

Political Traits of Brazil-Russia Relations: How have Developments in Ukraine during the 2000s affected their partnership?

Raquel dos Santos¹
Valdir da Silva Bezerra²

ABSTRACT

The diplomatic interactions between Brazil, Russia, and Ukraine have assumed increased relevance in the context of the Ukrainian War, justifying a more accurate analysis of its dynamics, development, and change. Primarily after February 2022, Brazilian diplomacy has been characterized by a certain neutrality regarding the conflict in Ukraine, causing disappointment in the West and seemingly appeasing Moscow's sensibilities. This paper evaluates the main political effects on Brazil-Russia relations caused by the Ukrainian War and two other relevant events during the 2000s, namely the 2004 Orange Revolution and the 2014 Euromaidan. By analyzing these events, we aim to answer the question: 'How did important geopolitical developments in Ukraine affect Brazil's relationship with Russia over time?' We consider this topic underexamined in today's academia and studies on the geopolitics of Brazil, one of the foremost leaders of the so-called 'Global South.' Brazil's neutrality during the Ukrainian War offers a valuable case study on the geopolitical balance of middle powers in the contemporary world. Furthermore, analyzing the relationship between Brazil and Russia, founding members of the BRICS, will deepen our understanding of how the current global changes affect our country's interstate diplomacy.

Keywords: Brazilian Foreign Policy, Russian Foreign Policy, Ukraine War, Geopolitics, Eastern Europe.

1 PhD and Master in Strategic Studies from the Fluminense Federal University (Rio de Janeiro) and Bachelor in History from the Federal University of Rio de Janeiro. Associate Professor at the Institute of Strategic Studies of the Fluminense Federal University. Member of the NEXUS Laboratory on Security and Development in Global Politics at the Fluminense Federal University, Rio de Janeiro - RJ, Brazil. Email: (raqueldos@id.uff.br - ORCID 0000-0003-2235-7628).

2 Master in International Relations from the Saint Petersburg State University (Russia). Researcher at the BRICS Study Center of the University of São Paulo (GEBRICS-USP). Author of the book *A Link with the Past: Putin's Russia and the Post-Soviet Space* (1st ed. – Curitiba: Appris, 2023). Email: (sb1.valdir@gmail.com – ORCID 0000-0001-6488-478X).

INTRODUCTION

Relations between Brazil and Ukraine were consolidated soon after the Cold War ended. Brazil recognized Ukraine's independence on December 26, 1991, shortly after the collapse of the Soviet Union. Three years later, President Itamar Franco signed a decree establishing the Brazilian Embassy in Kyiv. In 1995, Ukraine reciprocated the gesture by opening an embassy in Brasília and appointing Ambassador Olexander Nykomenko as its representative in our country.

During the 1990s, Brazil's approach toward Ukraine was based on several key factors, such as Ukraine's strategic regional importance—being the second-largest territory and population in the post-Soviet space—as well as the influence of the Ukrainian community in South America and in Brazil itself. Given this context, in the early 2000s, Brazil intensified its relations with Ukraine through scientific cooperation, particularly in the space sector.³

Also in the 2000s, Russia began to gain considerable importance in Brazilian foreign policy. At the turn of the century, both countries established a strategic partnership with an emphasis on political dialogue, economic development, science, technology, and cultural exchanges. Over time, this partnership deepened further, especially after the formation of BRIC in 2009—a group that advocated for multipolarity in global affairs and for the reform of multilateral global governance institutions such as the United Nations, the World Bank, and the IMF.

In light of this, the present article aims to assess whether—and how—the (geo)political situation in Ukraine during the 2000s affected the relationship between Brazil and Russia. To this end, the text focuses on three major events that have significantly changed and shaped the international landscape since then: the Orange Revolution of 2004, the Ukrainian political crisis of 2014, and the ongoing war in Ukraine that began in 2022.

The Orange Revolution of 2004 and Space Cooperation Between

3 The relations between Brazil and Ukraine were consolidated as soon as the Cold War ended. Brazil recognized Ukraine's independence on December 26, 1991, shortly after the Soviet Union collapsed. Three years later, President Itamar Franco signed a decree establishing the Embassy of Brazil in Kyiv. In 1995, Ukraine reciprocated the gesture by establishing an embassy in Brasília and appointing Ambassador Olexander Nykomenko as its representative in our country.

