Safeguards and nuclear- powered submarines

a model for special procedures on the nuclear fuel cycle

Resumen

This article focuses on the safeguards provided by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and how to apply them to nuclear fuel used by nuclear-powered submarines (SSN) developed by a Non-Nuclear-Weapon State (NNWS). Brazil is developing its own SSN, and Australia – supported by the AUKUS partnership – will also operate an SSN around 2030. Countries such as the Republic of Korea, Iran, and Canada have already shown current or past interest in SSN. In this context, it is worth thinking about models to conciliate the safeguards provided by the IAEA and the development and operation of an SSN by an NNWS. The article presents a model in three steps. Firstly, it focuses on the normative framework of the IAEA on this issue. Secondly, it addresses the methodology and structure of the model. The last section presents the model building for each phase of the nuclear fuel cycle. The research outcome was the development of  a model, structured following the nuclear fuel cycle, that combines four variables – NNWS interests, proliferation risks, safeguards, and possible key points of application of safeguards. This methodological approach makes the model unique and points out a future pathway of
negotiation between the IAEA and an NNWS with an SSN program.