognition of the right to sovereignty: Israel's right to exist, conditioned on the return of Israeli-occupied territories during the 1948 war cycle after the founding of the Israeli state⁸.

This stance of engagement was replaced in 1979 by more incisive action, due to the Iranian Revolution and the Afghanistan War (1979/1985). Such a stance became known as the Carter Doctrine (1980), according to which

An attempt by any outside force to gain control of the Persian Gulf region will be regarded as an assault on the vital interests of the United States of America, and such an assault will be repelled by any means

⁸ Since then the Oslo Accords have been rapidly dismantling, and the regional situation has deteriorated by a combination of internal tensions, terrorist attacks, external interference (Iraq wars in 1991 and 2003, Afghanistan war in 2001, Libya intervention in 2011) and local instabilities such as the Arab Spring, the rise of the Islamic State and the civil war in Syria. For an overview of the Middle East see VISENTINI, 2014.

necessary, including military force. (...)We've helped to strengthen NATO and our other alliances and recently we (...) decided to develop and to deploy modernized, intermediate-range nuclear forces to meet an unwarranted and increased threat from the nuclear weapons of the Soviet Union. We are working with our allies to prevent conflict in the Middle East. The peace treaty between Egypt and Israel is a notable achievement which represents a strategic asset (...) which also enhances prospects for regional and world peace". (CARTER, 1980, s/p)

This speech of force was not able to convey to the public the necessary security of Carter's foreign policy and Brzezinski's decisions. In Iran, the fundamentalist revolution brought Ayatollah Khomeini to power, toppling the secular government of Shah Reza Pahlevi, an American ally. In addition to the loss of this strategic pivot, the US faced the hostage crisis at its embassy, which lasted for 444 days (and involved the ransom payment following a failed military withdrawal operation). This crisis contributed to the defeat of Ronald Reagan. Another theme explored by Republicans was the invasion of Afghanistan by Soviet forces, perceived as proof that the Cold War was still being "won" by the USSR.

In this country, the policy was to support the anti-Soviet forces, represented by the Taliban, despite being Islamic fundamentalists. The association between the US and bin Laden, future leader of al-Qaeda and this resistance, would be born during this period. Subsequently, the US would break with the Taliban and bin Laden would become responsible for the 9/11/2001 terrorist attacks. The policy of supporting the Taliban has been replicated in other regions of the world, particularly Central America, and was defined as support for freedom fighters in the Reagan administration, ie anti-Soviet forces.

But what about the other actions implemented during 1977-1981 at the head of NSC? Firstly, it should be noted that these actions were successful in many respects, but obscured by the crises of Iran and Afghanistan between 1979/1980. As Skidmore (1993/1994) pointed out, one of the main problems of Carter's administration was its inability to build a positive impression on the public and to defend its foreign policy. As many of its components were innovative (particularly in geoeconomics) and gradually applied (as in the case of Western-Eastern Europe, China's engagement and the defense of human rights), the impression was a setback

because the results were not apparent. What became apparent were only the Soviet advances and new enemies such as the Islamic fundamentalists.

Second, while there was a unit of positions between the White House and the NSC, the same was not true of other foreign policy agencies such as DOS, which was headed by Secretary of State Cyrus Vance. Vance disagreed with Brzezinski's policies, who implemented them unilaterally with Carter's support, and these cracks reinforced the impression of government fragility. Finally, as Skidmore maintains, there was a detachment between these external actions and domestic politics, as the economy continued to have high unemployment and low growth compared to Western Europe and Japan, coupled with the second oil crisis of 1979. Thus, there was a profound crisis of legitimacy.

Many aspects that contributed to the end of the Cold War in 1989 were unknown to public opinion. Noteworthy were the exploitation of soft power mechanisms to break the unity of the Soviet regime from inside: these included economic aid to political opposition groups in the country and in Eastern Europe, including the financing of cultural projects such as "Radio Liberty" and "Radio Free Europe". These policies were called "Pacific Engagements," and were associated with more well-known measures such as bilateral negotiations for nuclear arms cutting, the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT) and increased investment in NATO.