Brazil and Ukraine

The so-called “Orange Revolution” in Ukraine consisted of widespread protests triggered by suspicions of fraud in the 2004 presidential election, which had brought Viktor Yanukovich—a pro-Russian candidate—to victory. After the results were announced, Yanukovich and his team faced intense pressure from the Ukrainian opposition, the press, and various Western leaders, all of whom questioned the legitimacy of the electoral process, deeming it fraudulent. A new round of elections was held, and Viktor Yushchenko, seen as a pro-Western candidate, ultimately won the contest.

Based on an analysis of documents issued by the U.S. Congress at the time, the United States was highly concerned about the Ukrainian presidential election and hoped for the victory of a “liberal” candidate (Tsvetkova & Yarygin, 2015). For the West, Yushchenko was indeed the most promising political choice. He supported Ukraine’s integration into the European Union (EU) and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), two structures geopolitically aligned with Western values. As a result of the Orange Revolution, Ukraine was included in the “European Neighbourhood Policy” (ENP) in 2005, a foreign policy framework established by the EU to strengthen relations with its eastern and southern neighbors.

In Moscow, the Orange Revolution was seen as a movement sponsored by foreign actors—especially the United States—aimed at weakening Russia’s influence in the post-Soviet space (Achcar, 2023). It was considered part of a so-called “hybrid war,” which Russian authorities believed to be a Western political weapon used to destabilize pro-Moscow regional governments through non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and social media (Alves; Macedo; Roahny, 2023).

Notably, about a year before the Revolution, Brazil’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs sent a telegram to the Brazilian Embassy in Kyiv containing critical commentary on the forces at play in Ukraine’s internal politics. The telegram referenced the views of then-Ukrainian Deputy Foreign Minister Oleksandr Chalyi, who stated on January 7, 2003, that “the United States was using foreign policy tools to force internal changes in Ukraine,” and predicted that within ten years [i.e., by 2013], Ukraine would be well-positioned to integrate into the EU (Ministério das Relações Exteriores,

2003)⁴. Chalyi's observation—that the United States was using foreign policy instruments to induce political changes in Ukraine—is highly relevant for understanding the complex relationship between Ukraine and Russia since then.

In any case, Brazilian diplomacy did not publicly comment at the time on the controversies of the Orange Revolution, possibly considering it a domestic Ukrainian matter. Brazil, then led by Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva (Lula), was more focused on positioning the country as a key actor in the Global South⁵, seeking to strengthen cooperation with both Ukraine and Russia. A testament to this is Lula's visit to Moscow in 2005, which resulted in a joint declaration containing several important points.

Figure 1 – The Presidents of Brazil, Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva, and Russia, Vladimir Putin, during a meeting in Moscow, 2005.



Source: Agência Brasil (2005)

Among these were the promise to intensify and diversify the bilateral trade agenda, which at the time totaled approximately 2.1 billion dollars; the willingness to establish a partnership in the aviation sector,

4 The period mentioned by Chalyi [around 2013] coincides with the moment when the Ukrainian population rose up against the government for not signing the association agreement with the EU, triggering the Euromaidan.

5 By “Global South,” meaning those developing nations marked by significant social inequality and that experienced periods of colonization by European powers in the past.

including the possibility of installing an Embraer assembly line on Russian soil; Brazil's support for Russia's accession to the World Trade Organization (WTO); and advances in the bilateral "technological alliance," including cooperation for the modernization of Brazil's Satellite Launch Vehicle (VLS-1) (ITAMARATY, 2005).

Also in 2005, Brazil ratified the treaty signed with Ukraine on "Long-Term Cooperation in the Use of the Cyclone-4 Launch Vehicle at the Alcântara Launch Center," a binational space project that would later be named Alcântara Cyclone Space (ACS), aimed at launching Ukrainian satellites from the Alcântara base in northeastern Brazil (BRASIL, 2005). The partnership with Ukraine combined Brazil's⁶ advantageous geographic position with the Eastern European country's expertise in space technology, embodied in its Cyclone-4 rocket. For Kyiv, the project offered an opportunity to redirect its rocket technology toward commercial purposes, while also strengthening ties with an emerging country from the Global South.

However, Russia was quick to express its concerns about this space partnership. In 2006, during the third round of negotiations on the Mutual Technology Protection Agreement, representatives of the Russian government voiced disapproval of Brazil's cooperation with Ukraine (PESSOA, 2007, p. 172). The argument was that Ukraine depended on Russian technology for its space industry, making it a dependent country in this sector. Russia was one of Ukraine's contractors within the ACS project; moreover, Ukrainian cosmodromes themselves involved participation from Russian companies, such as the *Konstruktorskoye Byuro Transportnogo Mashinostroyeniya* (Design Bureau for Transport Engineering), responsible for creating launch complexes for Cyclone-type vehicles. In addition, the first-stage engines of Ukrainian rockets were developed by the Russian company *Energomash*, and Russia also supplied fuel components (PIIA HOBOCTИ, 2008).