The human rights promotion, supported by the Helsinki Agreement (1975), was also part of the agenda. In Helsinki, multidimensional negotiations were established between the USSR and Western European countries, with support from the US, aimed at strengthening principles of scientific and technological cooperation, collaboration on humanitarian issues, enhancing citizens' right to come and go, and liberalization of borders among others. In addition to human rights, the so-called "planetary issues" were on the agenda, such as the environment (BRZEZINSKI, 1971, p. 71).

The human rights policy and its association with conditionalities for nations to obtain loans, the US support, among others, were extended to the Third World. The aim of these actions was to promote democracy-building mechanisms and lead to the "regime change" of the southern nations through a system of political and economic pressures and incentives. In a 1986 text, the White House's strategies and tactics for winning the Cold War were clearly systematized in this passage by Brzezinski,

1) Accelerate the emergence of a more self-reliant Western Europe and eventually a Europe recovered from its postwar division; 2) Promote an informal strategic triangle in the Far East through broader economic and political cooperation between the United States, Japan, and China; 3) To support southwest Asia by politically and militarily strengthening the southern neighbors of the Soviet Union; and 4) Supporting internal pressure in the Eastern European States under Soviet rule and even within the USSR itself for greater tolerance and political diversity. (BRZEZINSKI, 1986, p. 213).

The convergence between the author's geopolitical and geo-economic thinking and the American doctrine of power projection are systematized in the following chart.

Strategic Front	Tactic recommendation – Policy Formulation	Decision making and implementation
Western Europe	Encourages regional self-sufficiency; economic recovery and strategic consolidation	Defense Force Modernization (NATO); Troop Repositioning; Strategic Match
Eastern Europe	Internal pressures; Human Rights Defense and Political Opening Pacific Engagement	Pacific Engagement
Far East	Strategic Triangle US-Japan-China	Normalization of relations with China; Strengthening Capitalism in Japan
Southwest of the USSR (Arc of Crisis - Africa, Asia and the Middle East - Third World)	Fortalecimento Político e Reforço Militar Promoção dos Direitos Humanos	Israel-Egypt Peace Process (“Land For Peace”); Carter Doctrine; Political-strategic intervention/interference; Communism reversal
Latin America	Human rights and economic development North-South relations update	Negociações e Cronograma Devolução do Canal do Panama; Political-strategic intervention/interference
Globalization and interdependence	Scientific and Technological Revolution (RCT) Develop and Explore Comparative Advantages – US	Trilateral Commission; Economic (Commercial and Financial) Conditions applied to Southern Nations; Southern Nations Engagement to Capitalist Sphere – US; Isolation of Communist World

Based on BRZEZINSKI, 1971, BRZEZINSKI, 1983, BRZEZINSKI, 1986, BRZEZINSKI, 1989, ROTHKOPF, 2013.

GEOECONOMIC AGENDAS

While the lines of Brzezinski's geopolitical thinking differ little from the classical traditions, his geoeconomic thinking established a new tradition in US strategy, updated to the new reconfiguration trends of the international system, with an emphasis on economic power. In the 1970s, these trends were represented by the emergence of globalization and interdependence phenomena, which indicate the existence of a more politically, economically and socially integrated world.

These phenomena were driven by various events: the emergence of the Third World and the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) in the 1950s and 60s, the demand for the development of these nations and the creation of a "new economic international economic order" (NIEO) and the third industrial revolution, the Scientific and Technological Revolution (STR). The consolidation of the Southern political force was fundamental in the 1970s and needed to be incorporated into the agenda.

This context generated an international system that no longer relied solely on US-USSR bipolarity in the East-West; there was also a complementary split in the North-South. The existence of the South, and the power asymmetries between these nations and the developed ones, was perceived as a new component of the Cold War. The deteriorating economic conditions in the South (accelerated by the STR) affected its geopolitical prospects and accentuated its instability and potential for attraction to the Soviet model (and religion-linked fundamentalist social models to promote equality and justice). The US should include in its agenda supportive policies for Southern nations, using economic pressure mechanisms (conditionalities) to co-opt and adapt them to its liberal model, for

The international system is changing from a system designed to promote interstate peace to a system also designed to promote intrastate progress; from a system designed to make possible greater global economic productivity to a system also designed to enhance greater economic equity (...) The new nations are particularly sensitive about it. Yet it is also these nations that are especially insistent that the international system increasingly shift the focus of its concern from a preoccupation with the preservation of peace to a greater concern with the promotion of global development, especially in order

to obviate the existing inequalities in the material conditions of humanity. To accomplish that objective, closer cooperation among nations, and a measure of interference in the internal affairs of some by others, will almost be inevitable". (BRZEZINSKI, 1975, s/p)

On the other hand, this liberal model should be strengthened and modernized to remain superior, both in terms of the US internal dimension and globally. To this end, the creation of the Trilateral Commission represented an innovation in the partnership between developed capitalist nations and was created in 1973 by the initiative of the American millionaire David Rockefeller. The goal was to establish a non-governmental body, with influential names from the private economic sector, academia, the state, and civil society, to discuss economic and social issues. Brzezinski chaired the still-active think tank between 1973 and 1976, a period that marks his approach to Carter as already mentioned above. The main members were the US, Japan, and Western Europe, reinforcing capitalist tripolarity. Rockefeller led the creation of another similar body, the Club of Rome (Assman, Chomsky, Santos, 1979).

Brzezinski worked geoeconomics on two levels: North-South relations and North-North relations. Strengthening the North-North axis was essential for maintaining South supremacy and blocking efforts to build a NIEO through South-South coalitions such as the G-77 and NAM, as well as maintaining USSR isolation in the world economy. An additional objective was to allow the US to contain the advance of Western Europe and Japan. The US had a strong comparative advantage and should exploit it from its leadership in the RCT, which Brzezinski called the "technetronic revolution". At the same time, this was a fragile leadership because of its domestic problems.

Brzezinski in the 1970s became one of the first authors to identify signs of American decline. In *Between Two Ages: America's Role in the Technetronic Era* (1970) the author draws attention to themes of declining theses (represented by KENNEDY, 1990): social complacency, hedonism, consumerism, racism, xenophobia, dysfunctional and polarized politics between conservatives and liberals. In his words, "The age of volatile belief is closely linked to the impact of the technetronic revolution on existing ideologies and conceptions of life." (BRZEZINSKI 1970) At that moment, the author considers himself as an optimist: "I firmly believe that this society has the capacity, the talent, the wealth, and increasingly,

the will to overcome the difficulties inherent in the historical transition.” (BRZEZINSKI, 1971, p. 16).

This optimism and the validation of its policies in the geoeconomic and geopolitical sectors seemed to have been achieved in 1989 when the Cold War ended with the predominance of the North American model. The containment strategy, however, would also have appreciable effects on the United States, which would give America the profile of being the (...) the first (...) only (...) global superpower (...) the very last “(BRZEZINSKI, 1997, s/p).

POST COLD WAR: THE END OF THE AMERICAN DREAM? (1900/2017)

The Fall of the Berlin Wall brought to light a series of paradoxical and contradictory analyzes of the future of the international order. On the one hand, the triumphalist interpretations of authors such as Francis Fukuyama and his end of history (1989) predominated; on the other, the catastrophic analyzes of disorder and conflict, summarized in Samuel Huntington’s Clash of Civilizations (1993) emerged. Brzezinski distanced himself from this media appeal of simplistic assumptions that heralded the closure of bipolarity as the unchallenged prevalence of the liberal model and the end of ideologies or exacerbated the open confrontation between ‘us and them’ (the West and the rest). There was a continual process of reordering the balance of world power, in which the United States retained its power capacities but faced serious problems.