Indeed, Russia had built significant historical ties with Ukraine's aerospace industry, which had been an integral part of the Soviet space program since the 1950s. Therefore, after the dissolution of the Soviet Union, Ukraine inherited certain space technology capabilities but not full independence in this sector. All these factors meant that the state of political relations between Russia and Ukraine affected the ACS project in

6 The Alcântara Launch Center, located near the equator, provides an ideal and cost-effective site for rocket launches due to the reduced fuel required to place satellites into orbit.

its early years. After all, the first launch of the Cyclone-4 from the Alcântara base had been scheduled for 2006; however, the ongoing political crises in Ukraine—due in part to the Orange Revolution—temporarily halted the project’s funding by Kyiv (РІА НОВОСТИ, 2008).

In a sense, the Brazil–Ukraine partnership in the space sector demonstrated Ukraine’s ability to establish strategic alliances outside Moscow’s orbit, while also highlighting the potential of Brazil’s multivector foreign policy during the early years of President Lula’s administration. In the early 2000s, the diplomacy led by Lula and his Foreign Minister Celso Amorim aimed to diversify the country’s international partnerships, making Brazil less dependent on the traditional centers of power—namely, the United States and Western Europe. In any case, the space cooperation with Ukraine did not harm Brazil’s relationship with Putin’s Russia, despite Moscow’s clear disapproval of the ACS project.

The 2014 Ukrainian Crisis and the Principle of Brazilian Neutrality

At the end of 2013, when Ukrainian President Viktor Yanukovich (the same who had lost the 2004 election to Yushchenko) decided to suspend the process of signing an Association Agreement with the EU, protests broke out in the capital, Kyiv, led by students, opposition figures, and nationalist groups. The turbulent—and increasingly violent—unfolding of events in the capital ultimately forced Yanukovich to resign from the presidency and flee to Russia shortly afterward, while a new government was established in Kyiv. For Russia, the change of government in Kyiv following the so-called Euromaidan in Ukraine represented a coup d’état sponsored by the United States to overthrow a pro-Russian leader in Ukraine (ALVES; MACEDO; ROAHNY, 2023), similar to what had happened during the Orange Revolution of 2004.

Once again, the Kremlin felt it was the victim of a “hybrid war,” carried out through coordinated actions by opposition networks, the media, and NGOs that exploited Ukraine’s economic and social crisis to overthrow a legitimate government (ALVES; MACEDO; ROAHNY, 2023). Amid the crisis, Putin and the Kremlin leadership began to claim that Russian populations in eastern Ukraine—more specifically in the Donbas Basin, composed of the republics of Luhansk and Donetsk—as well as in Crimea, were being targeted by ultranationalist forces. Based on this

argument, Russia annexed the Crimean Peninsula in March 2014, following a popular referendum that was widely contested from the standpoint of international law. As a result, the United States, Canada, the European Union, and other Western-aligned countries imposed economic sanctions on Russia as a way to punish Putin and his administration.

Brazil, then under the presidency of Dilma Rousseff, did not recognize Crimea as part of Russia, but also did not impose sanctions on Moscow. Brazil's first reaction to the annexation came in a statement by Foreign Minister Luiz Alberto Figueiredo during a visit to France; Figueiredo avoided directly condemning Moscow for the events, echoing a note issued by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs after the ousting of President Yanukovich (MENEZES, 2018). The note expressed the Brazilian government's concern "with the deterioration of the political and institutional situation in Ukraine," adding that the political crisis in that country "should be addressed by the Ukrainians themselves, peacefully and with respect for institutions and human rights" (MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS, 2014).

During the United Nations General Assembly on March 27, 2014, Brazil abstained from voting on Resolution A/68/262, which addressed the 'Territorial Integrity of Ukraine,' a document urging Russia to respect the principles of sovereignty and political independence of states, while denouncing the Crimean referendum as illegal (UNITED NATIONS, 2014; SANTOS, 2024). Brazil's abstention at the United Nations demonstrated the country's reluctance to compromise its bilateral relations with Russia. At the time, Antônio de Aguiar Patriota, Brazil's representative at the UN, called for a peaceful resolution to the conflict, urging the parties involved to engage in dialogue. Furthermore, Patriota stated that Brazil was closely monitoring the situation in Ukraine, with which the country had "close bilateral ties" through its cooperation "in the field of space technology" (MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS, 2014).