A continuity of thought prevails that is not affected by the conjuncture of the 1990s or the events of the 21st century such as 9/11/2001. All these phenomena are considered part of the transformations generated by the post-Cold War, since the main lines of international politics remain in geopolitics and geoeconomics: the dispute for Eurasia and the preservation of the US political, economic social and strategic power. However, such big lines are fragmented by moving trends: the acceleration of China’s growth, the repositioning of the Third World, the European, Japanese and Russian fragility, and especially the US crisis.

These reflections have been systematized in five books, which can be divided into two blocks: the first in the 1990s, analytical content focused on the transition from the Cold War to the post-Cold War, *Out of Control* (1993), *The Grand Chessboard: American primacy and the geostrategic*

imperatives (1997) and Geostrategic Triad (2001); and a second block in the 21st century *The Choice: Global Domination or Global Leadership* (2004), *Second Chance: Three Presidents and the Crisis of American Superpower* (2007) and *Strategic Vision* (2012)⁹.

The most representative works of each block, which synthesize them, are respectively *Grand Chessboard* and *Strategic Vision*. The first bloc assesses the immediate impacts of the end of the USSR on the future of Eurasia, and the ways in which the US must act in a new scenario of power vacuum and reorganization of the geopolitical forces of the former "Arc of Crisis", renamed into "Eurasian Balkans". If once the enemy was the USSR, in the post-Cold War the greatest risk is the strategic void filled with fragmentation forces, sustained by the instrumentalization of religion and opposition to the West. Ideological and cultural polarizations are grounded in the context of exclusion from globalization (to which he had already warned) in the Third World, and extend to the internal borders of countries.

The US and the European Union (EU) need to play a more decisive role in the Eurasian space in order to contain these instability trends in the space of the former USSR. China should be an object of attention, not changing a basic condition of geopolitics (extending to geoeconomics), the focus remained on Eurasia.

"For America, the chief geopolitical prize is Eurasia (...) Now a non-Eurasian power is preeminent in Eurasia—and America's global primacy is directly dependent on how long and how effectively its preponderance (...) is sustained (...) Eurasia is thus the chessboard on which the struggle for global primacy continues to be played." (BRZEZINSKI, 1997, s/p)

The second block emerges in the light of a darker America affected by terrorist attacks¹⁰, fragmented and socially polarized. In *The Choice*, the questioning of the title - global domination, or leadership - points to the failure of the hegemonic project as was built in the Cold

⁹ David Ignatius interview with Brzezinski and Brent Scowcroft was published in 2008 under the title *America and the World: Conversations on the Future of American Foreign Policy*.

¹⁰ When questioned for his "indirect responsibility" on 9/11, since bin Laden's actions had been tolerated in Afghanistan against the USSR, Brzezinski rejected the criticism, highlighting the differences between the periods and historical issues involved. See GATTI, 2013.

War. This failure brings with it an imperial dynamic that clashes with its democratic tradition and its soft co-optation mechanisms. According to the author, George W. Bush's presidential choices (2001/2008) reinforced isolation, consumed resources and were inefficient.

The economic crisis of 2008, which hit the central economies, the basis of the 1970's trilateral was a reflection of these trends of excessive spending, deregulation and excessive consumerism. An internal crisis prevails and, externally, there is an unstable balance of power. This opens room for rising trends in Third World powers such as China, India and Brazil, leading to a multipolar power deconcentration.