Meanwhile, the Ukrainian ambassador in Brasília, Rotyslav Tronenko, in an article published in *Folha de São Paulo*, urged Brazil not to remain silent in the face of Russia's "act of aggression" (TRONENKO, 2014). The German newspaper DW published an article titled "Tied to Russia and the BRICS, Brazil remains silent on the Crimea crisis," arguing that Brazil's Ministry of Foreign Affairs avoided following the West in its condemnation of Moscow over the Ukraine crisis (CAULY, 2014). In fact, in July 2014, Brazil would host Russian President Vladimir Putin

for the BRICS Summit in Fortaleza, where the defense of multipolarity in international relations, the need for reforms in multilateral global governance institutions, and the plan to create a development bank led by the five member states of the group—the New Development Bank—were reaffirmed.

In addressing the Ukraine crisis, the Fortaleza declaration only emphasized the need for comprehensive dialogue and the reduction of tensions by the parties involved in the conflict (BRICS, 2014), a language considered by many to be vague and even conciliatory toward Russia. As a result, both Brazilian and international media criticized Brazil's stance on the 2014 Ukrainian crisis. One such example was the newspaper *Estado de São Paulo*, which published an article titled "Crisis in Kyiv puts Brazilian diplomacy in a conflicting position: Ukraine provides Brazil with know-how to manufacture and launch rockets from the Alcântara Base, while Russia is a BRICS partner" (ESTADÃO, 2014). However, in 2015, the Brazilian government denounced the Space Cooperation Treaty with Ukraine, citing fiscal constraints and the lack of viable market opportunities for satellite launches; this move, a year after Euromaidan, symbolized the relative distancing between Brazil and Ukraine and the end of a dream of technological cooperation in the space sector (SANTOS, 2024).

Brazilian diplomats decided to adopt a softer stance toward Moscow, which differed from that of the West. On the other hand, the crisis negatively affected relations between Brazil and Ukraine. The growing tensions between Ukraine and Russia further complicated the ACS project, which the Brazilian government officially ended in 2015.

The 2022 Ukraine War and Brazil's Attempt at 'Equidistance'

In 2021, Ukraine was led by a young political figure, Volodymyr Zelensky, a former comedian whose 2019 presidential campaign had promised peace for the country, offering a solution to the situation in the Donbas Basin, where Russian-backed separatist militias were demanding autonomy for the regions of Donetsk and Luhansk. From Russia's perspective, since 2014, Ukraine had been seen as a 'platform' used by the West to undermine Moscow's security interests in the post-Soviet space. This perception led Putin and other Kremlin officials to initiate negotiations with European leaders in late 2021 and early 2022 over the inadmissibility

of Ukraine's possible accession to NATO, which represented a 'red line' in Moscow's interpretation.

The West insisted on NATO's so-called "open-door policy," while Russia wanted Ukraine kept away from the Atlantic Alliance—something the United States and Europe were unwilling to concede. Faced with this stalemate, in the early hours of February 24, 2022, Putin launched his 'special military operation,' authorizing Russian troops to invade Ukraine under the justification of defending the populations of Luhansk and Donetsk from the "unjustified aggression of the Ukrainian army" (PUTIN, 2022; our translation).

Russia's invasion of Ukraine was widely condemned internationally, bypassing Security Council authorization and prompting emergency meetings at the United Nations General Assembly. On March 2, 2022, the resolution titled 'Aggression against Ukraine' called for the immediate end of the conflict and the withdrawal of Russian troops from Ukrainian territory. Brazil and 140 other countries voted in favor of the resolution. Five countries voted against it (Russia, Belarus, North Korea, Syria, and Eritrea), and 35—including China, India, South Africa, Cuba, and Kazakhstan—abstained (UN NEWS, 2022).

International institutions such as the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund ceased cooperation with Russia, refusing to approve new loans or halting ongoing projects in the country (WORLD BANK, 2022). At the same time, the United States and its Western allies imposed harsh economic sanctions on Russia, excluding the country from the international interbank payment system SWIFT and placing restrictions on European imports of Russian oil and gas. Simultaneously, the United States became the main financier and supplier of military aid to Ukraine, which only further exacerbated the Kremlin's fears regarding Washington's geopolitical aspirations in Europe⁷.

At the UN General Assembly (UNGA), most countries of the so-called Global South did not confront or condemn Russia as directly as the Western nations did. Instead, many chose a neutral stance toward the war. On March 2, 2022, regarding the resolution on 'aggression against Ukraine,' 40 countries either voted against it or abstained, including China, India, South Africa, Cuba, Kazakhstan, and others (UN NEWS, 2022).