Similar issues extend to Second Chance, and reach a broader level in Strategic Vision. Common to all works are questions about the nature and effectiveness of the Global War on Terror (GWT) initiated by W. Bush in 2001 and military operations in Afghanistan (2001/2014) and Iraq (2003/2011). Although he had reservations about the Afghanistan conflict, the author saw it as necessary as a response to the 9/11 aggression. The war in Iraq, and the preventive Bush Doctrine that guided it, were, for Brzezinski, the country's main mistake and strategic failure in the conduct of its hegemony, and the costs of this "war of choice" reflect internally and externally. In a Washington Post article, this stance can be clearly seen

There is a right and a wrong way for America to wage war. Obviously, if it is attacked, America must respond with all its might. The same is true if an ally is attacked. But the issue becomes much more complex if a threat, but not an attack, is involved. America must then consider carefully the consequences of its actions, both for itself as the world's preeminent power and for the longer-term evolution of the international system as a whole. The United States may have to go to war to oust Saddam Hussein from power in Iraq (...) But war is too serious a business and too unpredictable in its dynamic consequences -- especially in a highly flammable region -- to be undertaken because of a personal peeve, demagogically articulated fears or vague factual assertions. (BRZEZINSKI, 2002, s/p).

For

These two wars had one common trait: they were expeditionary military operations in hostile territories. In both cases, the Bush administration showed little

regard for the complex cultural settings, deeply rooted ethnic rivalries generating conflicts within conflicts, dangerously unsettled neighborhoods (...) and the unresolved territorial disputes (...)" (BRZEZINSKI, 2012, p. 67)

The "wrong way" to wage war is a reflection of a misguided assessment by President Bush and the neoconservatives of the international scenario, the fight against terrorism, the resources of power, and the role of the United States. The neoconservative rise, whose origins date from the Reagan era, led to greater internal political polarization, a religious missionary sentiment, and valued a militaristic, unilateral and unipolar perspective. Such a perspective, symbolic of the neoconservative agenda (COOPER, 2011, TEIXEIRA, 2007) does not match the main geopolitical and geoeconomic flows and is inefficient to sustain stability. The rise of the Islamic State, the outbreak of the Arab Spring in the region and economic tensions are just some byproducts of these actions. And

"The consequences were a dramatic decline in America's global standing in contrast to the last decade of the twentieth century, a progressive delegitimation of (...) presidential and (...) national credibility, and a significant reduction in the self-identification of America's allies with America's security." (BRZEZINSKI, 2012, p. 70)

Strategic Vision (2012) can be considered the synthesis of these critiques, assessments and scenario projections. In the text, the author resumes the policies of W. Bush, presents a diagnosis of the world, of America and makes suggestions for the action of Barack Obama's Democratic presidency (2009/2016). Brzezinski points to the decline of the West and the United States as a benchmark, and the absence of countries that can occupy the US global leadership post, including China.

While recognizing China's exponential growth and repositioning, it considers that its geoeconomic advances are insufficient to ensure the construction of a new alternative world order to the US. However, he does not discard the possibility that the "American dream" of prosperity, inclusion and consumption could be replaced by a "Chinese dream". The same dilemma, strengths and weakness, extend to other emerging powers

such as India, Brazil, and Russia: vulnerabilities outnumber available power resources and make them unable to take the place of the US.

On the other hand, it supports the question about the American capacity to play this role. The issue of decline is very present. Six shortcomings are identified: "(...) national debt, flawed financial system, widening social inequality, decaying infrastructure, public ignorance and gridlocked politics". (BRZEZINSKI, 2012, p. 55) Even with positive points, such as "(...) overall economic strength, innovative potential, demographic dynamics, reactive mobilization, geographic base and democratic appeal." (BRZEZINSKI, 2012, p. 55), the situation is difficult.

The result is a permanent crisis: the world will be "By 2025, not Chinese but chaotic" (BRZEZINSKI, 2012, p. 75). Given this scenario, he indicated corrective paths, and some political recommendations were incorporated by Obama.

Chief among the recommendations is the need for domestic reform, without which the foundations of US power would continue to erode. Obama partially met this goal by promoting economic recovery, restoring social policies in education and health, and advocating national reconciliation. The success was partial, as the process was not able to be homogeneous or inclusive. Faced with the effects of the economic crisis of 2008, some sectors such as the automobile and steelmakers failed to recover effectively, increasing the feeling of exclusion. This sentiment spurred the advance of conservatism, populism, nationalism, and xenophobia epitomized in the rise of Trump¹¹.

In the external field, the proposals were also partially incorporated, mainly with reference to China and East Asia. In the region, he advocated a double movement towards China: containment and engagement, to promote "A stable and cooperative new East" (BRZEZINSKI, 2012, p. 155). Engagement could be achieved through a new trilateral and updating of capitalist arrangements to the Chinese model, and containment to reorganization of the Chinese surroundings, with the strengthening of Japan and South Korea. One effect was the creation of the Transpacific Partnership. (TPP), consisting of the increase of military ties and the repositioning of troops in Asia (with the increase of actions in the South China Sea)¹² and the free trade agreement, consolidated

¹¹ See COLGAN and KEOHANE, 2017.

¹² The region is in territorial dispute and is a strategic crossing zone. See PINOTTI, 2015.

from 2015 (remembering that it was suspended by Trump in January 2017 immediately after his inauguration).

The West's position needed to be revitalized from the Atlantic axis, with the strengthening of the US-EU alliance. The issue was addressed by Obama with the modernization of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the opening of secret negotiations in 2013 for a US-EU bilateral free trade agreement, the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership Agreement (TTIP). These negotiations have also been suspended. Another point, the creation of a "vital and larger West" (BRZEZINSKI, 2012, p. 132), is more controversial, proposing the inclusion of Russia and Turkey and a "new west" to contain the "new east".

Russia is a threat because of its weakness, which risks revisionism, the power vacuum and its co-optation by the Chinese system. This co-optation takes place through agreements such as the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, bilateral energy negotiations and part of the One Belt, One Road (OBOR) project, which brings together from Eurasian nations to southern Africa. Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), established in 2001, comprises (until November 2017) Eurasian pivot countries, as defined since the 1970s: Russia, China, Tajikistan, Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, India and Pakistan (as well as observers such as Iran, Afghanistan, Mongolia and Belarus). The New Silk Road occupies a similar space in Eurasia, advancing to southern Africa through infrastructure projects and energy exploration. Given this Brzezinski scenario, argues that

(...) to respond effectively in both the western and eastern parts of Eurasia, America must adopt a dual role. It must be the promoter and guarantor of greater unity in the West, and it must be the balancer and conciliator between the major powers in the East." (BRZEZINSKI, 2012, p. 185)

If Obama has taken steps to achieve these advocated goals, Trump deconstructed such efforts. At no time, until his death, Brzezinski failed to criticize Republican management, considering the existence of a strong mismatch between the world and the US. The consequences of this period, however, will be the object of analysis of new strategists.

CONCLUSIONS

The contemporaneity of Brzezinski's reflections goes beyond time limits that attempt to restrict his work to the evaluation of his actions in the White House. The fluidity of the US decision-making system, the formation and co-optation of clever brains in academia, and their transition to government during the Cold War, are the product of a specific era and a society that sought the best means to achieve its goals. Subsequently, these persons continued to operate in this system and their influence marked the development of US strategic agendas for more than five decades.

Geopolitical and geo-economic diagnoses about the nature and projection of US power, the characteristics of the Soviet system, the pivot Eurasian states, the rise of China and the European and Asian capitalist powers, the emergence and consolidation of the Third World, and the North-South splits, addressed in the text, indicate a permanent capacity to understand the past, the present and to project the future. The important thing was to innovate and make choices, always with the same goal: to strengthen, preserve and expand US hegemony, focusing on multidimensional and up-to-date power mechanisms to underpin the liberal-democratic regime.

The central question that Brzezinski posed in the last decade was whether these geopolitical and geo-economic scenarios and recommendations still resonated with policymakers and decision makers. With the exception of Barack Obama's government and initiatives such as TPP and TTIP and the growing military and economic presence in Asia, the former National Security Adviser's response was "no". There was no US adequate perception about the phenomena regarding contemporary international organizations associated with the transformation of Eurasia, beginning with China and its renewed alliance with Russia, or the social, strategic and economic shrinkage of the country and its major allies EU and Japan.