7 For Putin and the rest of the Russian leadership, the post-Cold War expansion of NATO eastward marked the United States' attempt to consolidate a unipolar world under its dominance.

Indeed, the war in Ukraine once again put Brazil's relationship with Russia⁸ to the test, with the country attempting to balance its diplomatic position between Western condemnations of Moscow and Russia's justifications for initiating the conflict. Then-President Jair Bolsonaro opted for a cautious approach, considering Brazil's dependence on Russian fertilizers, which are essential for the national agribusiness sector. Bolsonaro attempted to distance himself from the conflict, even suggesting at the UN the establishment of an immediate ceasefire and negotiations between the parties (BOLSONARO, 2022). Under his administration, the 2019 BRICS Summit in Brasília did not even mention Ukraine in its final declaration.

In 2023, when Lula returned to office as president, Brazil's cautious stance persisted. According to Foreign Minister Mauro Vieira, Lula's foreign policy would not automatically align with either side [the West or Russia], being guided solely by national interests within the framework of multilateralism and international law (VIEIRA, 2023). However, despite this so-called "pragmatic equidistance," some developments gave rise to the perception that Brazil showed a certain preference toward Russia. One such example was the visit of Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov to Brazil in April 2023.

On that occasion, Lula and Mauro Vieira took the opportunity to reaffirm Brazil's position of neutrality, emphasizing their desire to form a "peace club" to mediate negotiations between Russia and Ukraine (MELLO, 2023). Later that same month, during a trip to China, President Lula agreed with Beijing's proposals for initiating peace talks between Russia and Ukraine. China's proposal, supported by Brazil, included respect for the territorial integrity of states (a point in Ukraine's favor), the prevention of the strengthening and expansion of military blocs (a point in Russia's favor, as it clearly alludes to NATO)⁹, the immediate suspension of sanctions against Moscow, and the facilitation of grain exports through the Black Sea, among other elements (CHINA, 2023). Additionally, Brazil defended "an immediate cessation of hostilities [in Ukraine] and the importance of diplomatic efforts [...] [toward] achieving a peaceful,

8 Moreover, Brazil also suffered the indirect consequences of the conflict, such as the increase in energy prices and inflation

9 According to the Sino-Brazilian understanding, the West (and, ultimately, the United States) should reject any future NATO expansion plans in Europe, which clearly excludes the possibility of Ukraine becoming a member of the Alliance.

negotiated solution” (MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS, 2023)¹⁰.

Nevertheless, Lula’s government came under pressure from some sectors of the media and key political forces within the country due to its more conciliatory stance toward Russia—unlike the openly condemnatory approach adopted by the West in relation to Putin and his regime. For example, newspapers such as *O Globo* gave space to critiques of Brazil’s participation in BRICS and its partnership with Moscow; some argued that BRICS should be dissolved following Russia’s aggression against Ukraine and that Brazil should openly condemn Vladimir Putin for committing “war crimes” (CHACRA, 2023).

Pressed to hear Ukraine’s side of the conflict, Lula met personally with Zelensky in New York on September 20, 2023. However, Zelensky left the meeting without obtaining the expected support from Lula for Ukraine’s demands regarding a “just peace.” During the meeting with the Ukrainian leader, the Brazilian president remained focused on the need to work toward peace, once again reiterating his intention “to find a group of friendly countries that could come up with a proposal that was neither from one nor the other of the two [countries] at war” (DA SILVA, 2023). Zelensky, however, maintained that a just peace for Ukraine could only be achieved under Kyiv’s proposed terms, as his country was the victim of Russian aggression—highlighting a clear divergence of positions between him and Lula¹¹.

In short, Brazil’s stance aligned with that of other regional powers in the Global South, such as India, Iran, and South Africa, which condemned the war initiated by Moscow but did not join the West in its attempt to diplomatically isolate Russia. This attempt, described as a “political mistake” (O GLOBO, 2022) by Lula’s special advisor for international affairs, Celso Amorim, reflects Brazil’s intention to play a possible mediating role between Russia and Ukraine—even if the country appears not to be as “equidistant” as it claims, especially when it comes to the future expansion of NATO in Europe, including to Ukraine. On the other hand, Ukraine’s President Zelensky and other Ukrainian diplomats have criticized Brazil for its leniency toward Russia. At the same time, Brazil has also expressed criticism toward certain aspects of Western-

10 In 2022, trade between Brazil and Russia even reached a historic record of 9.8 billion [dollars].

11 It is important to remember that, months before the meeting with Zelensky, the United States and Germany were unable to convince Lula to provide weapons and ammunition to Kyiv.

dominated multilateral governance institutions, such as the World Bank and the IMF. This is why the country values its participation in groups like BRICS, which advocate the need to reform these organizations, thereby reducing the Western monopoly on global decision-making and promoting a multipolar world order.

CONCLUSION

Recently, Brazilian diplomacy has decided to adopt a softer stance toward Russia, distinguishing itself from the openly condemnatory approach practiced by the West, especially after the 2014 Euromaidan and the outbreak of the war in Ukraine in 2022. On one hand, the growing tensions between Kyiv and Moscow throughout the 21st century, particularly after the Orange Revolution of 2004, have tested the Russian-Brazilian relationship, which is considered strategically important by Itamaraty. In fact, the successive political crises in Ukraine were not enough to harm Brazil's relationship with Russia, neither in 2014 nor in 2022. This outcome can be explained by a series of factors, including the partnership within the BRICS, the common goal of establishing a multipolar world order, and, not least, Brazil's commercial interests, as the Brazilian agribusiness depends significantly on Russian fertilizers to survive.

With the outbreak of the war in Ukraine in 2022, Brazil – compared to the West – maintained a relatively more conciliatory stance toward Russia, not adopting the Western rhetoric and sanctions against Moscow, which Brazilian diplomacy considered to be 'counterproductive' and a 'strategic mistake.' Still, Brazil did not refrain from condemning the Russian invasion of Ukraine both at the UN and in other multilateral forums, adhering to constitutional principles of respect for sovereignty and territorial integrity of states. In summary, Brazil's intention to maintain a certain 'equidistance' from both conflicting sides appears to reveal a strategy of diversification and autonomy in foreign policy, which, although well-intentioned, has encountered difficulties in adjusting to the expectations of the West and the sensitivities of Russia.

REFERENCES

ACHCAR, Gilbert. **The New Cold War: The United States, Russia, and China from Kosovo to Ukraine**. Chicago: Haymarket Books, 2023.

ADDRESS by the President of the Russian Federation. **President of Russia Vladimir Putin**: citizens of Russia, friends. Moscow, 24 fev. 2022. Disponível em: <http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/67843>. Acesso em: 26 mar. 2025.

ALVES, Benno Warken; MACEDO, Bruno Vieira de; ROAHNY, Lucas. Preparando-se para a guerra híbrida: uma análise das ações russas de enfrentamento a revoluções coloridas e interferência externa. **Conjuntura Austral**, Porto Alegre, v. 14, n. 66, p. 87–102, 2023. ISSN: 2178-8839. <https://doi.org/10.22456/2178-8839.130300>.

BOLSONARO, Jair. Discurso do Presidente da República, Jair Bolsonaro, na “Abertura do Debate Geral da 7ª Sessão da Assembleia Geral das Nações Unidas - AGNU”. [S. l: s. n.], 2022. Disponível em: <http://www.biblioteca.presidencia.gov.br/presidencia/ex-presidentes/bolsonaro/discursos/discurso-do-presidente-da-republica-jair-bolsonaro-na-abertura-do-debate-geral-da-77a-sessao-da-assembleia-geral-das-nacoes-unidas-agnu> Acesso em: 2 mai. 2024.

BRASIL. Arquivo Geral do Ministério das Relações Exteriores. . Destinatário: Embaixada do Brasil em Kyiv. Brasília, 7 jan. 2003. 1 telegrama.

BRASIL. Decreto nº 8.494, de 24 de julho de 2015. Torna pública a denúncia pela República Federativa do Brasil do tratado entre a República Federativa do Brasil e a Ucrânia sobre cooperação de longo prazo no uso do veículo lançador Cyclone-4 no Centro de Lançamento de Alcântara, assinado em Brasília em 21 de outubro de 2003. Brasília: 2015. Disponível em: <https://www.gov.br/aeb/pt-br/programa-espacial-brasileiro/cooperacao-internacional/documentos-ucrania/decreto-no-8494.pdf> Acesso em: 2 jun. 2024.

BRASIL. Decreto nº 5.436, de 28 de abril de 2005. Promulga o Tratado entre

a República Federativa do Brasil e a Ucrânia sobre Cooperação de Longo Prazo na Utilização do Veículo de Lançamentos Cyclone-4 no Centro de Lançamento de Alcântara, assinado em Brasília, em 21 de outubro de 2003. Brasília: 2005. Disponível em: https://www.planalto.gov.br/ccivil_03/_ato2004-2006/2005/decreto/d5436.htm Acesso em: 24 mar. 2025.