This has generated a high degree of inefficiency, both in politics and economics, which reached its peak in the Bush administration, and which Obama sought to reformulate. For Brzezinski, this strategic stagnation was not the product of 9/11/2001 alone, but part of the neoconservative conception of international relations, tied to the concept of unipolarity and military projection as the main instrument of power. The creation of new commands such as the United States Africa Command (US AFRICOM),

the United States European Command (USEUCOM) and NATO updates, the US Southern Command (SOUTHCOM) and the US Pacific Command (USPACOM) and US Central Command (USCENTCOM), focusing on the South Atlantic, Sino-Russian-Indian surroundings, on MSCh and Eurasian, Afghanistan and Iraq military operations reflect this dynamic.

In this equation is lacking a balance between geopolitics and geoeconomics, associated with a dysfunctional domestic policy regarding public spending, economic reforms and social polarization. Increasing military investment and interventionism have had an adverse effect: they erode US power without impeding the advance of adversaries or stabilizing priority regions. In contrast, emerging nations such as China focus on alternative forms of projection, starting from economic expansion, which has become linked to mechanisms for increasing strategic power. The post-Soviet Eurasian and surroundings vacuum, added to Africa and South America, came to be occupied not by the US, but by China.

However, Obama could slow without stopping this process, by reinforcing the Eurasian regional powers' restraint mechanisms: OBOR project referral by China and the US's inability to provide positive economic signals to allies demonstrate ongoing difficulties. According to Blackwill and Harris (2016), there is a mismatch between the geoeconomic and geopolitical agendas, with a stress on the latter. The geopolitical view is also outdated, not understanding the speed and multidimensionality of Chinese expansion, which is an assessment similar to Brzezinski's.

Deepening the US crisis, the election of Donald Trump in 2016 initiated a process of rapid deconstruction of these initiatives, which may have medium and long term results. As mentioned, some of Trump's first actions were the suspension of projects and negotiations by the Asian and transatlantic pivots, added, until the close of 2017, to the lack of a strategic doctrine. In such a context Brzezinski's strategic reflections risk becoming only a subject of readings and debates, with no practical application.

It is paradoxical to think that in a scenario such as the one envisioned by Trump, in which immigrants are seen as enemies, a person like Brzezinski might never have been an active member of the university and government (or perhaps he might never have been allowed to immigrate). Nonetheless, amidst the 21st century trends of power deconcentration, multipolarity, crisis, and fragmentation, reading Brzezinski remains a necessity and a learning experience to policymakers as well as decision makers in the strategic arena.

GEOPOLÍTICA E GEOECONOMIA: HISTÓRIA E ATUALIDADE NO PENSAMENTO DE ZBIGNIEW BRZEZINSKI

RESUMO

A hegemonia dos Estados Unidos, estabelecida em 1945, foi construída ao longo das décadas com base em concepções geopolíticas e geoconômicas e com a contribuição de diferentes pensadores. O objetivo deste artigo é avaliar a natureza e as origens do pensamento de um destes pensadores, Zbigniew Brzezinski, e suas contribuições e impactos na área de estudos estratégicos, com base em suas obras e em sua atuação à frente do Conselho de Segurança Nacional nos Estados Unidos e como consultor da Casa Branca. O texto está dividido em três partes, além da Introdução e as Considerações Finais: um estudo sobre as décadas de 1950 e 1970, com foco na atuação inicial de Brzezinski como acadêmico e a interrelação de sua ascensão como analista e estrategista à Guerra Fria e as particularidades do sistema político norte-americano, o pensamento geopolítico e geoconômico na bipolaridade e, por fim, o pós-Guerra Fria.

Keywords: Geopolítica. Geoeconomia. Estados Unidos. Zbigniew Brzezinski.

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