CAULYT, Fernando. Ligado a Rússia e BRICS, Brasil silencia sobre crise na Crimeia. **DW**, [s. l.], 20 mar. 2014. Disponível em: <https://www.dw.com/pt-br/ligadoa-r%C3%BAssia-e-brics-brasil-silencia-sobre-crise-n-a-crimea/a-17511516>. Acesso em: 2 jul. 2024.

CHACRA, Gustavo Cerello. O que Lula fará com o BRICS?. **O Globo**, 9 jan. 2023. Disponível em: <https://oglobo.globo.com/blogs/guga-chacra/coluna/2023/01/o-que-lula-fara-com-o-brics.ghtml>. Acesso em: 19 mar. 2025.

CHINA'S Position on the Political Settlement of the Ukraine Crisis. **Ministry of Foreign Affairs The People's Republic of China**, Beijing, 24 fev. 2023. Disponível em: https://www.mfa.gov.cn/eng/zy/gb/202405/t20240531_11367485.html. Acesso em: 26 mar. 2025.

DECLARAÇÃO conjunta sobre os resultados das conversações oficiais entre o Presidente da República Federativa do Brasil Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva e o Presidente da Federação da Rússia, Vladimir V. Putin. **Secretaria de Estado das Relações Exteriores**. Moscou, 18 out. 2005. Disponível em: <https://aplicacao.itamaraty.gov.br/ApiConcordia/Documento/download/7184>. Acesso em: 26 mar. 2025.

GENERAL Assembly Overwhelmingly Adopts Resolution Demanding Russian Federation Immediately End Illegal Use of Force in Ukraine, Withdraw All Troops. **United Nations**, [S. l.], 2 mar. 2022. Disponível em: <https://press.un.org/en/2022/ga12407.doc.htm>. Acesso em: 4 jul. 2024.

IGLESIAS, Simone; BECK, Martha. Sanções dos EUA à Rússia são um erro, diz Celso Amorim. **O Globo**, 5 ago. 2022. Disponível em: <https://oglobo.globo.com/mundo/noticia/2022/08/sancoes-dos-eua-a-russia-sao-um-erro-diz-celso-amorim.ghtml>. Acesso em: 2 abr. 2024.

MELLO, Patrícia Campos. Lula vai apresentar a Biden ideia de “clube da paz”. **Folha de São Paulo**, São Paulo, 8 fev. 2023. Disponível em: <https://www1.folha.uol.com.br/mundo/2023/02/lula-vai-apresentar-a-biden-ideia-de-clube-dapaz-para-ucrania-com-participacao-da-china.shtml>. Acesso em: 4 nov. 2024.

MENEZES, Gustavo Oliveira Teles de. O Brasil e as questões do Kosovo e da Crimeia. **Revista NEIBA - Cadernos Argentina-Brasil**, Rio de Janeiro, v. 7, n.1, p. 1-19, 2018. ISSN 2317-3459.

MISSAGIA, Raquel dos Santos. **Análise em dois níveis da cooperação espacial entre Brasil e Ucrânia (1995-2015):** ou sonhos de uma noite de verão na política internacional. 2023. 287 f. Tese (Doutorado em Estudos Estratégicos) - Universidade Federal Fluminense, Instituto de Estudos Estratégicos, Niterói, 2023.

PESSÔA, Maria Teresa Mesquita. **A cooperação Brasil - Ucrânia nos Usos Pacíficos do Espaço Exterior:** A binacional Alcântara Cyclone Space. Curso de Altos Estudos. Brasília: IRBr, 2007.

ROSTYSLAV Tronenko: a farsa da independência da Crimeia. **Folha de São Paulo**, São Paulo, 19 mar. 2014. Disponível em: <https://www1.folha.uol.com.br/paywall/login.shtml?https://www1.folha.uol.com.br/opiniao/2014/03/1427493-rostyslav-tronenko-a-farsa-da-independencia-da-crimea.shtml>. Acesso em: 4 jan. 2025.

SANT'ANNA Lourival. Crise em Kiev deixa diplomacia brasileira em posição conflitante. **Lourival Sant'anna repórter e analista internacional**, [S. l.], 25 fev. 2014. Disponível em: <https://www.lourivalsantanna.com/paises/europa/ucrania/crise-em-kiev-deixa-diplomacia-brasileira-em-posicao-conflitante/>. Acesso em: 2 ago. 2024.

SERGUNIN, Alexander. **Teorizando o BRICS:** Perspectivas Críticas. In: Aspectos Jurídicos Internacionais do BRICS. Belo Horizonte: Editora D'Plácido, 2019.

SILVA, Luiz Inácio Lula da. Declaração do presidente Lula à imprensa

após reunião bilateral com o presidente da Ucrânia, Volodymyr Zelensky. Ministério das Relações Exteriores: 2023. Disponível em: <https://www.gov.br/mre/pt-br/centrais-de-conteudo/publicacoes/discursos-artigos-een-trevistas/presidente-da-republica/presidente-da-republica-federativado-brasil-entrevistas/luiz-inacio-lula-da-silva-2023-2026/declaracao-dopresidente-lula-a-imprensa-apos-reuniao-bilateral-com-o-presidente-da-ucrania-volodymyr-zelensky> Acesso em: 26 mar. 2025.

SITUAÇÃO na Ucrânia. **Gov.br**, Brasília, 31 out. 2022. Disponível em: https://www.gov.br/mre/pt-br/canais_atendimento/imprensa/notas-a-imprensa/situaca-o-na-ucrania. Acesso em: 2 nov. 2024.

STATEMENT delivered by the Permanent Representative of Brazil to the United Nations, Ambassador Antonio de Aguiar Patriota, at the plenary session of the UN General Assembly on the situation in Ukraine - New York, United States, March 27, 2014. **Gov.br**, Brasília, 27 mar. 2014. Disponível em: <https://www.gov.br/mre/pt-br/centrais-de-conteudo/publicacoes/discursos-artigos-e-e-trevistas/diplomatas/discursos/statement-delivered-by-the-permanent-representative-of-brazil-to-the-united-nations-ambassador-antonio-de-aguiar-patriota-at-the-plenary-session-of-the-un-general-assembly-on-the-situation-in-ukraine-new-york-united-s-tates-march-27-2014>. Acesso em: 2 dez. 2024.

TERRITORIAL integrity of Ukraine: resolution / adopted by the General Assembly. **United Nations Digital Library**, [S. l.], 2014. Disponível em: <https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/767565>. Acesso em: 26 mar. 2025.

VIEIRA, Mauro. Mauro Vieira define a “doutrina Lula” para as relações exteriores. [Entrevista concedida a] Brian Winter. **Americas Quarterly**, Nova Iorque, 23 mar. 2023. Disponível em: <https://www.americasquarterly.org/article/entrevista-chanceler-mauro-vieira-define-a-doutrina-lula-para-as-relacoes-exteriores/>. Acesso em: 19 mar. 2025.

VISITA ao Brasil do Ministro dos Negócios Estrangeiros, Sergey Lavrov. **Gov.br**, Brasília, 14 abr. 2023. Disponível em:

https://www.gov.br/mre/pt-br/canais_atendimento/imprensa/notas-a-imprensa/visita-a-o-brasil-do-ministro-dos-negocios-estrangeiros-da-russia-sergey-lavrov. Acesso em: 2 jan. 2025.

WINTER, Brian. Entrevista: Chanceler Mauro Vieira define a “doutrina Lula” para as relações exteriores. **Americas Quarterly**, Nova Iorque, 23 mar. 2023. Disponível em:

<https://www.americaquarterly.org/article/entrevista-chanceler-mauro-vieira-define-a-doutrina-lula-para-as-relacoes-exteriores/>. Acesso em: 19 mar. 2025.

WORLD Bank Group Statement on Russia and Belarus. **World Bank Group**, Washington, 2 mar. 2022. Disponível em:

<https://www.worldbank.org/en/news/statement/2022/03/02/world-bank-group-statement-on-russia-and-belarus>. Acesso em: 4 dez. 2024.

РОССИЯ вытесняет Украину из бразильского космоса. **РИА НОВОСТИ**, Москва, 15 set. 2008. Disponível em: <https://ria.ru/20080915/151280595.html>. Acesso em: 26 mar. 2025.

ЦВЕТКОВА, Наталья; ЯРЫГИН, Григорий Олегович. Участие Публичной Дипломатии США в Политической Трансформации Украины, 1990-е - 2000-е Годы. Disponível em:

<https://cyberleninka.ru/article/n/uchastie-publichnoy-diplomatii-ssha-v-politicheskoy-transformatsii-ukrainy-1990-e-2000-e-gody>. **Вестник Санкт-Петербургского университета**, сер. 6, вып. 4, с.68-82, 2015.

VI BRICS Summit – Fortaleza Declaration – July 15, 2014. Gov.br, Brasília, 20 ago. 2015. Disponível em:

<https://www.gov.br/mre/en/contact-us/press-area/press-releases/vi-brics-summit-fortaleza-declaration-july-15-2014>. Acesso em: 19 mar. 2025.